Brooks v. Hobbie

• Citation: 631 So.2d 883
• Parties: Bernest BROOKS and Rubin McKinnon v. Walker HOBBIE, Jr., and Billy Joe Camp. J. Elbert PETERS, et al. v. James E. FOLSOM, Jr., etc., et al. 1930110.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1993
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 883

631 So.2d 883

Bernest BROOKS and Rubin McKinnon v. Walker HOBBIE, Jr., and Billy Joe Camp.

J. Elbert PETERS, et al. v. James E. FOLSOM, Jr., etc., et al.

1930110.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 22, 1993.

James U. Blacksher and Leslie M. Proll, Birmingham, and Solomon S. Seay, Jr. and Terry G. Davis, Montgomery, and Edward Still, Birmingham, for Bernest Brooks and Rubin McKinnon.

William H. Pryor, Jr. of Walston, Stabler, Wells, Anderson & Bains, Birmingham, and Algert S. Agricola, Montgomery, for J. Elbert Peters, Jacob Savage, Douglas Moore, Beth Springler McDonald, Bettye Fine Collins, Donald R. Murphy, Wendy Allen and George Kingston.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Marc Givhan, Courtney W. Tarver and Mort P. Ames, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellees.

SHORES, Justice.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has certified this question:

"Did the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, in Sinkfield v. Bennett, CV-93-689-PR, have subject matter jurisdiction under Alabama law to enter the orders of May 12 and August 13, 1993?"

The question certified arose out of litigation that began in March 1992, when a group of African-American plaintiffs brought an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama challenging, under federal law, the way district lines are currently drawn for the Alabama State Legislature. (Brooks v. Camp, Civil Action No. 92-T-364-N (M.D.Ala.) In February 1993, another group of plaintiffs, identifying themselves as Republicans, brought another action in a federal court, which also claimed that the legislative district lines as then drawn violated federal law. (Peters v. Folsom, Civil Action No. 93-T-124-N (M.D.Ala.). These two cases were consolidated by the United States District Court, which, without reaching the merits of the contentions of the parties, stayed further proceedings in both cases on the ground that the Alabama legislative process had not run its course with regard to redistricting the legislature.

On February 23, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its decision in Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993), holding that federal courts are required to "defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address the highly political task itself." 507 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1080. (Emphasis added.)

The Brooks plaintiffs and other African-American citizens then brought a separate action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in which they challenged the existing state legislative district lines under both federal and state law. (Sinkfield v. Bennett, CV-93-689). On May 12, 1993, at the request of all parties litigant in the Sinkfield litigation, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County tentatively approved a consent judgment adopting a plan for redistricting the state legislature for the 1994 legislative elections. The plan was submitted to the United States Justice Department and was precleared by that Department, as required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. After holding a hearing at which all of the parties to the litigation had an opportunity to be heard in regard to the plan, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County entered a final judgment on August 13, 1993, implementing the plan.

The plaintiffs in Brooks and the defendants in both Brooks and Peters moved that the federal court dismiss both cases in the federal court and defer to the final judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. Only the plaintiffs in Peters oppose the dismissal of the cases in the federal court. They contend that the Alabama state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to redistrict or reapportion the State Legislature.

A three-judge federal panel, ¹ noting "the important and determinative issue of Alabama law as to whether the Montgomery County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to enter its order adopting a plan for the reapportionment of the State Legislature," has certified that question to this Court. We have expedited the matter, because trial of these consolidated federal cases has been set for January 4, 1994.

We answer the question in the affirmative.

It is understandable that counsel for Peters would base his argument upon our old cases of Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 51 So.2d 869 (1951), and Ex parte Rice, 273 Ala. 712, 143 So.2d 848 (1962), decided at a time when our Alabama state courts, like other state courts, stayed out of "political" issues such as re-districting of the legislature. Waid v. Pool held that an earlier lawsuit challenging the Alabama legislature's failure to redistrict was properly dismissed:

"We are of the conclusion that the decree of the court dismissing the bill was free from error and is due to be affirmed. We are satisfied that the appellants are earnest and serious in their contentions and desire for relief, but the difficulty we encounter here is that they are seeking interference by the judicial department of the state in respect to matters committed by the constitution to the legislative department. Constitution of 1901, §§ 43, 44 and 199."

255 Ala. at 442, 51 So.2d at 870. Ex parte Rice summarily affirmed the dismissal of a legislative redistricting lawsuit, citing Waid v. Pool. Peters argues that these two cases demonstrate that circuit courts have no jurisdiction to decide whether the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions are violated by the legislature's action in redistricting itself. We disagree. A careful analysis of those two cases will demonstrate that the courts deferred to the legislature and its primary duty in redistricting itself and declined to exercise jurisdiction in that context. Contrary to the argument advanced by counsel for Peters, these old Alabama cases were not based upon any provision of the state constitution that would limit the power of the courts to entertain the actions. These cases reflect the Court's sensitivity to the fact that the legislature has the primary right and responsibility, pursuant to Art. IX, §§ 198, 199, and 200, to redistrict itself, and the courts' reluctance to interfere in that area.

At the time of Waid v. Pool, indeed until the United States Supreme Court spoke in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), both state and federal courts considered legislative redistricting as an area peculiarly political and, thus, nonjusticiable in the courts. The United States Supreme Court often sanctioned the action of the lower federal courts in declining to exercise their jurisdiction in cases considered "political."

The pre-Baker v. Carr attitude is reflected in Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946), in which the majority refused to reach the merits of a federal court challenge to a congressional apportionment plan in Illinois. Justice Frankfurter urged the court not to enter "this political thicket":

"[T]his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."

328 U.S. at 553-54, 66 S.Ct. at 1200; see South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641, 94 L.Ed. 834 (1950).

Then, in 1962, in Baker v. Carr, supra, a case challenging the malapportioned Tennessee legislature, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that such cases were nonjusticiable because they presented "political questions." The Court, reversing the federal district court's dismissal of the complaint, stated:

"We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable 'political question.' The cited cases do not hold the contrary.

"Of course the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection 'is little more than a play upon words.' Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540, 47 S.Ct. 446 , 71 L.Ed. 759."

369 U.S. at 209, 82 S.Ct. at 706. The holding in Baker v. Carr was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection:

"We conclude that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."

369 U.S. at 237, 82 S.Ct. at 720.

Within a year of Baker v. Carr, actions challenging state legislative apportionment plans were instituted in over 30 states. ² One of these was Alabama, where, in Ex parte Rice, supra, this Court declined to consider an equal protection challenge to legislative districting. As noted above, this Court summarily affirmed on the authority of Waid v. Pool, despite the holding in Baker v. Carr.

Two years later the "one person-one vote" decision of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), answered a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama legislature. In Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Baker v. Carr:

"We are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a state legislature is a complex and many-faceted one. We are advised that States can rationally consider factors other than population in apportioning legislative representation. We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing views as to political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.... To the extent that a...