Ex parte Bruner
Decision Date | 30 August 1996 |
Parties | Ex parte Anne BRUNER and James Bruner, individually and as administratrix and administrator of the Estate of James Holland Bruner, deceased. (Re Anne BRUNER and James Bruner, etc. v. Thomas H. CAWTHON, M.D., F.A.C.S., P.C., et al.). 1950451. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James H. Tipler of Tipler Law Firm, Andalusia, for petitioners.
Thomas H. Keene, Fred W. Tyson and N. Wayne Simms, Jr. of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, for respondent.
The writ of certiorari is quashed as improvidently granted.
In quashing the writ, however, this Court disapproves the reliance of the Court of Civil Appeals on Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Those federal cases do not control Alabama's peremptory challenge procedure, which is based on adequate and independent state law.
WRIT QUASHED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.
I concur in the decision to quash the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. However, I am compelled to disagree expressly with two views presented by Justice Maddox in his special concurrence regarding the procedures Alabama has developed to eliminate discrimination in petit jury selection. The first area of disagreement involves his premise that the procedure developed in this state is grounded on, and controlled by, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and its federal court progeny. The second area is his conclusion that in Alabama the burden of proof of discrimination, which is on the opponent of the strike, is equivalent to the one currently required by the United States Supreme Court. I shall address each of these conclusions more fully in the following sections.
The first point on which I disagree with Justice Maddox is his premise that Batson forms the peremptory challenge framework
for Alabama--if not for every state in the country. According to this premise, Alabama's framework is based on federal law. Thus, Justice Maddox states that in Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991), and Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So.2d 1225 (Ala.1992), we were "merely attempting to follow the Batson standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court." 681 So.2d at 185Justice Maddox's premise is consistent with the rationale of the Court of Civil Appeals, which refused to analyze the Bruners' claims of discrimination in the selection of their jury under the procedure this Court outlined in Millette. In particular, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: Bruner v. Cawthon, 681 So.2d 161 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).
However, the rationale of the Court of Civil Appeals, like Justice Maddox's premise, incorrectly assumed that Alabama's peremptory challenge framework is a matter of federal law. Ignored is the fact that the movement to reform the rules relating to discrimination in jury selection was initially a state court movement. This fact was made clear in Batson itself, which was decided only after a number of state courts had already taken the initiative in ameliorating the harsh rule of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). 1 More specifically, Batson explained that two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals had recently "[f]ollow[ed] the lead of a number of state courts construing their State's Constitution" to challenge as discriminatory peremptory strikes based on evidence supplied in the "particular case," rather than requiring, as did the federal standard, proof of "systematic exclusion of blacks." Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 1715 n. 1 (emphasis added). As examples, the Court cited People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984); and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 1715 n. 1.
Significantly, when this Court in Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986), first discussed the operation of Batson, it relied on the same state cases cited in Batson as cases on which to establish the principle under consideration. The extent of this reliance is illustrated by the following excerpt from Jackson:
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