Brinson v. School Dist. No. 431

• Decision Date: 25 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 48428,48428
• Parties: Elva G. BRINSON, Petitioner, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT # 431, Respondent, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 602

576 P.2d 602

223 Kan. 465

Elva G. BRINSON, Petitioner, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT # 431, Respondent, Appellant.

No. 48428.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Feb. 25, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The right to an appeal in this state is neither a vested nor constitutional right, but is strictly statutory in nature. It may be limited by the legislature to any class or classes of cases, or in any manner, or it may be withdrawn completely. It lies within the legislative domain to determine from what orders or judgments an appeal may be taken.

2. Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over the official acts of administrative officials or boards except where the legislature has made some statutory provision for judicial review.

3. In the absence of a statutory provision for appellate review of an administrative decision no appeal is available but relief from illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable acts of public officials and boards can be obtained by using such equitable remedies as quo warranto, mandamus, or injunction.

4. The review of a decision by an administrative board as authorized by K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101 (a ) is limited to decisions of administrative boards that exercise quasi-judicial functions. This omnibus statute authorizes review only if no special statute authorizes an appeal.

5. Under the decisions of this court the scope of review provided by the legislature in K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ) does not authorize a district court to try the issues decided by an administrative agency de novo.

6. In reviewing a decision of an administrative agency or tribunal under authority of K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ) a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency or tribunal; it is limited to deciding whether: (1) The agency or tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; (2) the administrative order is substantially supported by evidence; and (3) the tribunal's action was within the scope of its authority.

7. A teacher's contract of employment extended by reason of the provisions of the continuing contract law (K.S.A. 72-5410, et seq.) nevertheless may be terminated by mutual assent of the teacher and the school board.

8. The record on review from a decision of the Court of Appeals is examined and it is held : (1) The district court utilized a scope of review not authorized by K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ); (2) there was substantial evidence before the board to support its finding that a teacher's continuing contract had been terminated by mutual assent; and (3) the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the district court's judgment is affirmed.

Christopher Randall, of Turner, Hensley & Boisseau, Chartered, Great Bend, argued the cause, and Raymond L. Dahlberg, of the same firm, Great Bend, and Jerry L. Griffith, Hoisington, were with him on the brief for the appellant.

Tom Kelley, of Dreiling, Bieker & Kelley, Hays, argued the cause, and Thomas L. Toepfer, of the same firm, Hays, was with him on the brief of appellee and cross-appellant.

FROMME, Justice:

Elva G. Brinson, a school teacher employed in the Hoisington school system, was terminated by the school board in June, 1974. She filed her grievance in accordance with the established grievance procedure of the school district. The board after holding a grievance hearing refused to reinstate her. She then appealed to the district court under authority of K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ) (now K.S.A. 60-2101(d )). The district court heard the matter de novo, it refused to reinstate the teacher but it held she had been improperly terminated and ordered the district to pay her a year's salary less certain sums in mitigation of damages.

On appeal the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed June 17, 1977, reversed the judgment of the district court. The Court of Appeals held the district court exceeded the scope of review authorized by K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ) when it heard the matter de novo. The Court of Appeals found there was substantial evidence to support the decision of the board and that the board had not acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. It reversed the judgment of the district court. We agree with its decision.

The case is before this court on a petition filed by Elva G. Brinson for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At the outset it should be noted that the grievance procedure followed by the teacher and the board in this matter is not that provided for in K.S.A.1977 Supp. 72-5436, et seq. The latter statute did not originally come into being until July 1, 1974. However, no question is raised concerning the sufficiency of the grievance procedure established by the school district and followed by the parties in this case. The procedure followed is referred to in the record as the "Employees' Grievance Procedure according to Board Policy # 9-9 of the Hoisington U.S.D. 431 Board of Education Policy Handbook."

On review in this court Elva G. Brinson urges three reasons for reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, she contends the proper scope of review in the district court was a trial de novo in the strict legal sense; second, the district court properly held the school board acted arbitrarily since there was no substantial evidence to support its decision; and third, she contends the Court of Appeals' opinion is inconsistent with the continuing contract law, K.S.A. 72-5410, et seq.

In support of her first argument Mrs. Brinson cites various cases decided in this court or in the Court of Appeals. None of the cases cited covers an appeal under authority of K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ). We will discuss these cases later but first it is well to review some of the basic decisions of this court on the scope of review in the courts, and it should be kept in mind that this state has no general administrative procedure act governing review of administrative orders.

The right to an appeal in this state is neither a vested nor constitutional right, but is strictly statutory in nature. It may be limited by the legislature to any class or classes of cases, or in any manner, or it may be withdrawn completely. It lies within the legislative domain to determine from what orders or judgments an appeal may be taken. (In re Waterman, 212 Kan. 826, 830, 512 P.2d 466; State v. Burnett, 222 Kan. 162, 166, 563 P.2d 451.) Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over the official acts of administrative officials or boards except where the legislature has made some statutory provision for judicial review. (In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 140 Kan. 465, 467, 37 P.2d 7; City of Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 187 Kan. 701, 703, 360 P.2d 29.) In the absence of a statutory provision for appellate review of an administrative decision no appeal is available but relief from illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable acts of public officials and boards can be obtained by using such equitable remedies as quo warranto, mandamus, or injunctions. (State ex rel. v. Unified School District, 218 Kan. 47, 50, 542 P.2d 664.)

In this state the legislature has provided an omnibus statute authorizing appeals to the district court from orders of any tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-judicial functions. This authorization at the time of the present appeal was K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ), now K.S.A. 60-2101(d ). As in the case of all general statutes 60-2101(a ), now (d ), does not apply to appeals where a special statute has been provided by the legislature. Examples of special appeal statutes affecting decisions of administrative boards may be found in K.S.A. 8-259, 65-504, 44-1011, 65-2848, and 44-556. The scope of review provided by the legislature under any appeal statute depends upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in each particular statute and as interpreted by this court. See Lira v. Billings, 196 Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13; Rydd v. State Board of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 451 P.2d 239; Stephens v. Unified School District, 218 Kan. 220, 546 P.2d 197; Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828, 28 A.L.R.3d 472; Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966.

There is no special statute to cover appeals from orders of a school board. So in the present case we must look to the omnibus statute, K.S.A.1974 Supp. 60-2101(a ). This statute provided:

"A judgment rendered or final order made by a court or any other tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, may be reversed, vacated or modified by the district court. . . . The clerk shall thereupon docket the same as an action in the district court, which court shall then proceed to review the same, either with or without additional pleadings and evidence, and enter such order or judgment as justice shall require. . . . When an action is filed in the district court on appeal or removal from an inferior court the jurisdiction of the district court shall not be limited to only such matters as were within the jurisdiction of the lower court, and the district court may by order permit the issues to be enlarged in the same manner and to the same extent as if the action had been originally commenced in the district court." (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be noted the last sentence in the statute which we have emphasized applies to inferior courts and not to administrative agencies. In construing this statute for the purpose of determining the scope of review of administrative orders authorized by the legislature we note the provision limiting the review to orders of boards exercising quasi-judicial functions. This reference is an acknowledgment of the separation of powers doctrine. This doctrine is explained in Rydd v. State Board of Health, supra:

"By reason of the constitutional inhibition known as the separation of powers doctrine, the...