Brooks v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 10 March 1964
• Docket Number: No. 63-396,63-396
• Parties: Princess D. BROOKS, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 675

161 So.2d 675

Princess D. BROOKS, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Appellee.

No. 63-396.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 10, 1964.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1964.

Joseph Rosenkrantz, Miami Beach, and Julius H. Erstling, So. Miami, for appellant.

John R. Barrett, City Atty., and John S. Lioyd, Asst. City Atty., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HORTON and TILLMAN PEARSON, JJ.

TILLMAN PEARSON, Judge.

This appeal concerns itself with the question of whether the plaintiff is barred from prosecuting her claim against the City of Miami because of her failure to give notice as provided by the City Charter. We hold that the City is estopped, under the circumstances in this case, to assert the defense.

The plaintiff claimed that she was injured by falling into a water-meter hole which was alleged to have been negligently left uncovered. She filed her complaint in which she alleged that she had served written notice of her claim upon the City Attorney of the City of Miami. This allegation was made in order to avoid dismissal under § 93 of the Charter of the City of Miami (Fla.Sp.Laws 1925, ch. 10847 as amended) which provides in part:

'No suit shall be maintained against the city for damages arising out of any tort, unless written notice of such claim was, within sixty (60) days after the day of receiving the injury alleged, given to the City Attorney with specifications as to time and place of the injury. * * *'

The City filed its answer by way of general denial and one affirmative defense in which it was alleged that any injuries suffered by the plaintiff were caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the City filed a 'motion for judgment on the pleadings' and 'motion to strike a sham pleading.' Attached to the motion to strike was an affidavit of the City Attorney that he had not received a written notice of the claim. The motion to strike as sham was presumably filed under Rule 1.14(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A. which provides:

'(a) Motion to Strike. If a party deems any pleading or part thereof filed by the other party to be a sham, he may, before the cause is set for trial, move to strike said pleading or part thereof and the court shall hear said motion, taking evidence of the respective parties, and if the motion be sustained, the pleading to which the motion is directed shall be stricken. Default and summary judgment, decree, decree pro confesso, and summary decree, on the merits, may, in the discretion of the court, be entered, or the court may for good cause shown, permit additional pleadings to be filed.'

In response the plaintiff filed an affidavit in which she set forth that by error her notice of claim was sent to the Director of the Department of Water and Sewers of the City of Miami and that she had received a reply which lulled her into believing the notice was sufficient. Attached to the affidavit was the reply in which the city official stated 'Your letter of April 30 concerning injury to Princess Deloise Brooks will be forwarded to our insurance company and you will, no doubt, hear from them shortly.'

Based upon the motions of the defendant and the two affidavits, the trial judge entered an 'Order on Pleadings.' This order recites that the motions are granted and that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The action of the trial judge in this matter amounted to a summary judgment for the defendant because of the failure of the plaintiff to give proper notice of her claim to the City. The dismissal cannot be sustained upon the basis of a finding that the pleading was a sham. Guaranty Life Ins. Co. of Florida v. Hall Bros. Press, Inc., 138 Fla. 176, 189 So. 243; Carapezza v. Pate, Fla.App.1962, 143 So.2d 346.

Nevertheless, we do not feel that this appeal should be decided on that basis because each party has in good faith presented to this court argument upon the real question involved, which is, whether the facts constitute an estoppel against the City to raise the defense of lack of notice. We shall, therefore, consider the judgment as a summary final judgment based upon the pleadings and the affidavits.

It is clear that the plaintiff misplead her case. Her allegation that she had notified the City Attorney has been demonstrated to be untrue. However, it is within...