Brooks v. Allen

Decision Date01 April 2016
Docket NumberNo. 2015–0255,2015–0255
Citation168 N.H. 707,137 A.3d 404
Parties Renee M. BROOKS v. Steven ALLEN
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Bryan J. Kerman, of Methuen, Massachusetts, by brief and orally, for the petitioner.

Kenneth P. Doherty, of Lawrence, Massachusetts, by brief and orally, for the respondent.

CONBOY, J.

The respondent, Steven Allen, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by the petitioner, Renee M. Brooks, and denying the respondent's cross-petition to partition. We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. The petitioner and the respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18–month period of separation in 20062007. They are the parents of a son who was born in 1996.

The parties met in 1991. In 1993, the respondent purchased a two-family apartment building in Haverhill, Massachusetts. The deed and mortgage were in the respondent's name only. The parties resided in one of the apartments and rented the other; the rental income covered the mortgage payments. The trial court found that both the petitioner and the respondent "performed renovations and upkeep on the property, with funding for the repairs and maintenance coming largely from [the respondent], aided by the proceeds from the mortgage." Both parties contributed financially to the household, with the respondent providing the majority of the income.

In 1995, the parties acquired land in Merrimac, Massachusetts as joint tenants, intending to build a house for themselves. That project never came to pass, however, and they sold the property in 1997.

In 1998, the parties sold the Haverhill property and purchased a house in Atkinson, New Hampshire (the Atkinson property). The deed and mortgage were in the respondent's name only. The trial court found that the money for the down payment on the Atkinson property came from the sales of the Merrimac land and the Haverhill house, and the parties' savings. The court also found that "[the respondent's] savings far exceeded the savings contributed to the down payment by [the petitioner] as [she] had remained at home during this time frame to care for their son."

From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in the Atkinson home. The trial court found that it was their plan "to remain together and continue to build on the financial foundation they started in 1993." The court also found that "[d]uring this time frame, [the petitioner] had returned to school and obtained a nursing degree allowing her to gain employment as a registered nurse," and that "both parties contributed to the maintenance of the Atkinson property and the regular functioning of the household, sharing the responsibility of the expenses of the family unit."

In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in the respondent's name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. The respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it.

In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire (the Northwood property). The respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The trial court found that at the time they purchased the Northwood property, "the parties agreed that [the respondent] would pay the mortgage and expenses on the Northwood property and the 2003 line of credit on the Atkinson property while [the petitioner] would be responsible for all of the other expenses of the Atkinson property (real estate taxes, utilities, and groceries)," and that this agreement continued until the parties separated in 2013. The trial court also found that the Northwood property, a seasonal home on a lake, "was in disrepair at the time of purchase requiring the parties to undertake substantial renovations to make it habitable. Both parties assisted in this task with [the respondent] doing the majority of the physical labor."

The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2008, they jointly obtained a mortgage, and discharged the 2007 mortgage that was in the respondent's name only. In 2009, they jointly obtained a mortgage, and discharged the 2008 mortgage. In 2010, they completed a number of loan applications, either individually or jointly, for a mortgage on the Northwood property. On the applications, the respondent represented that his monthly income was $1,413 and that he did not own any property. The petitioner represented that her monthly income was $8,036 and that she owned the Northwood property, the Atkinson property, and a property in Haverhill, Massachusetts. The parties thereafter jointly executed a mortgage secured by the Northwood property, and discharged the 2009 mortgage. In 2012, the parties again sought refinancing, with the petitioner completing the loan application in her name only. As a result of this refinancing, the 2010 mortgage was discharged.

In 2012, the parties also obtained another home equity line of credit on the Atkinson property as joint borrowers with each party individually liable for the full amount. The respondent, however, was in full control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. The parties executed a new mortgage secured by the Atkinson property, and the 2003 mortgage was discharged.

In 2013, the petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from the respondent's attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, the respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that the petitioner could not access those funds.

