Brooks v. Green's Appliances Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 March 1999 |
| Parties | 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 2188 Reginald G. BROOKS, Appellant-Respondent, v. GREEN'S APPLIANCES INC. et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Peter J. Scagnelli, Albany, for appellant-respondent.
Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Napierski & Maloney P.C. (Joseph T. Johnson of counsel), Albany, for respondents-appellants.
Before: MERCURE, J.P., CREW III, PETERS, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.
Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.), entered January 20, 1998 in Rensselaer County, which, inter alia, partially granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
On June 15, 1993, plaintiff was driving his motorcycle through the intersection of State and Pearl Streets in the City of Albany when he collided with a delivery truck owned by defendant Green's Appliances Inc. and operated by defendant Russell C. Bradley. Plaintiff and his passenger, Donna Clark, commenced separate negligence actions against defendants to recover for their personal injuries. Clark's lawsuit, in which plaintiff was named as a third-party defendant, was tried first. The jury found that plaintiff and defendants were negligent and apportioned liability for the $329,291 in damages at 5% and 95%, respectively. Notably, defendants did not appeal from this judgment.
Following the jury's verdict, plaintiff moved in this action to collaterally estop defendants from relitigating the issues of liability and apportionment of fault. Alternatively, he sought summary judgment on the issue of liability. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's application to apply the collateral estoppel doctrine but partially granted him summary judgment on liability and directed a trial on apportionment of fault and damages only. These cross appeals ensued.
As the party seeking the benefit of the collateral estoppel doctrine, it was plaintiff's burden to prove that the issues in the present action are identical to those necessarily decided in the prior action (see, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-501, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487). Plaintiff has clearly demonstrated that certain issues raised in this action--the respective negligence and apportionment of liability of the parties arising from the June 15, 1993 collision--were squarely addressed and specifically decided, primarily against defendants, in the prior action (see, Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 444 N.Y.S.2d 585, 429 N.E.2d 104; Kirisits v. State of New York, 163 A.D.2d 860, 861, 558 N.Y.S.2d 390). Defendants, we note, do not seriously dispute the identity of issues between the two cases.
As the party opposing collateral estoppel, it was defendants' substantial burden to establish that they were not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior action (see, Matter of Hee K. Choi v. State of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 933, 936, 550 N.Y.S.2d 267, 549 N.E.2d 469; Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., supra, at 501, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487). Plainly, defendants were full participants in the prior action during the trial of which they attempted to cast blame for the accident on plaintiff (see, Schwartz v. Public Adm'r. of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725; compare, Armstrong v. Bucci, 153 A.D.2d 652, 544 N.Y.S.2d 668; Ray v. Kramer, 109 A.D.2d 1087, 487 N.Y.S.2d 238). They were only minimally successful. Moreover, defendants' incentive to vigorously oppose any findings of negligence against them was no less there than it would be in the present action (see, Schwartz v. Public Adm'r. of County of Bronx, supra, at 72, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725).
The crux of defendants' contention that they were denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues is based on an adverse ruling rendered against them in the prior action, namely that they were precluded from offering the expert testimony of the police officer who investigated the accident. The officer allegedly concluded that plaintiff was traveling in a "Right Turn Only" lane before entering the intersection and cited him for this alleged traffic violation. Specifically, defendants contend that "[h]ad they been provided the opportunity to fully and fairly present the issue of liability to the jury [in the prior action], the jury's determination of liability and apportionment of fault would have been different". This argument, however, constitutes a collateral attack on a judgment from which defendants took no appeal (see, Shaid v. Consolidated Edison Co. of...
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