Briscoe Ranches, Inc. v. Eagle Pass Ind. Sch. Dist., 14757

• Decision Date: 29 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 14757,14757
• Citation: 439 S.W.2d 118
• Parties: BRISCOE RANCHES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. EAGLE PASS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees. . San Antonio
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 118

439 S.W.2d 118

BRISCOE RANCHES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. EAGLE PASS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.

No. 14757.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

San Antonio.

Jan. 29, 1969.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 1969.

Clements, Knight, Weiss & Spencer, Theo F . Weiss, Edward R. Finck, San Antonio, Petry & Fitzpatrick, Carrizo Springs, for appellants.

Hume & Hume, David Hume, Eagle Pass, Lavern D. Harris, Kerrville, for appellees.

BARROW, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling an application for a temporary injunction. Appellants, who are owners of rural property in appellee School District, filed suit on September 9, 1968, seeking injunctive relief from an allegedly arbitrary and discriminatory plan of taxation by said District, its Tax Assessor-Collector, the Board of Equalization and the Trustees of said District.

A temporary restraining order was granted without notice, restraining and enjoining said officials, pending the hearing for temporary injunction, from making up, examining or approving general tax rolls for the District, using values set by the Board of Equalization, from assessing, or attempting to assess any taxes on appellants' properties based upon the valuations set by said Board, and from collecting or attempting to collect taxes on appellants' properties based on these valuations. The hearing on the application for temporary injunction began September 18, 1968, and testimony was heard during a five-day period. At the conclusion of appellants' evidence, which consisted primarily of testimony by a member of the Board of Equalization, the Secretary of the Board of Trustees, who was ex-officio secretary of the Board of Equalization, the Tax Assessor-Collector, and several appellants, the trial court sustained appellees' oral motion for judgment which was based on several theories, denied appellants' application for a temporary injunction, and dissolved the temporary restraining order. Thereafter, appellees proceeded with their statutory duties and at the time of oral argument in this Court on January 8, 1969, all of the tax statements had been mailed out and approximately fifty per cent of the total taxes owed the District were paid.

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, in that the acts sought to be enjoined have been performed. It is true that after the restraining order was set aside by the trial court on September 24, 1968, the Board of Equalization approved the tax rolls, and tax bills were prepared on the basis of the tax rate set by the Trustees from the Board of Equalization's total assessed valuation, and sent to all taxpayers. A substantial part of the taxes have now been paid by owners of all types of property in the District. It is, therefore, too late to set aside the scheme or plan of taxation, in that it has now been fully implemented and put in operation. City of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 (1954); Seguin Independent School Dist. v. Blumberg, 402 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). After this appeal was perfected, several of the original appellants voluntarily paid their taxes in full, and the motion to dismiss is not contested as to these parties. ¹ Other appellants have paid only the taxes assessed against their mineral interests and still challenge the assessment against their lands. These appellants, as well as those who have not paid any of their 1968 taxes, are entitled to show that the taxes on their land have been illegally assessed and to secure relief in the event they prevail at the trial on the merits. Whelan v. State, 155 Tex. 14, 282 S.W.2d 378 (1955); State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569 (1954); Skinner Corp. v. Calallen Ind. School Dist., 409 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1966, no writ). Appellees' motion to dismiss is therefore overruled as to these appellants.

Appellants urge that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the temporary injunction because the admissions of appellees and the undisputed evidence establish the Board of Equalization adopted an arbitrary and illegal scheme of assessment of rural property by classifying all rural land in the District into three general classifications and setting one predetermined value to all land in each classification regardless of the uniformity or quality of same. They also urge that the evidence conclusively establishes a calculated plan and design to wilfully omit at least $9,000,000 worth of taxable bank deposits from the tax rolls. It is also asserted that the Board of Equalization did not hear any sworn testimony to justify an increase in the values of the individual land from that established by the rendition of said land by the individual appellants and/or the Tax Assessor-Collector.

Certain well-established rules are applicable to our review of this case. The trial judge is endowed with broad discretion to grant or deny a temporary injunction. It is therefore well settled that the scope of appellate review from such an order is limited to the narrow question of whether the action of the trial judge in granting or denying the temporary injunction constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 163 Tex. 616, 358 S.W.2d 589 (1962); Texas Foundries v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers' Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460 (1952).

Ordinarily, it is not a substitute for, nor does it serve the same purpose as the hearing on the merits. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W.2d 417 (1959); Labbe v. Carr, 369 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The basic complaint of appellants relates to the action of the Board of Equalization in dividing rural land into three general classes and setting a base value to each classification. There is no complaint that appellants were discriminated against in the Board's valuation of their rural property, in fact, the complaint is the converse, all land within a classification was considered of equal value. Nor is there any contention or showing on this appeal that there was any discrimination against rural landowners as opposed to owners of other type property. There was no showing that rural property was assessed at any greater percentage of market value than city property, utilities or minerals. Appellants' complaint boils down to the contention that although all land in the District is obviously not alike, the Board illegally adopted a scheme of valuation which did not allow for the individual differences.

The Constitution and laws of this State require taxing authorities to assess all property on the basis of its reasonable cash market value and require that all taxes be equal and uniform. Art. VIII, § 1, Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St.; Art. 7174, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. It has been recognized that exact uniformity and equality of taxation is an unattainable ideal. Whelan v. State, supra. Nevertheless, the Board of Equalization is charged by law and by oath with the ultimate responsibility of working to such an ideal. Arts. 7211--7212, 7215, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.

Appellee Board of Equalization, sometimes hereinafter referred to as Board, was duly appointed and qualified on June 5, 1968. Prior thereto most of appellants had rendered their property or the Tax Assessor-Collector had rendered same substantially in accordance with the 1967 valuations. Under same, all pasture land was divided into three classes and assessed accordingly: $13.00 per acre for the best land, $9.75 per acre for middle, and $6.50 per acre for poorest...