Trafton v. Devlin, Civ. 98-123-B.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 98-123-B.,Civ. 98-123-B.
• Citation: 43 F.Supp.2d 56
• Parties: Todd TRAFTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Patrick DEVLIN, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

Page 56

43 F.Supp.2d 56

Todd TRAFTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Patrick DEVLIN, et. al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 98-123-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

March 4, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles Gilbert III, Gilbert Law Offices, Bangor, ME, for plaintiffs.

Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for defendants.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRODY, District Judge.

This Section 1983 action arises out of the prosecution of Plaintiffs Todd Trafton ("Trafton") and Keith Trask ("Trask") for "night hunting" in violation of Me.Rev. Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 7406(5).¹ Defendants Patrick Devlin, Douglas Tibbetts, Michael Morrison, Durward Humphrey, and Kevin Adam ("Defendants") are wardens with the Maine Warden Service. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants withheld from the District Attorney exculpatory evidence concerning the night hunting charge in violation of their obligation to disclose such evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to adopt the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate, and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Except where noted, the following factual summary is based on the parties' Agreed (Limited) Statement of Facts filed on October 5, 1998.

On November 24, 1995, Devlin and three other defendants investigated a report of night hunting at Trask's East Corinth home. They confronted Trafton and Trask at the scene. Though neither was arrested, Defendants confiscated a deer carcass from the back of Trask's pickup truck. The District Attorney subsequently filed a criminal complaint against Trafton and Trask alleging that they shot the deer at night in violation of Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 7406(5). Trafton and Trask pled not guilty to the charges by letter dated January 2, 1996. No bail was imposed.

On April 10, 1996, Defendant Devlin telephoned Dr. Edgar Espinoza, Deputy Director and Chief of Forensic Science Branch of the National Fish and Wildlife Forensic Laboratory of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Devlin requested that Dr. Espinoza analyze data provided by Defendants concerning Plaintiffs' deer. Dr. Espinoza determined that the data were consistent with a conclusion that the deer had been killed during daylight hours and orally informed Defendant Devlin of this finding later that day.

Defendants failed to advise the District Attorney of Dr. Espinoza's finding prior to the start of Plaintiffs' trial on June 4, 1997. In fact, at a pre-trial hearing on November 27, 1996, Defendants Devlin and Morrison testified contrary to Dr. Espinoza's finding without mentioning the existence of that finding. When the finding ultimately was brought to the attention of the District Attorney after the first day of trial by someone other than Defendants, the court declared a mistrial. On the following day, the District Attorney dismissed the criminal action. Both before and after the dismissal, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were overheard joking about the expenses Plaintiffs incurred to defend themselves against the night hunting charge. (Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 7, 10 & 13.)

Plaintiffs filed the present Section 1983 action on June 12, 1998, seeking relief for damages including investigation and defense expenses, loss of earnings, physical and mental distress, and damage to reputation. On September 8, 1998, Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge issued his Recommended Decision denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on November 10, 1998.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine for these purposes if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is one that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1993). Facts may be drawn from "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). For the purposes of summary judgment the Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995).

III. DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on his conclusion that Defendants were not eligible for qualified immunity because their failure to turn over exculpatory information to prosecutors violated Plaintiffs' "clearly established constitutional rights." (Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision at 4.) Reviewing this matter de novo, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the question of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1215 (1st Cir.1996) ("a court may ... bypass the qualified immunity analysis if it would be futile because current law forecloses the claim on the merits").

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals against state actors who violate federal law. To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that `the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law' and (2) that the conduct deprived the complaining party of `rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.'" Martinez-Velez v. Simonet, 919 F.2d 808, 810 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)). The question in this case is whether Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendants violated their rights under the United States Constitution or federal law.

The parties do not dispute that Defendants failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the District Attorney, nor that this failure constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. See Campbell v. State of Maine, 632 F.Supp. 111, 121 (D.Me.1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 776 (1st Cir.1986) ("the only duty of a police officer in possession of exculpatory information is to turn it over to the prosecutor"); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2nd Cir.1992) (noting agreement with courts which have held that police satisfy Brady obligation by turning over exculpatory evidence to prosecutors); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F.Supp. 351, 389 (D.N.J.1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1070 (3rd Cir.1985) ("the police ... are under a duty to disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor"). By itself, however, an officer's failure to comply with Brady does not constitute a violation of an accused's constitutional rights. Rather, a Brady transgression rises to the level of a constitutional violation if it results in the denial of an accused's due process right to a fair trial. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-76, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("for unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside") (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).² In this case, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their rights to a fair trial since the court declared a mistrial after the first day of the proceeding when the exculpatory evidence came to light. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that Defendants' Brady violation resulted in prolonged prosecution of the night hunting case and associated expense and mental anguish amounting to a malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

While "malicious prosecution standing alone does not implicate federally protected rights," Torres v. Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir.1990), under certain circumstances a malicious prosecution may constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (rejecting substantive due process claim based on malicious prosecution, but leaving open possibility of Fourth Amendment claim); Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir.1994) (deeming procedural due process claim based on malicious prosecution viable under limited circumstances). The Court now examines these possibilities as they apply to the present case.

A. Due Process

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), courts were divided over the extent to which a malicious prosecution claim was actionable under Section 1983. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n. 4, 510 U.S. 266. In Albright, the Court eliminated much of the controversy by announcing that substantive due process did "not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang" the tort of malicious prosecution. Id. The First Circuit since has acknowledged that Albright "virtually ... foreclose[s] reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983" and thereby supersedes the Circuit's previous rule that a "conscience-shocking" prosecution constituted a substantive due process violation. Perez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 42. Based on these precedents, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot assert a substantive due process claim.

The Court also rejects Plaintiffs'...