Broderick v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 13 November 1903
• Docket Number: Nos. 13,607-(46).,s. 13,607-(46).
• Citation: 90 Minn. 443
• Parties: JOHN F. BRODERICK v. CITY OF ST. PAUL and Others.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 443

90 Minn. 443

JOHN F. BRODERICK v. CITY OF ST. PAUL and Others.¹

Nos. 13,607-(46).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 13, 1903.

Appeal by defendants from a judgment of the district court for Ramsey county, entered pursuant to the findings and order of O. B. Lewis, J. Reversed.

Daniel W. Lawler and Ambrose Tighe, for appellant.

James E. Markham and James C. Michael, for respondents.

LEWIS, J.

This action was brought for the purpose of enjoining the city of St. Paul and certain of its officers, and respondent the Cleveland Vapor Light Company, from entering into and carrying into effect the terms of a certain contract for lighting a part of the city streets. From a judgment entered in favor of respondents, appeal was taken.

The principal ground upon which the injunction was sought is that the contract was not executed in pursuance of the requirements of the city charter, and the specific grounds alleged in the complaint are that, in accepting the bid of respondent the Cleveland Vapor Light Company, action was taken by the city council by motion instead of by resolution; that the contract for such lighting was not let to the lowest bidder, as provided by law; that the bid of the Western Street Lighting Company was the lowest bid presented under the specifications, in all respects complying therewith, and was unlawfully rejected by the common council; that in considering the different bids under said specifications the common council and its members acted in an arbitrary and unlawful manner, and did not give a fair opportunity to all bidders to be heard; and that there was a secret and unlawful agreement or conspiracy entered into between the members of the council and respondent company to award such contract to it.

The record discloses remarkable haste on behalf of the council in calling for the proposal, in considering the various bids, and in letting the contract. It would seem, as is perhaps usually the case, that it was a struggle between the agents of different lighting companies to see which could exercise the most influence with the various members of the council, and instead of giving everybody a full opportunity to be heard in open discussion upon all of the points involved, before finally awarding the contract, the matter was so rapidly rushed through as to give some ground for suspicion as to the motive of the participants. However, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe the witnesses and to weigh the testimony, and it found that the board of public works and the members of the common council acted in good faith, and in the exercise of an honest judgment and discretion. Therefore upon that branch of the case we accept the findings of the court as final. We also accept the conclusions of the court to the effect that the council were justified in rejecting the bid of the Western Street Lighting Company, although the lowest bidder. This leaves for consideration the question whether, in accepting the bid of respondent and in awarding to it the contract, the common council proceeded as required by the city charter.

Under chapter 4 are enumerated the general powers of the common council. In section 7 it is provided that every order, resolution, or ordinance which shall pass the board of aldermen and the assembly shall, before it becomes operative, be presented to the mayor of the city for his approval or rejection. If he approves, such resolution goes into effect, but, if returned without approval, the common council shall proceed to reconsider the same, and if, after such discussion, two-thirds of all the members of both bodies shall agree to pass it, it shall become operative notwithstanding the mayor's veto: provided that, if the mayor retains the resolution without returning it for the period of five days, it shall become operative, and provided that, in all cases where the original action of the common council requires a two-thirds or greater vote, the veto of the mayor shall be effectual, unless overruled by a four-fifths vote of all the members of the council. By section 6 it is provided that no appropriation of money, or resolution, order, or ordinance for the payment of money, or creating any pecuniary liability, shall be valid or operative unless it shall have passed each of the two bodies of the council by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of a full body, taken by ayes and noes, and entered upon the record of the proceedings. By section 8, that every order, resolution, or ordinance shall be published in the official paper before the same shall be in force, and shall be recorded by the city clerk in books provided for that purpose. Under the provisions of section 9, the entire city government is placed in the hands of the common council, who are authorized to proceed by the enactment of proper ordinances, rules, and by-laws for such purposes. By section 10, the common council shall have authority, by ordinance, resolution, or by-law, among other things (division fiftieth),

"To provide for lighting the city and all public buildings, to establish, erect and maintain, and cause to be operated gas works, electric lighting plants, or other works for lighting the city streets, public grounds and public buildings."

From these provisions it appears beyond question that in providing for the lighting of the city the common council are limited in their action to procedure by ordinance, resolution, or by-law. The language is clear and explicit. The scheme of government is framed upon the theory that all important matters are delegated to the representatives of the municipality, consisting of the board of aldermen, the assembly, and the mayor. It contemplates a free and open discussion and consideration of each subject of enactment by each body of the common council and the mayor; and the object is not only to secure free deliberation and independence by such bodies and the mayor, but also to provide notice to the public of their various proceedings. The scheme is drawn for the very purpose of avoiding that secrecy and speed which is possible by motion, and without submission to the mayor, and without the publication and notice necessary in respect to a resolution. Such being the evident purpose of the charter provisions referred to, they must control the action of the common council in respect to the subject under consideration, unless it is otherwise provided.

Chapter 15 contains specific direction regarding the letting of contracts, and section 1 reads:

"All contracts for work to be...