Brookfield v. Hutchins
| Decision Date | 06 March 1940 |
| Citation | 11 A.2d 853,126 Conn. 435 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | BROOKFIELD v. HUTCHINS. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Earnest C. Simpson Judge.
Action by Frank Brookfield against Barbara K. Hutchins to recover a sum of money paid as part of the purchase price of real estate, wherein the defendant filed a cross-complaint claiming specific performance of the contract of sale. From judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and cross-complaint, the defendant appeals.
Error and case remanded for further proceeding.
Warren F. Cressy, of Stamford, for appellant (defendant).
Thomas J. Ryle, of Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.
AVERY J., did not sit.
The plaintiff secured judgment for the return of a deposit made by him on a contract to purchase certain real estate of the defendant. A deed of the real estate had been tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff. If the deed did not conform to the contract of purchase, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, otherwise not.
The facts were not disputed. Edward William Fisher at one time held the legal title to this property. Fisher died in England. His estate was probated there. Application for administration of the Connecticut property referred to was applied for, a copy of his will was admitted to probate and an ancillary administrator c. t. a. was appointed. The application for administration stated that Fisher held the property as trustee to secure an indebtedness from Henry A. Gibbs to the firm of which Fisher was a member. After administration had been granted the property referred to was inventoried and appraised. The inventory stated, among other things, that the real estate in question was held by Fisher as agent and trustee for his firm to secure the debt owed to the firm by Gibbs and that on payment of the debt to the firm, Fisher, as fiduciary, ‘ was under contract to reconvey the same property to Henry A. Gibbs of Darien.’ The Connecticut administrator then made application to the Court of Probate for the district of Darien for permission to transfer the property to the beneficiary, stating that the beneficiary was prepared to perform the condition on which the trust depended. Notice was given, the hearing was had, an order was entered, the transfer was made, the necessary returns and administration account were filed and the matter closed in the Court of Probate. Nothing appears in the record of the probate proceedings to show any contest or what evidence was offered in support of the application for transfer.
The agreement of sale by the defendant to the plaintiff read in part as follows: ‘ If upon examination of the title there shall appear to be any defect * * * affecting the marketability of the title to the above described premises, * * * the purchaser shall elect either (1) to receive a conveyance of the title as it exists, subject to said defects, without modification of the purchase price, or (2) to rescind the contract, in which case the purchaser shall be entitled to receive back from the seller any amount or amounts paid on the purchase price, together with the reasonable expense of examination of the title upon payment of which by the seller, the seller shall have no further liability under this contract and the same shall become void and of no effect.’
When the deed of the property was tendered to the plaintiff by the defendant, who held title under the conveyance authorized by the Court of Probate, the plaintiff's refusal to go through with the transaction was based on the claimed invalidity of this transfer from the estate of Fisher to Gibbs. It was agreed that if the Court of Probate had jurisdiction to order the reconveyance to Gibbs the title was good, otherwise it was defective. There is no occasion to consider whether, if the Court of Probate had jurisdiction to make the order, the estoppel created by it would extend beyond those interested in the estate under the will, by the laws of inheritance or as creditors. The trial court held, in accordance with the claims of the plaintiff, that the proceedings referred to in the Court of Probate involved a finding that Fisher held the property by express trust and to that extent involved a trial of the title to the property beyond its jurisdiction, that the reconveyance constituted a defect in the title under the contract and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
The defendant relies on General Statutes, § 4961, the relevant portion of which is printed in the footnote.[1] It has been the settled rule in this state that courts of probate do not possess the right to finally determine disputed titles to property. Mack's Appeal, 71 Conn. 122, 129, 41 A. 242; Wilson v. Warner, 84 Conn. 560, 565, 80 A. 718; 1 Cleaveland, Hewitt and Clark, Connecticut Probate Law, 142. ...
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Pigeon v. Hatheway
...Cooley, 83 Conn. 235, 76 A. 529; Note, 34 Ann.Cas.1914D, p. 419.' Bowne v. Ide, 109 Conn. 307, 315, 147 A. 4, 7; see Brookfield v. Hutchins, 126 Conn. 435, 440, 11 A.2d 853; 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice § 386. In the instant case, we are concerned with the validity of an option to......
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Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Willard
...of property, and the probate decree will be binding on anyone who does not have a direct claim to title. See Brookfield v. Hutchins, 126 Conn. 435, 11 A.2d 853 (1940). John B. Willard has no claim to title adverse to that of Marguerite. Therefore he lacks standing to challenge the inclusion......
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Booth v. Flanagan
...court to conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim for specific performance; see, e.g., Brookfield v. Hutchins, 126 Conn. 435, 440, 11 A.2d 853 (1940); Hall v. Pierson, 63 Conn. 332, 348, 28 A. 544 (1893); 1 W. Locke & P. Kohn, Connecticut Probate Practice § 73; and......