Bronk v. Ineichen
| Decision Date | 11 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-2882,94-2882 |
| Citation | 54 F.3d 425 |
| Parties | , 6 NDLR P 304 Alisha BRONK and Monica Jay, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bernhard INEICHEN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jeffrey Spitzer-Resnick (argued), Madison, WI, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Barrett J. Corneille (argued), Mary L. McDaniel, Bell, Metzner, Gierhart & Moore, Madison, WI, for defendant-appellee.
Before FAIRCHILD, CUMMINGS and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.
After a brief but contentious tenancy, plaintiffs Alisha Bronk and Monica Jay vacated their Madison, Wisconsin, apartment and brought suit against their former landlord, Bernhard Ineichen. Plaintiffs, two profoundly deaf women, alleged that defendant Ineichen had discriminated against them in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq., as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"); 1 Wisconsin state discrimination law, Sec. 101.22 Wis.Stat.Ann.; 2 and the Madison housing discrimination ordinance, Sec. 3.23(4), 3 by refusing to allow them to keep a dog in their rented townhouse. A jury found otherwise, returning a special verdict of no liability against Ineichen. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, and now challenge on appeal the district judge's denial of these motions and certain of her evidentiary rulings. While the record demonstrates ample evidence to support the determination of no liability, we are concerned that the tendered jury instructions may have confused jury members by unnecessarily conflating local, state, and federal law. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
Plaintiffs' history of conflict with the defendant dates back to the day they signed the townhouse lease in the summer of 1992. Frequent and varied disputes soon ensued, but the sorest of all subjects was a dog named Pierre. Bronk asked Ineichen when she signed the lease whether he would permit her and Jay to have a "hearing" dog, 4 but Ineichen refused to modify his no-pets policy. Shortly after plaintiffs took possession of the townhouse, Bronk's brother Keith arrived for a visit with Pierre and another dog, Debbie. Pierre, whom Keith allegedly had trained as a hearing dog, was to remain with plaintiffs. On discovering Pierre in the townhouse, Ineichen put his foot down; he quickly evicted Pierre, who went to Bronk's parents' home in Kenosha, Wisconsin.
Over the next few months, plaintiffs argued Pierre's case with Ineichen. There is some dispute as to how much of the dialogue Ineichen, a Swiss immigrant, actually comprehended (according to his testimony, not much), but the conversations involved repeated attempts to explain the distinction between mere house pets and hearing dogs. Bronk testified, for example, that she offered to show Ineichen a certificate proving Pierre's abilities but that Ineichen showed no interest. For his part, Ineichen threatened in writing to raise plaintiffs' rent and charge them an additional security deposit if they brought Pierre back to the townhouse, accused them of making trouble, and hinted that he would prefer them to find new living arrangements.
In November 1992, Bronk and Jay filed a complaint with the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission ("MEEOC") alleging that Ineichen had discriminated against them on the basis of both their gender and their disability. After a cursory investigation the MEEOC found probable cause to believe that Ineichen had discriminated against Bronk and Jay based on their disability (but no probable cause to support the sex discrimination claim) and sought to enjoin Ineichen from enforcing his no-pets policy against them. Ineichen reluctantly conceded and did not resist the injunction, which subsequently was issued on December 23, 1992. Relations between landlord and tenants never recovered, however, and in March 1993, after both women lost their jobs in Madison, Bronk and Jay relocated to Kenosha. Thereafter they brought the instant suit for damages in federal court.
At trial, defense counsel for Ineichen conceded his client's sour disposition as well as his unyielding refusal to allow Pierre in the townhouse. Nevertheless, he argued, Ineichen's obduracy did not violate plaintiffs' rights or any of the applicable statutes for the simple reasons that Pierre was not a hearing dog and plaintiffs did not have a legitimate need for him. The defense tendered evidence that Pierre had received no training beyond that purportedly provided by Keith Bronk, an amateur with no demonstrated experience in training hearing dogs; that contrary to Bronk's deposition testimony, no facility had ever certified Pierre as a hearing dog; and that the various affidavits produced by plaintiffs which set forth Pierre's assistive functions were contradictory as to what he could actually do. Maria Merrill, the women's former roommate, testified that in a brief encounter with Pierre before he was shipped off to Kenosha she did not see any evidence he was trained. An expert witness for the defense testified that intensive, professional schooling and isolation from other animals (both of which Pierre concededly lacked) were prerequisites for a hearing dog. The defense also attempted to undermine plaintiffs' claim that they needed Pierre's assistance and suffered without it. Under cross examination, plaintiffs acknowledged that they had lived together on several previous occasions in other apartments, and had never before demanded or had access to a hearing dog.
At the close of the evidence, the district judge instructed the jury regarding the claims against Ineichen. Although the plaintiffs had asserted violations of state and municipal equal protection ordinances as well as federal law, the jury did not render separate verdicts on each claim. Instead, they received a two-question special verdict form on liability that asked only whether Ineichen had discriminated against plaintiffs by failing to reasonably accommodate their disability. After deliberation, the jury returned with an answer of "no" as to both plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs raise several challenges to both the trial procedures and its result. Initially they contend that Ineichen's absolute refusal to allow Pierre in the townhouse required the district judge to issue judgment in their favor on the federal claim despite the adverse jury verdict. Acknowledging that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate "only when there can be but one conclusion from the evidence" and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 515 (7th Cir.1993), plaintiffs contend that evidence supported the sole conclusion that Ineichen would have rejected their request to have Pierre live with them under any circumstances. That, they contend, should have ended the jury's inquiry.
The proper focus of this trial, however, was not simply the motivation behind Ineichen's actions, but the import of these actions: regardless of his cantankerous or even malevolent attitude, did Ineichen violate the FHAA? The amended statute under which plaintiffs claim a violation bars discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of ... rental ... of a dwelling ... because of a handicap of.... that ... renter," and defines discrimination as, among other things, "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(f)(2). Two adjectives, "reasonable" and "necessary," figure prominently in this definition, modifying both the term "accommodations" and Ineichen's obligations under the law.
The statute is worded as a broad mandate to eliminate discrimination against and equalize housing opportunities for disabled individuals. The House Report on the FHAA identifies a "clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream," H.R.Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988, pp. 2173, 2179, and adds that "the right to be free from housing discrimination is essential to the goal of independent living." Id. Implicit nonetheless in the text of the FHAA is the understanding that while reasonable accommodations to achieve necessary ends are required, some accommodations may not be reasonable under the circumstances and some may not be necessary to the laudable goal of inclusion. The requirement of reasonable accommodation does not entail an obligation to do everything humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person; cost (to the defendant) and benefit (to the plaintiff) merit consideration as well. 5 United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir.1994) (); see also Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir.1995) (). Similarly, the concept of necessity requires at a minimum the showing that the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability.
Were it acknowledged by the parties in this case that Pierre was a hearing dog providing needed assistance to the plaintiffs, this case might be susceptible to determination as a matter of law. Balanced against a landlord's economic or aesthetic concerns as expressed in a no-pets policy, a deaf individual's need for the accommodation afforded by a hearing dog is, we think, per se reasonable within the meaning of the statute. 6 Pierre's skill level, however, was hotly...
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