Broadway v. Jeffers

• Decision Date: 07 January 1938
• Docket Number: 14599.
• Citation: 194 S.E. 642,185 S.C. 523
• Parties: BROADWAY v. JEFFERS, and four other cases.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

194 S.E. 642

185 S.C. 523

BROADWAY v. JEFFERS, and four other cases.

No. 14599.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 7, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Orangeburg County; T. S Sease, Judge.

Separate actions by Burnette Broadway and others against W. A. Jeffers for professional services rendered and hospitalization furnished to defendant's adult son. Verdict and judgment against defendant in each of the cases, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Zeigler & Brailsford, of Orangeburg, for appellant.

P. F Haigler, of Orangeburg, and Howard A. Jenkins, of Summerville, for respondents.

BAKER Justice.

These actions were instituted and prosecuted to judgment by respondents for the recovery of compensation for professional services rendered and hospitalization furnished to appellant's son, William Jeffers, an adult not residing with appellant. The cause of action of each respondent being so connected and interwoven with the same conditions, facts, and circumstances as their basis, counsel for respondents and appellants, by mutual consent, tried the cases together.

The second and third paragraphs of the Broadway complaint are as follows:

"Second: That on the Twelfth day of July, 1935, her services as such a nurse were engaged by the Defendant, W. A. Jeffers, for his son, William Jeffers, who was then a patient at the Summerville Infirmary, located at or near the Town of Summerville, in the County of Dorchester, in the State aforesaid at a per diem basis of Five Dollars ($5.00), such employment being for special night duty.

Third: That continuously thereafter, and up to and including the Twenty-second day of August, 1935,-a period of Forty-Two days,-she rendered such professional services to the said William Jeffers at the request, and with the sanction and approval, of the said Defendant W. A. Jeffers." The second paragraph of the Tupper complaint is as follows: "Second: That, on the Twelfth day of July, 1935, his services, as such physician and surgeon, were engaged by the said Defendant, W. A. Jeffers, for his son, William Jeffers, who was then a patient at the Summerville Infirmary, located at or near the Town of Summerville, aforesaid, and who was suffering from a gunshot wound in the chest and abdominal cavity, which necessitated an immediate major operation; that as such physician and surgeon, this Plaintiff, then and there, performed the services, so contracted for, with very satisfactory results, and thereafter continued in daily attendance on the said patient, the said William Jeffers, with the consent, sanction and approval of the said Defendant, W. A. Jeffers, through the 30th day of August, 1935, at which time the said patient was dismissed by this Plaintiff."

The second paragraph of the Miles complaint is as follows: "Second: That, on the Twelfth day of July, 1935, his services as assistant to Dr. Elias D. Tupper, the physician and surgeon in charge, were engaged by the said Defendant, W. A. Jefers, for his son, William Jeffers, who was then a patient at the Summerville Infirmary, located at or near the Town of Summerville, aforesaid, and who was suffering from a gunshot wound in the chest and abdominal cavity, which necessitated an immediate major operation; that such services were rendered; that thereafter and while the said William Jeffers was a patient at the said Infirmary this Plaintiff rendered other professional services to the said William Jeffers, at the request, and with the consent, sanction and approval of the said Defendant, W. A. Jeffers."

The second and third paragraphs of the Sweet complaint are as follows:

"Second: That she is informed and believes that on the Thirteenth day of July, 1935, her services as such a nurse were engaged by the Defendant, W. A. Jeffers, for his son, William Jeffers, who was then a patient at the Summerville Infirmary, located at or near the Town of Summerville, in the County of Dorchester, in the State aforesaid at a per diem basis of Five Dollars ($5.00), such employment being for special day duty.

Third: That continuously thereafter, and up to and including the Twenty-Sixth day of July, 1935,-a period of Fourteen days,-she rendered such professional services to the said William Jeffers at the request, and with the sanction and approval, of the said Defendant, W. A. Jeffers."

