Brooker v. Brooker
Decision Date | 18 May 1999 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-867.,COA98-867. |
Citation | 133 NC App. 285,515 S.E.2d 234 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Tracey Kyles BROOKER, Plaintiff, v. Christopher Charles BROOKER, Defendant. |
Homesley, Jones, Gaines, Homesley & Dudley, by L. Ragan Dudley, Statesville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Morrow, Alexander, Tash, Long & Kurtz, by C.R. "Skip" Long, Jr., Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.
Christopher Charles Brooker (Defendant) appeals from the trial court's order increasing his child support obligation from $250.00 to $446.00 per month.
Defendant and Tracey Kyles Brooker (Plaintiff) were married on 29 July 1989 and divorced on 25 March 1996. On 5 November 1993, one minor child was born of the marriage. The Iredell County District Court entered a consent judgment on 13 December 1995 in which Defendant agreed to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per month.
On or about 8 April 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion, in Iredell County District Court, for an increase in Defendant's child support obligation. Defendant subsequently filed notice that "he intends to request a continued deviation from the child-support guidelines, and it will therefore be necessary to inquire as to the parties' reasonable living expenses as well as to the child's reasonable needs." In addition, Defendant filed a motion for change of venue on the grounds that "plaintiff is now a resident of Wilkes County, while defendant is a resident of Forsyth County," noting that "neither party nor the minor child [currently] resides in Iredell County."
Because tapes of the hearings on the parties' motions were deemed unusable, the parties prepared a narrative statement of the testimony presented at the hearings for the record on appeal. See N.C. R.App. P. 9(c)(1). The record, including this narrative statement, reveals that Plaintiff and the minor child lived with Plaintiff's grandmother when the consent judgment setting child support was entered. At that time, Plaintiff earned approximately $1,190.00 (net) per month. From this amount, Plaintiff paid her grandmother $100.00 per month for rent and paid "about $35.00" per month in "grocery and school" expenses for the minor child. In addition, her grandmother provided daycare for the minor child. Since that time, however, Plaintiff's net monthly income has increased to $1,415.00 per month; in addition, she receives coaching supplements in the amount of $700.00 per semester. Plaintiff and the minor child have moved out of her grandmother's home, and Plaintiff's rent is now $270.00 per month. Plaintiff's grocery bills, at the time of the hearing, were $90.00 per month, and the minor child's daycare expenses were $65.00 per month. In addition, "the minor child is now becoming involved in recreation department activities that costs [sic] between $35.00 and $50.00 per month."
The record reveals that Defendant's income at the time of the consent judgment was "substantial," but does not reveal the actual amount. Defendant testified that his current gross income is $28,296.00, and that he "now has a roommate with whom he share[s] expenses." Defendant calculated his total monthly expenses (including the existing $250.00 child support obligation) at $1,915.00.
After hearing all the evidence presented by the parties, the Iredell County District Court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
The trial court made no specific findings as to the actual expenses of Plaintiff and/or the parties' minor child. The trial court did, however, make a detailed finding as to Defendant's expenses and found some of Defendant's claimed expenses to be either "unnecessary," "exorbitant," or unverified. The trial court was "not persuaded by the evidence of the defendant that the defendant is unable to meet the calculated child support obligation in the amount [of] $446.00 per month."
Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that "there exist a substantial changes [sic] in circumstances warranting a modification of the prior Consent Judgment of this Court." The trial court further concluded that Defendant "has failed to overcome the presumption of the [Guidelines] and is not entitled to a deviation therefrom." Accordingly, the trial court entered an order on 20 February 1998 denying Defendant's motion for a change of venue and increasing Defendant's child support obligation to $446.00 per month pursuant to the Guidelines.
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The issues are whether: (I) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a change of venue; (II) the trial court's findings of fact support the conclusion of law that changed circumstances exist; and (III) the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to deny Defendant's request for deviation from the Guidelines.
Where custody and support have been determined by the trial court and a party seeks modification of the custody and support order, "the court first obtaining jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts and is the only proper court to bring an action for the modification of an order establishing custody and support." Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C.App. 681, 682-83, 177 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1970). That court may, in its discretion, enter an order transferring venue to another court for the convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and/or in the best interest of the child. Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C.App. 147, 149, 343 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1986).
In this case, the original child support order was filed in Iredell County District Court. Iredell County District Court is therefore the proper forum for motions to modify that order. In his motion to transfer, Defendant contended he had relocated to Forsyth County and Plaintiff had relocated to Wilkes County. Iredell County is, essentially, located between Forsyth County and Wilkes County and is in relatively close proximity to both. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to transfer venue to Forsyth County based on its determination that the Iredell County District Court remained the most convenient forum.
An existing child support order may not be modified absent a showing of changed circumstances. N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (1995). The determination of whether changed circumstances exist is a conclusion of law. See In re Helms, 127 N.C.App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) ( ); cf. Wiggs v. Wiggs, 128 N.C.App. 512, 514, 495 S.E.2d 401, 403 (, )disapproved of on other grounds by Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998); Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C.App. 463, 470, 271 S.E.2d 921, 926 (1980) ( ). Where the moving party is relying on either an increase or decrease in the child's needs to establish changed circumstances, she has the burden of "showing the child's expenses both at the time the original support order was entered and at the present time." Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C.App. 798, 800, 411 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1991). There is no need for the trial court to make specific, or evidentiary, findings of fact reciting the child's past and present expenses.1 The trial court is required, however, to make ultimate findings necessary to resolve material disputes in the evidence. The trial court is likewise required to make an ultimate finding as to whether the needs of the child have increased or decreased since entry of the prior order to support a changed circumstances conclusion on that ground. In this case, the trial court found that "the needs of the minor child and the needs of the plaintiff to support the minor child ...
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