Bronson Methodist Hosp. v. Forshee
| Decision Date | 15 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | 129017 and 129018,128663,Docket Nos. 128662 |
| Citation | 198 Mich.App. 617,499 N.W.2d 423 |
| Parties | BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Judy FORSHEE, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, and AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Intervening Third-Party Plaintiff, Cross-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. Judy FORSHEE, Guardian of Mark Darrell Forshee, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, and Auto Club Insurance Association, Intervening Plaintiff, Cross-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee. BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL, Plaintiff, v. Judy FORSHEE, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees. Judy FORSHEE, Guardian of Mark Darrell Forshee, Plaintiff, and Auto Club Insurance Association, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Sloan, Newton, Stevens & Yokum by Gary C. Newton, Kalamazoo, for Judy Forshee.
Brandt, Hanlon, Becker, Lanctot, McCutcheon, Schoolmaster & Taylor by David J. Lanctot, and Gross & Nemeth by Mary T. Nemeth and James G. Gross, Detroit, for Auto Club Ins. Ass'n.
Lilly, Domeny & Byrne by Terrence J. Lilly, Kalamazoo, for Michigan Mut. Ins. Co.
Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Robert J. Riley, Grand Rapids, for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Before HOOD, P.J., and SAWYER and JANSEN, JJ.
This consolidated appeal arises out of an action filed by plaintiff Bronson Methodist Hospital against Judy Forshee for medical expenses incurred in connection with the treatment of Forshee's minor son, Mark Forshee, following an automobile accident and from an action filed by Judy Forshee against defendants Michigan Mutual Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for failure to pay no-fault benefits. Auto Club Insurance Association intervened, seeking reimbursement for no-fault benefits it paid on behalf of Mark Forshee after the claim was assigned to it by the assigned claims facility pursuant to M.C.L. § 500.3172; M.S.A. § 24.13172. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Judy Forshee liable to Bronson Methodist Hospital, Bronson-Vicksburg Hospital, and Careflight in the total amount of $136,902.65. The trial court further determined that Mark Forshee was not entitled to no-fault insurance benefits and, therefore, entered judgment in favor of Michigan Mutual and State Farm and against Judy Forshee and Auto Club. Judy Forshee and Auto Club now appeal, and Michigan Mutual cross appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
On the evening of March 3, 1988, Mark Forshee was drinking beer and taking controlled substances with three friends Thomas Pefley, William Morrow, and Brian Antles. The group was traveling in the Pefley automobile, driven by Thomas Pefley and owned by his father, Stanley Pefley. During the course of the evening, the group was stopped by the police twice. On the first occasion, Thomas Pefley was ticketed for a burned-out headlight. During the second stop, a deputy confiscated two cases of beer and a billy club and arrested Thomas Pefley for violating his probation by carrying a concealed weapon. The deputy and Pefley apparently consulted on what to do with Pefley's automobile and, ultimately, the deputy asked Morrow to take custody of the automobile. Pefley yelled from the police cruiser at Morrow to "take the car home." After the patrol car left, Morrow began driving the car and took Antles home. Morrow and Forshee, however, did not proceed directly home themselves, instead purchasing a case of beer at a gas station and continuing to use the vehicle.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of March 4, a Mattawan police officer observed the vehicle speeding and signaled the occupants to stop. Instead, the car accelerated and a high-speed chase ensued, covering eighteen miles and attaining speeds ranging from seventy-five to over one hundred miles per hour. The Pefley vehicle and the police cruiser approached a "Y"-type intersection, and the officer began to brake to slow his speed in order to navigate the intersection, but the Pefley vehicle did not brake in time and was unable to stop because of its excessive speed. The car struck an embankment, hit a metal post, was launched, and remained airborne for approximately fifty feet. Both Forshee and Morrow were critically injured in the crash and were subsequently airlifted by air ambulance to Bronson Methodist Hospital.
There was some dispute below concerning whether Morrow or Forshee was driving the vehicle when the chase began and at the time of the accident. Morrow testified that at some point in the evening he turned the vehicle over to Forshee to drive because he was uncomfortable driving a vehicle with a manual transmission. In an earlier deposition, Forshee denied being the driver, though he had previously made a statement to the police in which he admitted driving the vehicle. The officer involved in the chase identified Forshee as the driver. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that Forshee was driving at the time of the accident. That finding is not challenged on appeal.
Following the bench trial, the trial court determined that Judy Forshee was liable for the medical expenses both because she had contractually assumed that duty and because of a statutory duty of a parent to pay for a minor child's medical care. The trial court further determined that Mark Forshee was not eligible for no-fault benefits because he had unlawfully taken the Pefley vehicle. The trial court did, however, reject Michigan Mutual and State Farm's argument that Mark Forshee's injuries were intentionally caused as a result of the reckless nature of his driving. The trial court also found that Mark Forshee was domiciled with his mother and, therefore, had he been entitled to no-fault benefits, Michigan Mutual would have been liable for payment of those benefits. 1
The parties raise various issues in their respective briefs, addressing those which are relevant to their individual interests. Those issues, however, can be consolidated into three issues to be addressed on appeal: (1) whether Mark Forshee is excluded from receiving no-fault benefits because he was using the vehicle unlawfully and had no reasonable belief that he was entitled to use it, (2) whether the injuries to Mark Forshee were so recklessly sustained as to be intentional within the meaning of the no-fault act, therefore precluding any recovery, and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that Mark Forshee was domiciled with his mother within the meaning of the no-fault act. The first two issues concern the interests of all the parties, though State Farm has not directly addressed those issues, while the third issue for the most part only concerns the interests of Michigan Mutual and State Farm and then only if it is determined that Mark Forshee is entitled to receive no-fault benefits.
We turn first to the issue whether the trial court erred in determining that Mark Forshee is excluded from receiving no-fault benefits under M.C.L. § 500.3113(a); M.S.A. § 24.13113(a). That statute provides that a person is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident the person was using a motor vehicle that he had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he was entitled to take and use the vehicle. The trial court determined that Mark Forshee had unlawfully taken the automobile and had no reasonable basis for believing that he was entitled to use the vehicle and, therefore, pursuant to the above statute, he is precluded from receiving personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in determining that Mark Forshee was precluded from obtaining no-fault benefits under that statute.
Under M.C.L. § 500.3113(a); M.S.A. § 24.13113(a), a person is precluded from receiving personal protection insurance benefits if the person had unlawfully taken the automobile and could not reasonably believe that he was entitled to take and use the vehicle. There has not been a great deal of case law development of what constitutes an unlawful taking under that statute. However, we do find guidance in the decisions that have construed whether a vehicle was taken with consent for purposes of the owner's liability statute, M.C.L. § 257.401; M.S.A. § 9.2101.
In Cowan v. Strecker, 394 Mich. 110, 229 N.W.2d 302 (1975), the Court considered the question of what constituted "consent" under the owner's liability statute and interpreted "consent" broadly. In Cowan, the defendant had loaned her automobile to an acquaintance, with the specific instruction that the acquaintance not let anybody else drive her car. The acquaintance disobeyed the restriction and allowed her son to operate the vehicle, with the result being an automobile accident. The Court concluded that the defendant was liable under the owner's liability statute because the vehicle had been used with her consent, even though the borrower of the vehicle had specifically violated the restrictions placed upon the use by the owner in further loaning the vehicle to her son. The Court, after noting that the purpose of the owner's liability statute was to place the risk of damage or...
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