Brock v. State

• Decision Date: 02 April 1934
• Docket Number: A-8641.
• Citation: 32 P.2d 88,55 Okla.Crim. 410
• Parties: BROCK v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

32 P.2d 88

55 Okla.Crim. 410

BROCK v. STATE.

No. A-8641.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

April 2, 1934

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1934.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Evidence that tends directly to prove the defendant guilty of the offense for which he is tried, or to show motive or intent, is not rendered inadmissible because it proves, or tends to prove, him guilty of other and distinct offenses.

2. Where the defense is justifiable homicide and the trial court permits defendant to testify relative to numerous specific acts of violence which deceased had told defendant he had committed on other persons, but which alleged acts of violence defendant did not see or have information of prior to the homicide, other than that alleged to have been given him by deceased, which information defendant testified he believed and acted on in part as a foundation for his belief of imminent danger to himself, the truthfulness of the information imparted by deceased to defendant was immaterial and neither the state nor defendant could introduce evidence thereafter to show that what deceased had told defendant was either true or false.

3. It is permissible for the state to offer evidence of the character of deceased, where evidence that he was of a turbulent and quarrelsome disposition is offered in support of defendant's claim of justification.

4. When a defendant takes the witness stand and testifies in his own behalf, the prosecution has a right to cross-examine him with the same latitude as any other witness. His cross-examination is not confined to a mere categorical review of matters stated in the direct examination, but he may be asked any question on cross-examination pertaining to the matter at issue, or that goes to his credibility as a witness.

Appeal from District Court, Jackson County; Frank Mathews, Judge.

J. H Brock was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

T. M Robinson and Stansell Whiteside, both of Altus, and George L. Zink, of Hobart, for plaintiff in error.

J. Berry King, Atty. Gen., Smith C. Matson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and D. R. Rutherford, Co. Atty., of Altus, for the State.

CHAPPELL Judge.

The plaintiff in error, J. H. Brock, was convicted in the district court of Jackson county of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree in the killing of W. C. Ernest, and his punishment fixed by the jury at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of twenty years.

Defendant makes no contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, but seeks a reversal because of alleged errors occurring during the trial and in the proceedings in the district court after the trial.

It is first contended the trial court erred in permitting the state to introduce certain irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial evidence.

This assignment relates to the testimony of one James N. Fitz, state bank examiner, who testified on behalf of the state that he had made an examination of defendant's bank immediately after this killing occurred.

The court permitted Fitz to testify, over the objection and exception of defendant's counsel, to certain shortages and irregularities in defendant's bank, which culminated in a shortage of $5,191 in the accounts of the bank at the time Ernest was killed. It is contended this evidence tended to establish a collateral offense, and in view of the fact that defendant admitted the killing, it was not necessary for the state to prove motive, and, even if it was competent for the state to prove motive, the court should not have permitted the state to introduce details of the alleged defalcations and irregularities.

This evidence being competent to prove motive, the mere fact that it tended to establish a collateral offense would not make it incompetent.

Beginning with State v. Rule, 11 Okl. Cr. 237, 144 P. 807, this court in cases too numerous to cite has held that in proving motive, system, plan, or scheme of criminality, the state may introduce evidence similar to that complained of in the case at bar. While it was not necessary for the state to prove motive, yet it could not be deprived of the right to introduce any evidence that was competent in the case, and proof of motive is always competent.

It is next contended the court erred in refusing to admit certain alleged competent and material evidence offered in behalf of defendant.

This assignment relates to the refusal of the trial court to permit defendant to introduce certain testimony relative to the violent and turbulent character of deceased, as evidenced by particular and specific acts of violence on the part of deceased.

The trial court permitted defendant, while testifying, to detail certain alleged conversations which he had with deceased, and concerning which defendant swore the deceased informed him in detail of certain acts of violence and threats made and committed by deceased on third persons, in the absence of defendant, and which defendant did not witness or have knowledge of other than that told him by deceased. But the court refused to permit defendant to introduce these alleged third persons to give their version of such alleged acts of violence and difficulties on the part of the deceased, which they had witnessed or known.

Defendant contends this evidence was admissible under the authority of Sneed v. Territory, 16 Okl. 641, 86 P. 70, 8 Ann. Cas. 354; Mulkey v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 75, 113 P. 532; and Mathews v. State, 16 Okl. Cr. 466, 184 P. 468.

None of these cases hold that evidence of this character, unknown to defendant prior to the commission of the homicide, is admissible.

The question before the jury was not whether the stories told by deceased to defendant of his quarrels, brawls, and difficulties were true, but was: Did defendant believe deceased had committed such acts detailed to him and by reason thereof believe deceased was a dangerous and violent man, and, acting on such belief, commit the killing in his own self defense? If he believed what deceased told him, it was immaterial whether it was the truth or a lie for the purposes of the trial. Hence, the mere fact that defendant might have shown by the proffered testimony that deceased had told him the truth could not have affected the issue in the case.

It is not error for the court to refuse to permit deceased to be tried upon the merits of the facts as to each alleged act of misconduct upon his part by the testimony of witnesses who had never detailed any of this evidence to defendant prior to the commission of the homicide.

It is next contended the court erred in permitting the state in rebuttal to introduce evidence of the good character of deceased for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen, since there had been no attack made upon the character of deceased by defendant.

The difficulty about this contention is that there was a specific attack made by defendant in his testimony upon the character of deceased as being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen.

Defendant after detailing the alleged conversations with deceased, in which deceased told him about seven separate and distinct acts of violence, immoral conduct, and threats with a gun on the part of deceased against third persons, testified:

"Q. Now, Mr. Brock, what impression did that create and leave upon your mind as to the kind of man Mr. Ernest was as to being a bad and dangerous character? A. I knew he was a bad and dangerous man from what he had told me.

Q. State whether or not that had any effect upon you? I believe you stated that you thought you were in danger at the time you fired the shot. A. Yes, that came into my mind as quick as a flash, all these things."

In Cody v. State, 23 Okl. Cr. 236, 214 P. 201, this court said: "It is permissible for the state to offer evidence of the good character of the deceased where evidence that he was of a turbulent or quarrelsome disposition is offered in support of defendant's claim of justification."

In Coulson v. State, 291...