Brookhouse v. Pray

• Decision Date: 01 July 1904
• Citation: 100 N.W. 235,92 Minn. 448
• Parties: BROOKHOUSE v. PRAY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

92 Minn. 448

100 N.W. 235

BROOKHOUSE

v.PRAY et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 1, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Willard R. Cray, Judge.

Action by Amy M. Brookhouse against Frances J. Pray and others to construe a will. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Certain provisions in a last will and testament construed. They read as follows:

‘Twentieth, pay to Daniel Brookhouse, son of my sister Mary, the sum of five thousand dollars. I do not know the place of residence of said Daniel Brookhouse, or even that he is now living. Now this bequest is made on condition that he, said Daniel Brookhouse shall appear and claim this bequest before the final distribution of my estate according to the terms hereof, and in no event later than ten years from the date hereof. * * *

‘Should any of the devisees hereinbefore named to whom said trustees and executors are directed to pay any part of my estate, die before payment is made to them, without leaving children or grandchildren, then and in every case, such bequest and devise shall wholly fail and the share of my estate so directed to be paid shall be paid to my wife, Frances J. Pray.’

It appears that D. B. did not survive the testator. Held:

(a) That the clauses quoted, read in the light of section 4449, Gen. St. 1894, vested in his children a contingent interest in such legacy, and that they took under the statute as purchasers.

(b) The testator intended to provide for his wife and blood relatives to the exclusion of others.

(c) The children of D. B. having died without issue before payment was made, said legacy vested in testator's wife.

2. Prior decisions followed holding that the intent of the testator will be determined from an examination of the instrument itself, if possible, without consulting special canons of interpretation, provided it be consistent with rules of law.

3. In the absence of other provisions in a will expressing a contrary intent, a legacy payable at a specified time in the future is not contingent, and vests immediately. Fifield, Fletcher, Larimore & Fifield, for appellant.

Alvord C. Egelston and Porter J. Neff, for respondents.

DOUGLAS, J.

Action by plaintiff against the trustees of the last will and testament of Samuel F. Pray, deceased, and Frances J. Pray to construe the provisions of said will, and for other equitable relief. From the judgment of the court that plaintiff is not the owner of or entitled to receive a legacy devised to one Daniel Brookhouse by said will, and that Frances J. Pray is entitled to receive the same, plaintiff appeals.

Samuel F. Pray executed his last will and testament and also died during the month of August, 1896. A large number of bequests were made, and the will contained a general clause bequeathing to his wife, Frances J. Pray, who was one of the special legatees, the residue of his estate. The material portions of the will are as follows:

‘I further direct that after five years from this date and within ten years from this date and at such time and times within said period as may to said trustees seem to the interest of my estate, said trustees and executors, sell and convey all my real estate and convert the same and all of my personal estate into money, * * * and pay out and distribute the same as follows, viz. * * *

‘Twentieth, pay to Daniel Brookhouse, son of my sister Mary the sum of five thousand dollars. I do not know the place of residence of said Daniel Brookhouse, or even that he is now living. Now this bequest is made on condition that he, said Daniel Brookhouse shall appear and claim this bequest before the final distribution of my estate according to the terms hereof, and in no event later than ten years from the date hereof. * * *

‘Should any of the devisees hereinbefore named to whom said trustees and executors are directed to pay any part of my estate, die before payment is made to them without leaving children or grandchildren, then and in every case, such bequest and devise shall wholly fail and the share of my estate so directed to be paid shall be paid to my wife, Frances J. Pray.’

Daniel Brookhouse died intestate three years before the will was drawn, and left surviving the plaintiff, his wife, and two children. Both children died intestate in 1899, during their minority, without issue, and their mother, as their heir, claims the legacy specifically bequeathed to Daniel Brookhouse. Appellant's rights depend upon the construction to be given the clauses of the will above quoted.

Section 4449, Gen. St. 1894, reads: ‘When a devise or legacy is made to any child or other relation of the testator and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issue who survives the testator, such issue shall take the estate so given by the will in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have if he had survived the testator, unless a different disposition is made or directed by the will.’ If the clause including legacy No. 20, construed in the light of this section of the statutes, vested the same unconditionally in the children of Daniel Brookhouse upon the death of the testator, appellant, as their heir, is entitled to recover; or if the language used by the testator in this bequest is construed as simply a gift...