Broodnox v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP

• Decision Date: 20 November 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:15cv425/MCR/EMT
• Parties: VINCENT A. BROODNOX, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

VINCENT A. BROODNOX, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15cv425/MCR/EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

November 20, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Vincent A. Broodnox ("Broodnox"), proceeding pro se, filed a civil action in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 2015-CA-001055 (see ECF No. 1-3 at 2-3, 13-21).¹ State court Defendant Wal-mart Stores East, LP ("Wal-mart") removed the action to this federal court by filing a notice of removal (ECF No. 1). Wal-mart contemporaneously filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 2). Broodnox responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 8-2, 11). Broodnox also filed a motion for default against Wal-mart (ECF No. 8). Wal-mart filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 10).

The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N. D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(E); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Wal-mart's motion to dismiss should be granted in part, but that Broodnox should be provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Additionally, Broodnox's motion for default should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Broodnox names the following nine Defendants in his complaint: (1) "all walmarts," (2) "china," (3) "u.n.," (4) "escambia police," (5) "security company," (6) "foreign power," (7) "at&t," (8) "communist party," and (9) "all associate on walmart website" (see ECF No. 1-3 at 11-12). Broodnox alleges that on February 22, 2015, he went to a Wal-mart store "to get me [sic] something to eat" (id. at 13). He alleges Raymond Latham angrily approached him and told him that he "was previously trespass warn[ed] not to come to" Walmart, and refused him service (id.). Broodnox alleges he returned to the Wal-mart store on February 27, 2015, to attempt to speak with the store manager (id.). He alleges Mr. Latham, Anner Vazquez, Matthew Appleberg, and all of the store employees agreed that he "do not go to none [sic] of there [sic] walmarts" (id.). Broodnox alleges Deputy Murphy did not "trespass warn" him (id.). He alleges the state prosecutor and judge dropped the misdemeanor trespass charge on April 29, 2015 (see id. at 13, 18-20). Broodnox claims that Defendants "wrongfully locked him up" (id. at 16). He claims that Defendants' conduct violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 245, and several Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (id. at 13). He also asserts several state law claims (id.). Broodnox seeks punitive damages and injunctive relief (id. at 14-16).

II. WAL-MART'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Wal-mart filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Broodnox's claims against it should be dismissed for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 2 at 2-3).² Wal-mart also contends the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim for relief, pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) (id. at 4-6).

Broodnox filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (see ECF Nos. 8-2, 11).

A. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that he pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10 requires a party to state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are governed by Rule 12(b)(6). In applying that rule, the allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:

Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Wal-mart argues that Broodnox alleges in a conclusory fashion that Wal-mart discriminated against him and violated his constitutional rights; however he fails to identify the protected category to which he belongs that formed the basis of the alleged discrimination (ECF No. 2 at 5). Further, Broodnox's allegations are conclusory and fail to allege any facts that would support an inference that Wal-mart discriminated against him (id. at 5-6). Wal-mart additionally argues that Broodnox simply lists a number of State and federal statutes and laws, but makes no effort to explain how each statute applies to the factual allegations of the complaint (id. at 6). Wal-mart contends the complaint is so convoluted and devoid of factual allegations that it should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim for relief (id.).

Liberally construing Broodnox's response, he asserts that Wal-mart's refusal to serve him constituted discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violated Florida Statutes § 760.08, which prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion, in the enjoyment of the goods and services of any place of public accommodation (ECF No. 8-2 at 1-3; ECF No. 11 at 1-2). He further asserts Wal-mart "trespass warned" him and deceived the police, causing him to be falsely arrested and detained, in order to "cover up" the discrimination (ECF No. 8-2 at 1).

1. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To the extent Broodnox asserts a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of his federal rights, two essential elements must be present: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420, 428 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Parratt). A private party does not normally act under color of state law and is therefore not subject to suit under section 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-29, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a 'state actor' for section 1983 purposes." Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). Private parties may be viewed as state actors for section 1983 purposes if one of the following three tests is met: "(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution ('State compulsion test'); (2) the private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State ('public function test'); or (3) the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise ('nexus/joint action test')." Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy this third test, the private party must be "intertwined in a symbiotic relationship" with the government. See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).

Here, nothing in Broodnox's complaint indicates that any Wal-mart employee acted with the arresting officer to falsify facts leading to Broodnox's arrest. Rather, he alleges only that Wal-mart employees provided false information to the officer. This is insufficient to show that the Walmart employees...