The second and third paragraphs of the infirmary complaint are as follows:

"Second: That on the Twelfth Day of July, 1936, (1935?) one William Jeffers, who was suffering from a gunshot wound in the chest and abdominal cavity, was admitted, as a patient, to the said Infirmary at the request and direction of his father, the Defendant, W. A. Jeffers.

Third: That the said Defendant, W. A. Jeffers, authorized, and agreed to pay, all charges and expenses of the said patient, William Jeffers, during the time that he was in the said Infirmary."

The appellant, W. A. Jeffers, the father of William Jeffers, by his answer denied liability in all cases on the ground that he had made no contract to pay for the services rendered to his son.

After the testimony was in, appellant made a motion to direct a verdict in his favor "as to all of the causes of action, upon the ground that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn by the jury from this testimony is that there was no contract made by the defendant under which he intended to assume a legal obligation and pay the claims of the young man mentioned in this complaint."

The motion was overruled and the trial judge submitted the cases to the jury, who found verdicts in each of the cases against appellant. The appellant then made a motion for a new trial upon the ground that the testimony did not warrant the verdicts. This motion was also overruled.

In appellant's printed brief, six "Questions" are stated as being raised by this appeal; but the record does not disclose so many. And it does not appear from the record, as we read it, that some of the "Questions," as stated by appellant, are warranted. We therefore confine this opinion to a discussion of the errors complained of by the exceptions.

The first exception alleges error in the refusal of appellant's motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that no reasonable inference could be drawn from the testimony that appellant intended to enter into a contract, or to assume the legal obligation, to pay the bills sought to be collected from him.

As a general rule, a request by a parent to a surgeon or physician to attend an adult child does not create an implied contract to pay for the services rendered by the physician or surgeon. However, this is not a rule of invariable application, for the conditions and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the request is made, as well as the utterances on the subject, must be taken into consideration, and if, under the facts and circumstances, the physician or surgeon is justified in believing and relying on the parents' intention to pay for the services rendered, although there is no express promise to pay therefor, an implied contract is created, making the parent liable for the reasonable value of the services rendered. Of course, if there is nothing in the facts and circumstances suggesting to the physician or surgeon that the parent intends to assume the legal obligation to pay, at the time the request for services is made, the parent is no more legally liable for services rendered to his adult child, living away from his home, than he would be for services requested to be rendered to a total stranger.

In 48 C.J. at page 1164, under services to adult child or married daughter, it is said: "A request by a parent to a physician to attend a child who is of age, or his or her acquiescence in the physician's attendance upon such child, does not raise an implied promise on part of the parent to pay for the physician's services, although the child is ill at the home of the parent. Similarly, a physician who at the importunity of a mother treats her married daughter, who is living with her husband, first insisting on the husband's consent, cannot recover from the mother as on an implied promise to pay for his services. But the circumstances may be such as to show an intention, on the part of a parent requesting or acquiescing in the services of a physician to his adult child, to be liable therefor, and a reliance on such intention by the physician, in which case the parent is liable."

In 21 R.C.L. page 413, under the discussion of recovery from person requesting attendance, we find: "* * * Medical service requested by one person in behalf of another and furnished to that other often gives rise to a contract implied in fact between the physician and the person requesting the service. Whether the person requesting the service undertakes to pay for it, and, so, is liable on general contract principles is a question of fact which must be settled by the jury. For example, although a promise to pay a physician for his services is not implied from the mere fact that a father calls him to attend his sick son, who is a man of mature age, yet, if the circumstances or conditions are such as to lead the physician to believe that the father is undertaking to pay for the services to be rendered and to charge the father with the knowledge thereof, he is liable under an implied contract."

In the discussion of the exception now under consideration, we in effect also pass upon appellant's exception No. 3, because it becomes necessary to settle if these actions are based on implied or express contracts, upon which theory were the cases tried in the circuit court.

That the allegations of a complaint are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader is such an elementary and well-established rule of the law...