Brooks v. Holden

• Decision Date: 04 January 1900
• Citation: 175 Mass. 137,55 N.E. 802
• Parties: BROOKS v. HOLDEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

175 Mass. 137

55 N.E. 802

BROOKS v. HOLDEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

January 4, 1900

COUNSEL

Rockwood Hoar, for plaintiff.

A. P Rugg, E. I. Morgan, and R. A. Stewart, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER J.

In the decision of this case it is necessary to consider the effect of two comparatively recent statutes, each of which in some degree changes the law of evidence. The first is St. 1896, c 445, relative to evidence in actions against the estates of deceased persons; and the second is St. 1898, c. 535 relative to declarations of deceased persons. We quote the language of the two enactments: 'In the trial of an action against an executor or against an administrator of a deceased person in which the cause of action is supported by oral testimony of a promise or statement made by said deceased person, evidence of statements written or oral made by said deceased person, memoranda and entries written by him, and evidence of his acts and habits of dealing, tending to disprove or to show the improbability of such statement or promise having been made, shall be admissible.' St. 1896, c. 445. 'No declaration of a deceased person shall be excluded as evidence on the ground of its being hearsay, if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge to have been made in good faith before the beginning of the suit and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.' St. 1898, c. 535. The first act took effect on May 28, 1896, and the second on June 16, 1898. The present action was begun on April 27, 1896, against Rufus B. Holden, who died on December 22, 1897. George E. Allen, the administrator of Holden's estate, appeared in the action and took the defense upon himself on June 15, 1899; and thereupon the case was tried without a jury, with a finding for plaintiff on June 16, 1899. At the trial the plaintiff introduced in support of the causes of action set out in his declaration oral testimony of statements made by Holden. In defense the administrator called as a witness an attorney who had been employed by Holden to defend the suit, and offered to show by the witness statements made by Holden to the witness after the date of the writ, and tending to disprove the statements of Holden put in evidence by the plaintiff. The question for decision is whether the evidence offered by the defendant was rightly excluded.

The statutes cited are general in form, and deal only with rules of evidence; and it is not contended that they are to be restricted in their application to cases brought after they took effect, nor that they do not apply in trials upon causes of action which accrued before their passage. But the plaintiff does contend that, the present action having been begun against Holden in his lifetime, it is not an action against the administrator of a deceased person, within the meaning of St. 1896, c. 445, and that the provisions of that statute were intended to apply only to actions originally brought against an executor or an administrator, and in which the testimony of the deceased could not have been obtained, by reason of his death occurring before the pendency of the suit. There is no reason why the statute should be so strictly construed. When, after the death of the original defendant, the administrator of his estate appeared in court and took upon himself the defense of the action, it was no longer an action against Holden, but became an action against an administrator of a deceased person, within the language and meaning of the statute. The positions of the respective parties were the same, and the reason for resorting to evidence of counter statements was the same, as if the suit had been brought originally against the present defendant. As oral testimony of statements made by the deceased intestate had been introduced in support of the plaintiff's causes of action, a case within the language and meaning of St. 1896, c. 445, was made out for the admission of counter statements of the deceased; and it was error to reject the evidence of such counter statements offered by the defendant, unless, as the plaintiff further contends, the operation of that statute has been limited by St. 1898, c. 535, or unless the evidence offered was inadmissible for some other reason.

In considering the effect of St. 1898, c. 535, we find no reason to hold...