The trial court found that the respondent's yearly mortgage payments on the Northwood property for the years 2007 through 2012 were, respectively: $14,972; $31,392; $24,295; $25,681; $19,728; and $23,624. For those same years, the trial court found that, "[o]f note, [the respondent's] yearly total gross income" reported on his federal tax returns was, respectively: $27,606; $16,963; $41,721; $27,908; $24,271; and $34,302. The trial court found that the petitioner's yearly total gross income reported on her federal tax returns was: $47,800 in 2005; $56,209 in 2006; $57,267 in 2007; $70,143 in 2008; $80,861 in 2009; $69,025 in 2010; $69,055 in 2011; and $69,956 in 2012.

In March 2013, the petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, the petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold pursuant to RSA 547–C:25 (2007), that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties, and that the court "grant such further relief as is fair and just." In count two, the petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court "[e]quitably determine" each party's interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party's liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party's liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent "individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate." The respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of the petitioner's petition.

A bench trial was held in February 2015. Subsequently, the court issued an order setting forth the respective interests of the parties. Regarding the Northwood property, the trial court found that the fair market value was $270,000 and, as of January 2015, it had a mortgage of $94,477.02. Accordingly, the court determined the equity to be $175,522.98, of which the petitioner was entitled to $70,209.19. Regarding the Atkinson property, the trial court found that as of December 2014, the fair market value was $362,000 and, as of the time of the parties' separation, it had a mortgage balance of $236,457. Accordingly, the court determined the equity to be $125,543, of which the petitioner was entitled to $50,217. The court ordered the respondent either to sell the Northwood and Atkinson properties, or to refinance or otherwise discharge the mortgages, and to pay the petitioner $70,209.19 for her interest in the Northwood property and $50,217 for her interest in the Atkinson property.

On appeal, the respondent asserts that the trial court erred in "determining the equitable rights of unmarried parties to a particular jointly owned property in a partition action pursuant to RSA 547–C," and in "determining the equitable rights of unmarried cohabitants to a particular individually owned property in the absence of express terms of a joint venture agreement." He argues that the trial court's order was "divorce like" because it "treated payments made solely by [the respondent] as payments made jointly as if the money came from one domestic partnership of the parties instead of using the available evidence showing who contributed what and how much toward each property as intended by a proper application of the controlling statute." He asserts that the court "simply used the fair market value and mortgage balance to determine how much money should be apportioned as equity of the domestic partnership" and then "entered a sixty-forty percentage split of said equity without fully explaining how or why it came up with that formula." The respondent further argues that "some of the trial judge's findings of fact were not supported by the evidence and were so plainly erroneous that such findings could not reasonably be made."

We review the trial court's decision to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Conant v. O'Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 649, 117 A.3d 692 (2015) ; see Chase v. Ameriquest Mortgage...

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4 cases
  • In re Doherty
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • April 1, 2016
  • White v. State
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • September 18, 2018
    ...1151 (1982). "The fact that some testimony was that of an expert [does] not compel a different conclusion." Id.; see Brooks v. Allen, 168 N.H. 707, 715, 137 A.3d 404 (2016) (recognizing that a trier of fact is not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence). To the extent that the pe......
  • Kapcsos v. Benshoff
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • June 29, 2017
    ...such credits are appropriate to assure that each party in a partition action receives an equitable share. See, e.g., Brooks v. Allen, 137 A.3d 404, 410-11 (N.H. 2016); Brady v. Varrone, 884 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 12. Because the parties were not married and DeLoatch died d......
  • Hayes v. Connolly
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • March 29, 2019
    ...powers which allow it to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation." Brooks v. Allen, 168 N.H. 707, 711, 137 A.3d 404 (2016) (quotation omitted). "A court of equity will order to be done that which in fairness and good conscience ought to be or shou......
2 books & journal articles
  • § 1.02 Disputes Between Cohabitants
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 1 Disputes Between Unmarried People
    • Invalid date
    ..."Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families," 12 Willamette L.J. 453 (1976). [82] Brooks v. Allen, 168 N.H. 707, 137 A.3d 404 (2016).[83] See: Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App. 1987); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1982).[84......
  • Cohabitation Worldwide Today
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 35-2, December 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...differences into both financial and custody decisionmaking.").99. See infra notes 101-10.100. See infra notes 111-14.101. Brooks v. Allen, 137 A.3d 404, 410 (N.H. 2016). The court previously held that until the legislature directs differently, the court would not recognize an implied contra......

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