Broad. Music, Inc v. Leyland Co.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:11CV2264 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | BROADCAST MUSIC, INC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEYLAND CO., LLC d/b/a HOOK, LINE & DRINKERS, et al., Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on three motions. First, the motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of Plaintiffs, Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), MJ Publishing Trust, Songs of Universal, Inc., Welsh Witch Music, ABKCO Music, Inc., Sony/ATV Songs LLC, Unichappell Music, Inc., Sloopy II Inc., Cyanide Publishing, Painted Desert Music Corporation, and Embassy Music Corporation on August 2, 2012. ECF Dkt #27. Defendants, Leyland Co., LLC ("Leyland Co."), and Ronald Leyland ("Mr. Leyland") filed an opposition brief on October 1, 2012. ECF Dkt. #34. Plaintiffs filed their reply on October 12, 2012. ECF Dkt. 36.
Second, the motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of Mr. Leyland on September 13, 2012, ECF Dkt. #31. Plaintiffs filed their opposition brief to the motion to dismiss on September 27, 2012, ECF Dkt. # 32.
Third, the Motion to Withdraw admissions was filed on behalf of both Mr. Leyland and Defendant, Leyland Co., LLC ("Leyland Co.") on October 1, 2012. ECF Dkt. #33. Plaintiffs filed their opposition brief to the motion to withdraw admissions on October 12, 2012. ECF Dkt. #35.
For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to withdraw admissions is denied, Mr. Leyland's motion to dismiss is denied, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.
For its factual basis, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment relies almost exclusively on facts deemed admitted due to Defendants' failure to respond to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions and Production of Documents. Plaintiffs commenced this action for copyright infringement on October 21, 2011. Defendants' Answer was filed on December 7, 2011. The Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production were served on June 7, 2012. See, Declaration of Ronald H. Isroff ("Isroff Declaration"), ¶7. Defendants' counsel was reminded of her failure to respond to the discovery requests on July 12, 2012, however, no response was filed. Id.
Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, provides that: "A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or by the party's attorney." Moreover, "[u]nder Rule 36(b), a request for admissions which is not responded to within the applicable time period 'is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.' " Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., 106 F.3d 147, 153 (6th Cir.1997). Pursuant to Rule 36(a) a party may seek to request an admission even where the request is "dispositive of the entire case." Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 601 F.2d 246, 253 (6th Cir.1979) (citations omitted).
Courts in this district routinely enforce the civil rule. See, Tracy v. Heffron, No. 86-2007, No. 86-2007, 1987WL 37916, at *1 (6th Cir. July 6, 1987)(the district court correctly deemed therequests for admissions to have been admitted by plaintiff because he did not respond to them pursuant to Rule 36(a)); Hitachi Medical Sys. Am., Inc. v. Branch, No. 5:09CV1575, 2011 WL 1326358, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2011)(Defendants' failure to respond within 30 days meant that the requests for admission are deemed admitted by default); Jasar Recycling, Inc. v. Major Max Management Corp., No. 4:08CV2830, 2010WL 395212, at * 3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2010)(matters deemed admitted from a failure to respond to requests for admissions can serve as a basis for a summary judgment motion.) However, a district court may, at its discretion, permit the filing of an answer to a request for admission that would otherwise be untimely. See e.g. Dupuis v. City of Hamtramck, 2008 WL 4615655 (E.D.Mich.2008); Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int''l Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Tripodi, 913 F.Supp. 290, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y.1996); United States v. Turk, 139 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D.Md.1991); see also, Gutting v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 710 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir.1983).
In their motion, Defendants argue that the dispositive motion deadline in this case was extended a number of times, and, as a result, they misunderstood that the time for filing their written answer or objection was continued as well. This explanation is unconvincing for two reasons. First and foremost, the civil rule plainly provides that the response time is statutory. Second, the discovery deadline (June 11, 2012) and thrice-extended dispositive motion deadline (August 2, 2012) had both expired several months prior to the date that Defendants filed their motion to withdraw admissions (October 1, 2012). Accordingly, Defendants have failed to articulate good cause for their failure to respond to the request for admissions and production of documents.
Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions within time provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 or at any time thereafter.1 As a result of Defendants' failure to respond to the Requests for Admissions, all of the Requests are deemed to have been admitted pursuant to the Civil Rule, and Defendants' motion to withdraw admissions is denied.
The standard for reviewing a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss challenge under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, requires that the court determine if the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ().
The "plausibility" standard, as articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, provides that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Under this standard, the fact claims made in the contested pleading "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (emphasis added). "The court must 'accept all the ... factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff [ ].' " Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 384 (6th Cir.2009)(omission in original)(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.2009)).
In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Leyland cites R.C. 1705.48(B) for the proposition that, in Ohio, members or managers of a limited liability company are not personally liable to satisfy any judgment or obligation of the limited liability solely by reason of being a member of the limited liability company. Here, Mr. Leyland's alleged liability is not predicated solely upon his role as a member/manager of Leyland Co., but as an infringer along with Leyland Co., since he had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and had a direct financial interest in such activity. See 17 U.S.C. §501(a); see infra at p. 11-13. Accordingly, Mr. Leyland's motion to dismiss is denied.
Summary judgment should be granted "where the moving party has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 870-873 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court must decide, "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden and must inform the court of the basis for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Further, the moving party must identify those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits" which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Themoving party must make a showing that no reasonable jury could find other than for the moving party. 60 Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993), see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party must present "some significant probative evidence that makes it necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at trial." 60 Ivy St. Corp., 822 F.2d at 1435, see First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-290 (1968).
The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment. BMI is a "performing rights society" which licenses the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works. 17 U.S.C. §101. The other plaintiffs are the copyright owners of various compositions that are the subject of this lawsuit. See, Declaration of Kerri Howland-Kruse, BMI's Assistant Vice...
To continue reading
Request your trial