Brittain v. Industrial Commission Of Ohio

Decision Date20 February 1917
Docket Number15388
Citation115 N.E. 110,95 Ohio St. 391
PartiesBrittain Et Al. v. Industrial Commission Of Ohio
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Court of appeals no authority - To reverse.

A court of appeals is without authority to reverse a judgment of an inferior court on the ground that such judgment is no' sustained by sufficient evidence. unless the judgment of reversal is concurred in by all of the judges of the court.

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The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr Harry Kohn, for plaintiff in error. Mr Edward C. Turner, attorney general; Mr. Eugene Carlin; Mr John C. Price; Mr. Homer E. Johnson, prosecuting attorney and Mr. Charles H. Conley, assistant prosecuting attorney, for defendant in error.

NICHOLS C. J.

The plaintiffs in error are dependents of John H. Brittain, who, it is alleged in the original petition in this case, while engaged in the performance of certain duties as an employe of The G. R. Hopkins Co., of Marion, Ohio, was so injured that he died.

Application for compensation was made in due form to the state industrial commission. The claim was denied, the reason assigned being that the death of said John H. Brittain did not occur while he was in the pursuit or in the course of his regular employment.

The dependents thereupon appealed to the court of common pleas of Marion county. The commission defended, its defense being that the deceased met his death by drowning, or from some other cause unknown, and not from any accident or injury sustained by him while acting in the course of his employment.

The case was tried, resulting in a verdict in favor of the dependents in the sum of $3,825. The trial judge overruled motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict.

Error was prosecuted to the court of appeals of Marion county, where, upon hearing, the judgment of the court of common pleas was reversed for the sole and only reason that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by sufficient evidence.

The journal entry in the court of appeals shows affirmatively that such judgment of reversal was concurred in by two judges of the court and dissented from by one judge thereof.

Error proceedings were thereupon commenced in the supreme court, the dependents coming as a matter of right, since the proceedings had in the court of appeals clearly constituted the case one in which a question arising under the constitution of Ohio was involved.

We have but the one question before the court, and it is here squarely for decision. Some other cases involving indirectly the same question have been brought to the court since the adoption of the new judicial amendment, but other errors have been so associated with the main question that until the instant case was reached the court has lacked the opportunity of passing upon this most important question.

The question is: What power, if any, has the court of appeals to reverse a judgment of the court of common pleas on the sole and only ground that the verdict of the jury on which the judgment was founded was not sustained by sufficient evidence unless the judgment of reversal is concurred in by all the judges of such court?

The constitution by its plain terms expressly denies the right of the court of appeals to reverse a judgment of a lower court on the weight of the evidence, except by the concurrence of all of the judges of the court.

Is there any essential difference between the terms "weight of evidence" and "sufficient evidence?" unless there is, then the court in the instant case has attempted to exercise a power expressly denied it by the constitution.

It is claimed by the plaintiffs in error that these terms are identical in legal meaning and that their employment has always been interchangeable.

Sufficient is defined as "adequate," "enough," "as much as may be necessary." When used in connection with evidence, it certainly implies some evidence. If we speak of one as lacking sufficient clothing to protect him from cold, it is not our meaning that he is entirely destitute of clothing, but rather that he needs more clothing.

There is no possible sense in which the term "sufficient," as associated with the word "evidence," may be used so as to imply that there is an entire lack of evidence. It may be slight and unsatisfactory, or it may only be a little short of the amount required. In either case it may be insufficient, but still it is some.

In a given case if some evidence, however slight, is introduced by a plaintiff in support of his cause of action and tending to prove each and every material element necessary to be proven, then the case must under the state of our law go to the jury.

On the other hand, if there be say four essential and material elements necessary to enable the party to establish his case, and some competent evidence be introduced tending to prove three of these four material elements, but no competent evidence at all tending to prove the fourth of this series of ele- ments, then he has failed at the threshold, and it. is then within the power of the court to direct a verdict of the jury against him.

To illustrate, and using for illustration the instant case, the plaintiffs in error, before recovery could be had, must show:

1. That the employe was injured in the course of his employment.

2. That the injury was not self-inflicted.

3. That the injury resulted in death within the period of two years.

4....

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