Britton v. Maloney
| Decision Date | 26 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 93-11430-NG. |
| Citation | 981 F.Supp. 25 |
| Parties | Randy BRITTON, Plaintiff, v. Patrick MALONEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Randy Britton, Lexington, MA, pro se.
Carolyn P. Britton, Lexington, MA, pro se.
Robert Boyle, City of Boston Law Deptment, Mary Jo Harris, Kopelman & Paige, P.C., Andrea W. McCarthy, Boston, MA, Robert J. Boyle, Jr., Asst. Corp. Counsel, for defendants.
Victor H. Polk, Jr., Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, MA, other interested party.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before me are defendant Patrick J. Maloney's motion for a judgment as a matter of law (docket entry # 183), motion for a new trial (docket entry # 184), and motion for remittitur (docket entry # 184).
Plaintiff Randy Britton ("Britton") was then and is now pro se. Britton is an African-American man, who is a graduate of both West Point and the Harvard University Graduate School of Business. His goal was to work as a stockbroker in New York City. He alleged that several Boston police officers illegally seized a rifle he owned and then pressed false felony charges against him when he threatened to sue for its return. The felony charges, he claimed, had a substantial effect on his life, his well-being and his prospects. The officers denied these allegations.1
This case was tried before a jury from February 3, 1997, through February 12, 1997. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on four of five counts against defendant Patrick J. Maloney ("Maloney") and awarded damages of $200,000.
Since the plaintiff was pro se and the issues complex, I invited the parties to use their post-verdict motions to raise any concerns about the outcome which they believed were significant. Maloney urges this Court to reverse the jury's verdict and enter judgment as a matter of law in his favor, or, in the alternative, order a new trial.
After review of the papers and the record, defendant's motions are DENIED.
II. FACTS ADDUCED AT TRIAL
On June 30, 1990, around 5:20-5:30 p.m., plaintiff Randy Britton entered the Boston Police Department ("BPD") headquarters at 154 Berkeley Street in Boston, carrying the unattached barrel and action portions of an AR-7 rifle. Essentially, Britton claims that the police took his rifle, illegally retained it and then brought false charges against him in retaliation for his threat to sue for its return.
Prior to arriving at the police station, Britton and his daughter had been on their way to the Regional Census Headquarters for the United States Census Bureau, where he was employed.2 Britton testified that while en route, he was chased by two individuals in a red car; the passengers — he claimed — pointed a gun at him. Fearing for his own safety and that of his daughter, Britton drove to the BPD Headquarters. He got out of his car and carried his daughter and the barrel and action portions of his rifle into the building.3 An unarmed patrol officer, Sandra Springer Glenn ("Springer"), was seated at a desk in the BPD lobby when Britton entered.4
Britton testified that he told Springer that he was being chased and needed help. About five minutes passed, and Britton became afraid that the people who had been chasing him would come into the police station. He left the lobby and stood in the building entrance. He saw a red car traveling around the block — the the same car that had chased him earlier. At this point, someone — defendant Detective Thomas Dooley ("Dooley") — came up and grabbed Britton from behind; Dooley was not in uniform. Dooley grabbed the barrel of Britton's rifle and began to pull.
As Britton let go of the rifle, he saw the red car circle around the block again; he told Dooley, Britton said Dooley took the rifle and walked outside, towards the red car. A woman got out of the car,5 and Britton observed Dooley speak with her. Sergeant Maloney then appeared.6 Britton was escorted by Maloney and other unidentified officers to the second floor of BPD headquarters. At this point, Britton no longer had the rifle; it was in the hands of either Maloney or Dooley.
Britton, his daughter, and the officers went upstairs, where they remained for about thirty to forty-five minutes. Britton said that most of the ensuing discussion centered around his rifle, not the chase. He showed the officers his FID card, and requested that Maloney and Dooley return the weapon. A background check on the FID card revealed that it was valid. Nonetheless, Maloney and Dooley refused to return the rifle, and told Britton that the police would hold it "for safekeeping." Britton left police headquarters at 6:15 p.m. or 6:20 p.m.
When Britton left police headquarters that evening, he had a copy of an incident report filled out by Dooley. (Trial Exh. 1). Britton had asked for the report so that he could have proof that the officers had taken his rifle. The report narrated the events of the evening, as Britton had related them:
Randy Britton observed standing in hallway of BPD HQ holding a 22 Caliber rifle A207588 AR-7 EXPLORER in his right hand; rifle taken from Randy Britton who states 2 occupants of red car MA 650 AAP did make threats against his person. Tyrone Stampley DOB 10-24-62 B/M §§ 014525860 Add 25 Weld St. Fram-MA also a W/F Tammy Carpenter W/F MIV rented from Nat Car Rental to a William Murphy. Rifle held for safekeeping. Randy Britton advised to seek asst. at Dist.04 Det's unit.
The "time completed" section on the incident report read 6:15 p.m., just shortly before Britton left. It listed the "type of incident" as "investigation persons" and the victim as "Comm of Mass."
By the time he arrived home, Britton was frustrated and angry. He decided to complain about the way he had been treated at police headquarters. At 8:00 p.m., he called BPD headquarters and spoke with a Sergeant Norman Connor, who gave...
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