Broadhurst v. City of Fall River

• Decision Date: 25 January 1932
• Citation: 278 Mass. 167
• Parties: THOMAS BROADHURST v. CITY OF FALL RIVER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

278 Mass. 167

THOMAS BROADHURST v. CITY OF FALL RIVER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

January 25, 1932

January 7, 1932.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY, WAIT SANDERSON, & FIELD, JJ.

Fall River. Pension. Constitutional Law, Control of municipalities. Municipal Corporations, Control by General Court. Sections 8 and 16 of St. 1931, c. 44, an act "authorizing the city of Fall

River to fund certain indebtedness and establishing a board of finance for said city," override every inconsistent power conferred by St. 1924, c. 278, relating to pensioning laborers in Fall River.

A pension, granted by the mayor of Fall River under St. 1924, c. 278, after the effective date of St. 1931, c. 44, is not an obligation binding the city unless and until approved by the Fall River board of finance. Sections 8 and 16 of St. 1931, c. 44, are constitutional.

CONTRACT, with a declaration as amended described in the opinion. Writ dated August 3, 1931.

The defendant demurred. The demurrer was heard in the Superior Court by T.J. Hammond, J., and was sustained.

A motion by the defendant that judgment be entered in its favor was allowed. The plaintiff appealed.

J.T. Farrell, for the plaintiff. E.T. Murphy, Corporation Counsel, (H.K. Hudner with him,) for the defendant.

RUGG, C.J. The plaintiff alleges in his declaration that certain instalments of a pension granted him on June 10, 1931, on retirement from the labor service of the defendant for incapacity, by the mayor of the defendant in accordance with St. 1924, c. 278 are due to him; that there is available sufficient appropriation to pay said instalments, and that the defendant refuses payment. The defendant demurs on the ground that the mayor had no authority to grant such pension without the approval of the Fall River board of finance established by St. 1931, c. 44, and that the declaration contains no allegation of such approval. The demurrer was sustained motion was allowed for the entry of judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

The question presented for decision is whether a pension granted by the mayor under St. 1924, c. 278, is a binding obligation upon the defendant unless and until approved by the Fall River board of finance established by St. 1931, c. 44, in force and effect at the times of the events here in issue. Said c. 278 relates to the pensioning of laborers in the city of Fall River. It is applicable only to that city. It provides in Section 1 that a laborer in the employ of that city in the position of the plaintiff "may, at his request and with the approval of the mayor, be retired from service, and if so retired he shall receive from said city for the remainder of his life an annual pension" of a stated amount. If that statute alone be considered, the plaintiff is entitled to receive payments on the pension. Every condition there prescribed has been met. But in this connection the scope and effect of St. 1931, c. 44, must be considered. That is entitled "An Act authorizing the city of Fall River to fund certain indebtedness and establishing a board of finance for said city." The design of that chapter, as disclosed by all its provisions, is to create a board of finance consisting of three persons to be appointed by the Governor, only one of whom need be a resident of Fall River, and to vest in that board complete control over all the financial affairs of that city. That general purpose is set forth in Section 8 in these words: "The board shall have supervision over the financial affairs of said city, and no appropriations shall be made, and no debt incurred, except with the approval or upon the recommendation or requisition of the board, which approval, recommendation or requisition shall be in writing. No department of said city, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the school and police departments, shall expend any money or incur any liability except with the written approval of the board." The sweeping nature of that general purpose and the intention that nothing shall stand in its way are emphasized by this sentence in Section 16: "The operation of such part of any statute as is inconsistent with the provisions of this act, in so far and to the extent that it applies to the city of Fall River or to any of its interests or affairs, shall be suspended so long as the powers and duties of the board continue to be in effect hereunder." The inescapable result of these provisions is that said c. 44 must override every inconsistent power conferred by said c. 278, under which the plaintiff claims.

The granting of a pension by a municipality is a factor in its financial affairs. A pension is definite in amount, lasts during the life of the pensioner, and must be disbursed regularly out of the public treasury without any concurring service rendered by the pensioner for the public. It constitutes a settled and positive liability. It is an addition to the fixed annual charges of the city. It would be vain to place entire responsibility for the financial affairs of the city on the board of finance, if without its cognizance or sanction expenses of this nature could be fastened upon the municipal treasury. The granting of the pension to the plaintiff was contrary to the first sentence of said Section 8. It also, in our opinion, is within the prohibition of the second sentence of that section. That inhibition against incurring liability except with the written approval of the board runs against every department of the city. It is not necessary to inquire with nicety whether under every form of city charter the mayor constitutes a department in a technical sense. It is common speech to refer to the chief officer of a city as the head of the executive department, or as that department. Compare Daly v. Mayor of Medford, 241 Mass. 336 , 338. As used in this context, we think that...