Broadus v. State, 50323

• Decision Date: 16 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 50323,50323
• Citation: 61 Misc.2d 970,307 N.Y.S.2d 479
• Parties: Thomas BROADUS, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 479

307 N.Y.S.2d 479

61 Misc.2d 970

Thomas BROADUS, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 50323.

Court of Claims of New York.

Feb. 16, 1970.

Richard O. Robinson, Buffalo, of counsel, for claimant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., by Edward Marschner, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for the State.

DECISION

HENRY W. LENGYEL, Judge.

This is a claim for damages for personal injury resulting from an industrial accident which occurred at Attica State Prison on June 15, 1965.

The claimant was convicted of a crime in 1963 and was incarcerated in Elmira Reformatory on November 22, 1963. He was transferred to Attica State Prison on July 17, 1964. While working in the prison metal shop as a punch press operator, he sustained a severe injury to the fingers of his left hand. After a period of medical treatment, he returned to work in the metal shop. He was paroled from the state prison on December 22, 1965. Unfortunately, he violated his parole in October, 1966 and was recommitted to Attica on November 21, 1966, where he remained until his unconditional release on October 29, 1968. This claim was brought against the State by the filing and service of a Notice of Claim on November 12, 1968.

Before we consider the substantive questions of liability and damages, we must resolve the jurisdictional question raised by the State at the commencement of the trial. It was the State's position that, as the claim was sued more than two years after December 22, 1965, it was barred by the Statute of Limitations and this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim.

The Penal Law § 510 (now Civil Rights Law § 79) provides that a person sentenced in a state prison for any term less than life forfeits all of his civil rights during the term of the sentence. Therefore, on the date of this industrial accident, the claimant was under a legal disability which prevented his bringing a claim against the State of New York. See, Green v. State of New York, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833. Cf. Correction Law § 6--b; Cataliotti v. State of New York, 61 Misc.2d 204, 305 N.Y.S.2d 28. However, the Court of Claims Act, § 10(5), provides that a claimant, under a legal disability when his cause of action accrues, may present his claim within two years after the disability is removed. In 1946, the Legislature amended the Penal Law § 510 to provide that, when a person such as the claimant is paroled, he has the right to institute a proceeding before a court '* * * with respect to matters other than those arising out of his arrest or detention.' (Penal Law § 510(b)). As an accident causing injury to a prisoner is not considered a matter arising out of his arrest or detention (Grant v. State of New York, 192 Misc. 45, 47, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758; Duffy v. State of New York, 197 Misc. 569, 571, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759; Matthews v. State of New York, 13 Misc.2d 298, 300, 178 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313; Todzia v. State of New York, 53 Misc.2d 200, 203, 278 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296), the claimant's legal disability was removed on December 22, 1965 and the two year Statute of Limitations commenced to run. He remained on parole until his reincarceration for violation of parole on November 21, 1966. Therefore, he was free to prosecute this claim against the State for approximately ten months.

The question we must determine is whether or not the two year Statute of Limitations continued to run uninterrupted from December 22, 1965, even though the claimant was again under a legal disability from November 21, 1966 until his final release on October 29, 1968. If the question is decided in the affirmative, we do not have jurisdiction over this claim which was brought more than two years after the legal disability was removed.

In Gershinsky v. State of New, York, 6 A.D.2d 964, 966, 176 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670, affd. w/o opn. 6 N.Y.2d 798, 188 N.Y.S.2d 190, 159 N.E.2d 681, the Court stated:

'* * * when a Statute of Limitations once begins to run, it will continue unless there is a saving qualification in the statute * * * and that disabilities, in order to bring a party within the exception of the statute of limitations, may not be piled one on another, i.e., once the statute has commenced to run it will continue notwithstanding any subsequent disability, so that where a disability existing at the time of the accrual of the cause of action is removed the statute will then run and will not be suspended by any subsequent intervening disability (54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 219).'

In an effort to avoid the effects of the above decision, claimant's counsel propounded the interesting and creative argument that, as the disabilities which existed during the periods July 17, 1964 through December 22, 1965 and November 21, 1966 through October 29, 1968, stemmed from the same crime and sentence of imprisonment, we were really considering only one legal disability and that claimant was not seeking to tack one disability upon another disability. He reached the conclusion that the reincarceration of November 21, 1966 merely reinstated the original and only legal disability; and, that claimant, therefore, had approximately thirteen months after October 29, 1968 in which to sue his claim. A similar argument was effectively disposed of by Judge John Carroll Young in Jordan v. State of New York, 56 Misc.2d 1032, 1034, 1035, 290 N.Y.S.2d 621, 625, wherein the learned Judge stated:

'As early as 1743 the courts of England, under a statute providing for the tolling of a statute of limitations while the plaintiff was 'beyond the seas', held that if one being beyond the seas returned, the statute would run without suspension even though the plaintiff again went beyond the seas.

'The Lord Chancellor, in the case of Sturt v. Mellish, ((1743) 2 Atk. 610, 614; 26 Eng.Rep. 765) said that 'by being in the kingdom after the cause of action had accrued, and not bringing any, though...