Brock v. Hardie
Decision Date | 03 May 1934 |
Citation | 154 So. 690,114 Fla. 670 |
Parties | BROCK v. HARDIE, Sheriff, et al. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D. Barns, Judge.
Habeas corpus proceeding by Neal M. Brock against Dan Hardie, as Sheriff of Dade County, and another. To review a judgment remanding the petitioner to the custody of the Sheriff, the petitioner brings error.
Judgment reversed, and the petitioner discharged from custody.
Spalding, MacDougald & Sibley, of Atlanta, Ga., and McKay, Dixon & De Jarnette and Marion E. Sibley, all of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Vernon Hawthorne, State Atty., Fred Pine, Co. Sol., and Harry Gordon, all of Miami, for defendants in error.
Neal M Brock was arrested upon a warrant issued by a justice of the peace for Dade county in which Brock was charged in eight counts with a violation of the 'Florida anti-trust Statute,' which constitutes article 12, part 1, title 2, chapter 10 of the Compiled General Laws 1927 embracing sections 7944 to 7954, inclusive.
The warrant charged that Brock was manager of an 'association or (the) subsidiary of an association' whose purpose was to 'carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of the business of fire insurance in the State of Florida,' and that he acted in pursuance of a combination of two or more fire insurance corporations which had entered into stipulations to that end.
Each count charged that Brock acted in pursuance of the combination: First, to create or carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of the business of fire insurance; second, to 'increase the price,' or rates of fire insurance; third, to 'prevent competition in the sale of fire insurance'; fourth, to 'fix at a certain standard or figure,' the exact amount being unknown, whereby the rate or rates of fire insurance to the public in Dade county, Fla., was in some manner unknown to affiant controlled or established; fifth, 'to make or enter into or execute or carry out a contract, obligations or agreement by which certain fire insurance corporations, whose identity' is unknown to affiant 'have bound themselves not to sell fire insurance' in Dade county 'below a common standard figure'; sixth, to 'execute or carry out a contract' by which the insurance companies 'have agreed in some manner' unknown to affiant 'to keep the price, rate or rates of fire insurance' in Dade county 'at a fixed or graduated figure'; seventh, to 'execute or carry out a contract, obligation or agreement by which certain fire insurance corporations' whose indentity is unknown 'have established or settled the price, rate, or rates of fire insurance' in Dade county 'between themselves and others to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves and others in the sale of fire insurance' in the county; and, eighth, to 'execute or carry out a contract, obligation or agreement by which certain fire insurance corporations,' identity unknown, 'have agreed to pool, combine or unite their interests that they have in connection with the sale of fire insurance' in Dade county in such manner that the price, rate or rates of fire insurance in Dade county 'was offered to the public by such combination and the members thereof at a certain standard or graduated figure or figures' the exact amount being unknown to affiant.
That count contained an alternative charge in the following words: 'or aided or advised in the creation or carrying out of such combination' by maintaining as such manager for the purposes of the combination the office described as 'Florida Inspection & Rating Bureau.'
The substance of the charge is that certain fire insurance corporations whose names are unknown to the prosecutor have entered into an agreement between themselves for the purpose of prescribing a rate for fire insurance in Dade county and that the accused Brock is aiding, co-operating with, and furthering the purpose of that alliance between the fire insurance companies by managing and operating the office known as Florida Inspection and Rating Bureau.
He applied for and obtained a writ of habeas corpus and sought his release from custody upon the grounds that sections 7944 to 7954, supra, are void as being in contravention of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida, that the said sections of the law are so indefinite and uncertain as to furnish no ascertainable standard of guilt, and that the warrant charged no offense against the laws of Florida.
Upon the hearing the circuit judge remanded the petitioner to the custody of the sheriff, whereupon Brock took a writ of error from this court to review that judgment.
The sections of the statute attacked in this case first define the word 'trusts' to be a combination of capital skill or acts by two or more persons, firms, or corporations, or association of persons, or either two or more of them, for either, any, or all of the following purposes:
Sections 7945, 7946, and 7947, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, provide for forfeiture of the charter of any corporation violating the provisions of the act; proceedings by the Attorney General in quo warranto for the forfeiture of the charters, and the denial to any foreign corporation of the right to do business in this state and prescribing the duty of the Attorney General to enforce the provisions of the act by proceedings in injunction against the foreign corporations voilating the provisions of the act.
Section 7948, Comp. Gen. Laws, provides the penalty to be imposed upon any person who 'shall be or may become engaged in any combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, or of either two or more of them, for either, any or all' of the purposes set out in the act.
Section 7949, Comp. Gen. Laws, relates to the sufficiency of the indictment's allegations. Section 7950 prescribes a rule of evidence in such prosecutions. Section 7951 provides for criminal liability of nonresidents committing violations of the law. Section 7952 provides for a penalty of $50 for each day in which violation of the law may be committed and requires the Attorney General and state attorneys to 'prosecute for and recover the same' in the name of the state. Section 7953 provides that any agreement made in violation of the act shall be void and not enforceable in law or equity, and section 7954 provides for the issuing of subpoenas ad testificandum by the 'tribunal having jurisdiction of the offense' or the Attorney General or any state attorney or county solicitor or grand jury to witnesses to testify as to violation of any provision of the act.
Counsel for petitioner contend that the statute does not expressly cover the business of fire insurance; that it furnishes no ascertainable standard of guilt; that the charge against the petitioner in the exact language of the statute is insufficient because no facts are alleged which tend to show that the alleged restraint of trade is unreasonable in its scope and detrimental to public welfare and obnoxious to public policy; that the statute denies to the petitioner the equal protection of the law because it exempts from its provisions co-operative marketing associations as shown by the last paragraph to section 7944, supra, and section 6509 Comp. Gen. Laws, including the...
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