Britten v. Updyke, 34
| Decision Date | 13 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 34,J,34 |
| Parties | Gordon W. BRITTEN, Administrator of the Estate of Earl H. Walkey, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clarence UPDYKE, Defendant and Appellee. une Term. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, Jackson, for appellant.
Haskell L. Nichols, Jackson, H. Attix Kinch, Jackson, for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiff appeals from denial of his motion for new trial after a Jackson county jury had rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. The substantial questions presented pertain to claimed errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.
Plaintiff's decedent, Earl Walkey, was killed almost instantaneously in a boating accident which occurred shortly after noon on Saturday, November 6, 1954, in the channel between Moon and Price lakes in Jackson county. The deceased was riding on the left side of the front seat of a 14'6"' motorboat driven by a 65-horsepower inboard motor. He was seated beside a friend named Howard Smith and the defendant, Clarence Updyke, who was driving from the right-hand driver's seat. As the boat was going underneath a low bridge in the channel, deceased's head struck the last two of the beams or stringers which supported the bridge, with such force that he died almost immediately.
Physical facts of the accident showed that the left side of the boat struck the concrete piling, which was on the far side of the bridge, as the boat was emerging from under the bridge and after decedent's head had struck the bridge stringers. The point of impact was at and below the water line, at a point estimated to be 3'8"' to the rear of the seat in which the three men were riding. The markings made by the boat on the piling strongly suggested that the left side of the boat was heeled at least a foot out of the water at the time of impact with the piling.
Plaintiff's theory of the accident was that the defendant driver was intoxicated and that, as he was going under the bridge, he swung the boat in a sharp right turn, causing the left side of the boat to rise out of the water and decedent's head to strike the stringers.
Defendant's theory of the accident was that Walkey stood up while the boat was going under the bridge, and that the force of the blow to his head threw the boat off course.
Both of the other persons in the boat at the time of the accident testified. There were no other eyewitnesses.
Howard Smith related that he and plaintiff's decedent, Earl Walkey, were in a tavern together on the morning in question when a call came inviting them to take a ride in defendant Updyke's motorboat. Updyke sat in the front right-side driver's seat, Walkey sat on the far left front seat, and Smith sat between them. Smith estimated the speed of the boat at about eight to ten miles per hour as it approached the low level bridge from the west, traveling in an easterly direction. He stated that the boat was being driven straight under the bridge's center, between the piers or pilings. He then gave the following testimony in relation to the events leading up to and immediately following the moment of accident:
'A. Well, just as we were coming to the bridge, my hair came blowing in my face, and Earl [decedent] says, 'Well, take this hat.' I told him I didn't need it. And he says, 'Go ahead and wear it.' And just as we got under the bridge, he turned around and started to put it on my head, and that is when he slumped over in my lap.
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Defendant Clarence Updyke's testimony was substantially the same as Howard Smith's in relation to the events leading up to the boat ride, the speed of the boat as it proceeded under the bridge, and its course. Updyke further testified that as he was proceeding under the bridge Smith yelled to him that decedent was hurt. He turned his head and saw decedent's head tilted back, blood rushing from his head and nose. He did not see decedent until after he was hurt, and could not recall any swerving of the boat. He also denied having had any intoxicating drinks prior to or during the boat ride.
Other relevant testimony included a conflict of opinion between a deputy sheriff and a State policeman who reported to the scene of the accident as to defendant Updyke's condition. The deputy testified that he thought defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the State policeman testified that he was not.
Mrs. Walkey testified on the issue of damages and on cross-examination, bearing on the question of her husband's contribution to her support, related a conversation with an acquaintance who expressed regret at her husband's death. She denied responding 'good riddance.' The acquaintance was produced by defendant's counsel as their last witness and testified emphatically that she had, indeed, used just those words applicable to her recently deceased spouse. His testimony was not shaken on cross-examination. This testimony was admitted as bearing on the issue of pecuniary damages, and no issue as to it is brought to us on appeal.
The trial judge reserved decision on a motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant in these words: 'We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty of negligence.' Appellant presents 15 issues for our review on appeal. The first six represent claims of error in the trial judge's charge to the jury. The next eight issues pertain to claimed errors in ruling on or commenting on evidence in the course of the trial, while the 15th suggests error in the trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial.
We have reviewed all of the issues pertaining to rulings during the course of the trial. In relation to all of the issues except one, we agree with the trial judge's reasoning or consider his ruling well within his discretion. The exception pertains to his refusing to strike his own comment to witness Smith, 'At least, you didn't get hit when you were sitting there.' Whether this comment from the judge had any prejudicial effect would depend in large measure upon how it was said. As to this, we have no guide from this record. We certainly do not find warrant for considering it reversible error.
Appellant places his principal reliance upon his first stated issue, pertaining to the charge, which he states as follows:
'The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's requested charges Nos. 7, 8 and 9.
'This is the principal ground for this appeal in view of the jury's specific finding that defendant was 'not guilty of negligence.'
'Plaintiff's theory of his case, as it pertained to defendant's negligence, was clearly set out in his declaration.
'Plaintiff charges that 'defendant steered, operated and propelled his said motorboat in a careless, reckless, willful, wanton, and grossly negligent manner, and at a high and dangerous rate of speed, and while under the influence of intoxicating liquor while passing through said channel and under said bridge as a direct result of which' the accident occurred and plaintiff's defendant was killed.'
The cited requests to charge detailed appellant's claims as to excessive speed and intoxicated driving and made reference to statutes prohibiting...
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