Broadwater v. Dorsey

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 63,63
• Citation: 666 A.2d 1282,107 Md.App. 58
• Parties: Ronald Lee BROADWATER, Sr., et al. v. Matilda Woodward DORSEY, et vir. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 58

107 Md.App. 58

666 A.2d 1282

Ronald Lee BROADWATER, Sr., et al. v. Matilda Woodward DORSEY, et vir.

No. 63, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 6, 1995.

Certiorari Granted March 8, 1996.

Matthew S. Sturtz (Miles & Stockbridge, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellants.

John T. Ward (John A. Bourgeois and Ward, Kershaw and Minton, P.A., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellees.

Argued before WILNER, C.J., and WENNER and CATHELL, JJ.

WILNER, Chief Judge.

A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that, in February, 1992, appellants, Ronald and Eleanor Broadwater, had negligently entrusted an automobile to their adult son, Ronald Broadwater, Jr., and that, on October 2, 1992, Ronald, Jr. negligently drove that vehicle on a public highway and caused injury to appellee, Matilda Dorsey. The jury awarded damages of $556,000 to Ms. Dorsey and her husband. From the judgment entered on that verdict, ¹ appellants have appealed, complaining that the court erred in failing to conclude as a matter of law that there was no liability for negligent entrustment. We shall affirm.

THE FACTS

Because appellants are urging an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we need to examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the Dorseys. We shall give scant attention, therefore, to the evidence supporting the defense that the jury had a right to reject and that it implicitly did reject. ²

In November, 1990, appellants owned or had in their possession five cars, all insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company--a 1986 Mercedes, a 1988 Toyota, a 1990 Plymouth Laser, a 1956 Ford Thunderbird, and a 1988 Corvette. The Ford and the Corvette, they contended, were not driven.

Ronald, Jr. was, to say the least, not a highly motivated person. He was born in June, 1965, and thus, by November, 1990, was 25 years old. After graduating high school in 1984 or 1985 (when he was 19 or 20), he attended three different colleges for varying periods but, despite five or six years of effort, had not graduated from any of them and had not even earned sufficient credits for an A.A. degree. Except for a brief period when he lived in an apartment paid for by his Between August, 1982 and October, 1989, Ronald, Jr. amassed 10 points on his driving record, for seven separate incidents of failing to obey traffic signals or speeding. Mrs. Broadwater paid a number of fines for her son and also paid for an attorney to represent him on one or more occasions. In 1980, when he was 15, Ronald, Jr. was involved in a motorcycle accident, as a result of which, in 1983, Dr. Broadwater was sued for having negligently entrusted the motorcycle to his son. The case was apparently settled.

parents while he was attending one of the colleges, he lived at home or stayed with friends. Although he worked part-time for his father for a while (there is some conflict in the evidence as to whether he was paid for his services), he never had a steady, permanent job. He was almost totally supported by his parents.

Beginning in November, 1990, and continuing through February, 1991, State Farm informed the Broadwaters that it would decline to renew the insurance on any of the five vehicles then owned by them unless Ronald, Jr. was excluded from the coverage. Those notices were each based on three recent violations by Ronald, Jr.--speeding in April and October, 1989 and failing to obey a traffic signal in July, 1988--and one accident. In October, 1990, he ran into a concrete bridge. Although the Broadwaters initially protested these notices, they eventually acceded to State Farm's decision and, in August, 1991, signed an agreement excluding Ronald, Jr. from coverage.

The son's irresponsible conduct may, in part, be explained by the fact that he was a drug addict. On September 20, 1991, the Broadwaters filed a petition with the District Court for an emergency evaluation of Ronald, Jr. Although Dr. Broadwater claimed in his testimony that the evaluation was "so that he would be forced to have his bipolar mental problems straightened out," in the petition he and his wife noted that Ronald, Jr. had a history of drug abuse dating back to 1980. During the most recent period, 1989-1991, they implied that he was taking cocaine intravenously in both arms. "Drug Abuse (Addiction)--1980-83 (Cocaine + Pot) Leading to seizure--transfer U. of Md. Shock Trauma--Never would agree to treatment--1989-91 back on drugs + IV cocaine (needle tracks both arms) June '91--Again would not agree to treatment--Last 8 wks behavior erratic--stole 2 of our cars [unclear] abuse to his mother could not finish college [unclear] Talks irrational. Has been constantly stealing money from parents. Life seems to be controlled by need for drugs. He is threat to his self mentally + physically + to the community."

