Brockman v. Kravic

Decision Date20 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. 22A04-0204-CV-169.,22A04-0204-CV-169.
Citation779 N.E.2d 1250
PartiesAllen J. BROCKMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. John N. KRAVIC, Ph.D., Appellee-Defendant.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Donald E. Smith, Louisville, KY, Attorney for Appellant.

Laurie Goetz Kemp, Leanne M. Garbers, Tera M. Rehmel, Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel, Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, L.L.P., Louisville, KY, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Allen J. Brockman appeals the trial court's dismissal of his suit against John N. Kravic, Ph.D. for lack of personal jurisdiction, raising the following issue: does a psychologist who is not licensed by—and does not practice in—the State of Indiana submit to the personal jurisdiction of Indiana's courts by mailing a written opinion into Indiana for claims arising from that opinion.

We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 1999, Kravic, a psychologist licensed in Kentucky, began counseling Brockman's son, A.B., at the request of A.B.'s mother, Tiffany Guerrero, in his Kentucky office. A.B. was the subject of a custody dispute between Brockman and Guerrero. Brockman, Guerrero, and A.B. were at all times residents of Indiana. In August 1999, Guerrero filed a petition for a change in custody of A.B. in Floyd Superior court in Indiana and requested the court to order a psychological examination of A.B. and appoint Kravic to perform the evaluation.

In September 1999, Kravic wrote a letter to Guerrero's attorney in which he opined that Brockman's visitation with his son should be temporarily halted. The trial court suspended Brockman's visitation with A.B. until it could interview A.B. In October 1999, the trial court ordered Brockman to attend a counseling session with Kravic, which he did.

In November 1999, Kravic wrote two more letters in which he recommended that Guerrero have full custody and that Brockman's visitation be "handled therapeutically." Appellant's Appendix at 75.

In October 2001, Brockman filed suit in the Floyd Superior Court against Kravic for slander, libel, defamation, interference with a parental relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kravic filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Floyd Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed and dismissed Brockman's suit. Brockman now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Brockman argues that the trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Kravic was erroneous and therefore his suit should not have been dismissed on this basis. Personal jurisdiction is the court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment over a person. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ind.2000); Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Felts, 759 N.E.2d 649, 653 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1237.

Because jurisdiction is presumed in Indiana and need not be alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff's burden to come forward with evidence that would establish jurisdiction does not arise until jurisdiction is challenged by the defendant. Mart v. Hess, 703 N.E.2d 190, 192-93 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). A challenge to personal jurisdiction may be raised either as an affirmative defense in the answer to the complaint or in a motion to dismiss. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1231. A party challenging the court's personal jurisdiction must prove its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence unless lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Id.; Felts, 759 N.E.2d at 654; Mart, 703 N.E.2d at 192; Freemond v. Somma, 611 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).

It is within the trial court's sound discretion to decide the jurisdictional facts. Freemond, 611 N.E.2d at 687. A trial court's findings of jurisdictional facts are generally reviewed for clear error. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1238. Once the court has decided those facts, however, whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law. Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind.2001); Freemond, 611 N.E.2d at 687. We review a trial court's determination of personal jurisdiction de novo. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1238; Felts, 759 N.E.2d at 654.

In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction, a trial court should engage in a two-step analysis. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1232; Felts, 759 N.E.2d at 654; Mart, 703 N.E.2d at 192-93. First, the court must resolve whether the conduct falls under the long-arm statute. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1232; Felts, 759 N.E.2d at 654; Mart, 703 N.E.2d at 192-93. Second, if the conduct falls under the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and courts of this state. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1232; Felts, 759 N.E.2d at 654; Mart, 703 N.E.2d at 192-93.

Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(A) is Indiana's equivalent of a "long-arm statute" and is the starting point for any analysis of personal jurisdiction. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1231. T.R. 4.4(A) is intended to extend personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limits and provides that a nonresident may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Indiana courts if certain conditions are met. Mart, 703 N.E.2d at 192-93. If a person's contacts with Indiana fall into any of the eight categories described, T.R. 4.4(A) is satisfied. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233.

T.R. 4.4(A)(2) states:

"Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of this state who has left the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent:
...
(2) causing personal injury or property damage by an act or omission done within this state[.]"

Here, Brockman alleges an injury from the letters Kravic wrote to Guerrero's attorney in the proceedings to determine the custody of A.B. He contends that the relationship between him and his son, both Indiana residents, has been damaged by Kravic's actions. The complaint alleges that Kravic's letters were published in Indiana and caused an injury in Indiana. Therefore, subsection (2) applies.

After finding a basis for jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, courts must examine whether asserting jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233. The modern approach to personal jurisdiction was established in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Id.; Breneman v. Slusher, 768 N.E.2d 451, 459 (Ind. Ct.App.2002),trans. pending. In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court explained that a person must have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233; Breneman,768 N.E.2d at 459. The existence of personal jurisdiction depends on the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum, not a mechanical test. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233; Breneman,768 N.E.2d at 459. In Hanson, the Supreme Court added the requirement that the defendant's contacts consist of some action by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233-34; Breneman,768 N.E.2d at 459-60. Only the purposeful acts of the defendant, not the acts of the plaintiff or any third parties, satisfy this requirement. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234; Breneman,768 N.E.2d at 460.

Thus, there is a two-part test to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under the Due Process Clause. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234; Breneman, 768 N.E.2d at 460. First, courts must look at the contacts between the defendant and the forum state to determine if they are sufficient to establish that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234; Breneman, 768 N.E.2d at 460. If the contacts are sufficient, then the court must evaluate whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice by weighing a variety of interests. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234; Breneman, 768 N.E.2d at 460.

Contacts are any acts physically performed in the forum state or acts performed outside the forum state that have an effect within the forum. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1235. There are two types of contacts that may be sufficient to establish jurisdiction: (1) the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the basis of the lawsuit, and (2) the defendant's contacts that are related to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Id. at 1234; Breneman, 768 N.E.2d at 460. Those concepts have come to be known as general and specific personal jurisdiction, respectively. Breneman, 768 N.E.2d at 460.

General personal jurisdiction refers to the ability to be sued for any claim in a state. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234. In order to establish general personal jurisdiction, the court must find continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state such that the defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court in that state for any matter. Id. General personal jurisdiction may exist if the contacts are substantial, continuous, and systematic. Id. The contacts required for general personal jurisdiction are greater than those needed to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Id.

Specific personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction that stems from the defendant's having certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the court may hear a case whose issues arise from those minimum contacts. Id...

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  • Davis v. Simon
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    ...previous Indiana cases in which a defendant's purposeful conduct subjected it to Indiana's jurisdiction: [I]n Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), we held that a psychologist who did not practice and was not licensed in Indiana but sent allegedly defamatory letters regardi......
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