Brooks v. Greene

• Decision Date: 29 September 2017
• Citation: 153 A.D.3d 1621,61 N.Y.S.3d 403
• Parties: In the Matter of Halbert BROOKS, Jr., Petitioner–Appellant, v. Paula GREENE, Respondent–Respondent. In the Matter of Paula Greene, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Halbert Brooks, Jr., Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

153 A.D.3d 1621

61 N.Y.S.3d 403

In the Matter of Halbert BROOKS, Jr., Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Paula GREENE, Respondent–Respondent.

In the Matter of Paula Greene, Petitioner–Respondent,

v.Halbert Brooks, Jr., Respondent–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Sept. 29, 2017.

Lovallo & Williams, Buffalo (Timothy R. Lovallo of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant and Respondent–Appellant.

Michele A. Brown, Attorney for the Child, Buffalo.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, petitioner-respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, awarded respondent-petitioner mother sole custody of the parties' child and directed that a third party supervise the father's overnight visitation with the child. Subsequently, Family Court issued orders that allowed the father to exercise unsupervised, overnight visitation at his apartment with the child, thereby rendering this appeal moot insofar as it concerns that part of the order requiring supervised visitation (see generally Matter of Dawley v. Dawley [appeal No. 2], 144 A.D.3d 1501, 1502, 40 N.Y.S.3d 863 ). We conclude that the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply (see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 ). Inasmuch as the subsequent orders did not resolve the custody issues, however, we reject the contention of the Attorney for the Child (AFC) that the father's appeal is moot in its entirety (cf. Matter of Pugh v. Richardson, 138 A.D.3d 1423, 1424, 29 N.Y.S.3d 207 ).

Contrary to the father's contention, the court properly denied his recusal motion. "Absent a legal disqualification ..., a Judge is generally the sole arbiter of recusal" ( Matter of Murphy, 82 N.Y.2d 491, 495, 605 N.Y.S.2d 232, 626 N.E.2d 48 ; see Judiciary Law § 14 ), and the decision whether to recuse is committed to the Judge's discretion (see Murphy, 82 N.Y.2d at 495, 605 N.Y.S.2d 232, 626 N.E.2d 48 ; Matter of Trinity E. [Robert E.], 144 A.D.3d 1680, 1681, 41 N.Y.S.3d 817 ). Although recusal is required where the "impartiality [of the Judge] might reasonably be questioned" ( 22 NYCRR 100.3 [E] [1] ), a party's unsubstantiated allegations of bias are insufficient to require recusal (see Matter of McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 104 A.D.3d 1315, 1316, 961 N.Y.S.2d 838 ). Here, the record does not support the father's allegations that the Judge treated attorneys differently based on their respective racial backgrounds, or that the Judge was biased against him because of her alleged familiarity with his social worker. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that any alleged bias influenced the Judge's rulings relating to the father's attempt to subpoena the testimony of the mother's other minor children or to his cross-examination of the mother.

Contrary to the father's further contention, the court properly denied his motion to remove the AFC inasmuch as the motion was based solely on "unsubstantiated allegations of bias" (Matter of Leichter–Kessler v. Kessler, 71...