In response to the question asking them to document the behavior leading them to believe that their son had a mental disorder and was in imminent danger of doing bodily harm to himself or others, they wrote, in longhand:

As a result of this petition, Ronald, Jr. was committed for evaluation and, according to his mother, remained hospitalized for four to six weeks. She was asked, but claimed that she could not recall, whether, as a further result of the petition, criminal charges were filed against Ronald, Jr. for assaulting and battering Mrs. Broadwater.

On December 16, 1991, Mrs. Broadwater purchased a 1982 Mazda RX 7 sports car from a friend for $2,750. On or about February 2, 1992, Mrs. Broadwater transferred the car to Ronald, Jr., who had the vehicle retitled in his name. Prior to that transfer, Ronald, Jr. received three additional speeding tickets, one of which had already resulted in a conviction.

Although the Broadwaters insist that the transfer was an arms-length sale, the fact is that the son paid nothing for the car and the Broadwaters paid the insurance premium to permit their son to obtain the minimum required insurance coverage from the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund. In a document dated February 2, 1993, which he captioned as "Agreement of repayment," and on which he referenced the Mazda, Ronald, Jr. stated "I, Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr. noted on this date that I agree to pay back Eleanor V. and Ronald L. Broadwater Sr. the sum of $2750.00, for the above automobile when I have completed my college degree." (Emphasis Once the car was turned over to Ronald, Jr., he apparently used and regarded it as his own. As noted, the Broadwaters disclaimed much knowledge about their son's activities and whereabouts thereafter. The accident that led to this lawsuit occurred in October, 1992. Ronald, Jr. was driving the Mazda that had been given to him by his mother eight months earlier.

                added.)   As of July, 1994, no payments had been made on that promise
                

DISCUSSION

Maryland recognizes the tort of negligent entrustment as it is currently expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 390:

"One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them."

See Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 485, 431 A.2d 76 (1981); Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 585 A.2d 196 (1991); Mackey v. Dorsey, 104 Md.App. 250, 258, 655 A.2d 1333 (1995).

The Restatement articulation of the tort contains a number of discrete elements. The defendant must supply the chattel; he must know or have reason to know that the person he supplies it to is likely to use the chattel in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm to other persons; and he must have reason to expect that those other persons may be endangered by the entrustee's use of the chattel. In addition, as is true in any action founded on negligence, the plaintiff must show injury and causation--that he suffered injury as a result of the negligent entrustment.

Citing cases either not on point or that have been rejected by the Court of Appeals and attempting to distinguish cases that, in our view, are clearly relevant, appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to each of these elements. ³ Control

Viewing the situation at the time of the accident, appellants note that, as of then, the Mazda belonged to Ronald, Jr., who was an adult, and that they had no control over either the car or their son. Citing language from earlier cases and from § 308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, they argue that a sine qua non for liability is the ability to prohibit the use of the chattel, i.e., the ability to exercise control over either the chattel or the entrustee. We do not dispute that principle; the problem is in appellants' application of it.

The tort is founded upon an entrustment--the supply of a chattel by the defendant to another person. That necessarily presumes that the defendant had a choice whether to supply the chattel or not. Control has to be viewed in that context. The tort does not rest on any vicarious liability--on imputing to the supplier the negligence of the entrustee--but rather on the direct negligence of the supplier in supplying the chattel in the first place. That negligence must, of necessity, be viewed as of the time of the entrustment, not as of the time the entrustee improperly uses the entrusted chattel.

The argument made by appellants here was made and rejected in Kahlenberg, supra, 290 Md. at 489, 431 A.2d 76. There was evidence in that case that the defendant father had purchased a car for his son, knowing that the son was reckless. It was not clear who actually owned the car, in part because the accident occurred before the title was transferred from the former owner. Assuming, however, that the...