Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County, No. 2001-SC-0816-DG (KY 5/20/2004), No. 2001-SC-0816-DG.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-SC-0816-DG. |
| Parties | Sandra C. BROOKS and William C. Jacobs, Appellants v. The LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY Housing Authority; Austin J. Simms; Margaret Burch; and Jim Despain, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case, which was tried under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA") in the Fayette Circuit Court. At trial, Appellant, Sandra Brooks, claimed that Appellees, The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, et al., unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her race and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a discrimination complaint. Brooks lost on the discrimination claim, but prevailed on the retaliation claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Brooks on the discrimination claim and reversed the judgment in her favor on the retaliation claim. We granted discretionary review to address a number of important issues, including the application of the after-acquired-evidence doctrine and whether unlawful retaliation under Kentucky law is construed consistently with federal law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In 1987, The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority ("the Housing Authority") advertised in the Lexington paper an opening for an assistant housing manager. Brooks, who is African-American, applied and was interviewed for the position. During the course of the interview process, Brooks was told that a position for a work order clerk was also available. While Brooks gave permission to be considered for-the work order clerk position, she emphasized her strong preference for the better paying assistant housing manager position.
At the conclusion of the interview process, Brooks was the top candidate for both positions, although Brooks did not know this at the time. But instead of being offered the assistant housing manager position, the Housing Authority offered her the work order clerk position and Brooks accepted. The assistant housing manager position was then readvertised. When Brooks learned that she had been the top candidate for the position, she sought to reapply but was told that Housing Authority policy prohibited her from applying for another position during her one-year probationary period. Ultimately, a white female was hired for the position.
In 1990, a new assistant housing manager position was created. Brooks applied for the job and was one of the top three candidates for the position at the conclusion of the interview process. Brooks underwent a second interview with the designated supervisor for the position, Shirley Cook. At trial, Cook testified that she was unsatisfied with all three candidates and reported this to Austin Simms, who was the Housing Authority's executive director and ultimately responsible for the hiring decision. Simms indicated to Cook that he would like to see Brooks get the job. At Simms' request, Cook took Brooks to lunch to re-evaluate her. Cook's opinion of Brooks' qualifications did not change and the assistant housing manager position was readvertised.
Brooks again reapplied. At the conclusion of the interview process, Brooks did not emerge as a top candidate, and a white female among the top three candidates filled the position.
On appeal, Brooks argues that, after she established a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with her initial hire in 1987, the failure to consider her for the readvertised position in 1987 and the failure to promote her in 1990, the Housing Authority failed to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Therefore, she argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict on her discrimination claims. We disagree.
It is unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race...." KRS 344.040(1). In a claim arising under the statute, the plaintiff-employee bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583, 590 (2002), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). One way this burden can be met is by proof that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for and applied for an available position, (3) did not receive the job, and (4) that the position remained open and the employer sought other applicants. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d. at 678. Upon establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for its action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 215 (1981). After the defendant has met this burden, "the McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer relevant." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 407, 418 (1993). This is because "the McDonnell Douglas presumption is a procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production." Id. at 521, 113 S. Ct. at 2755, 125 L. Ed. 2d. at 425 (emphasis in original). The case then proceeds with the plaintiff having to meet her burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d. 105, 117 (2000).
On a motion for directed verdict, failure to introduce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory employment practice is fatal to the defendant-employer's case where the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S. Ct. at 2748, 125 L. Ed. 2d. at 417-18 (1993), because the defendant-employer has failed to rebut the presumption of discriminatory animus created by the plaintiffs prima facie case. We now turn to Brooks' argument that she was entitled to a directed verdict because the Housing Authority failed to produce evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not hiring her as, or promoting her to, an assistant housing manager.
As to the initial failure to hire Brooks in 1987, both Brooks and the Housing Authority rely on the reason articulated by the trial judge for denying Brooks' motion for a directed verdict. This was Austin Simms' testimony that Brooks was not hired for the assistant housing manager position because she had already been hired for the work order clerk position. That is, the Housing Authority could not hire her for both positions. But on appeal, we are not limited to the reasons articulated by the trial judge for denying Brooks' directed verdict motion.
The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict is set forth in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459 (1990):
Upon review of the evidence supporting a judgment entered upon a jury verdict, the role of an appellate court is limited to determining whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for directed verdict. All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Upon completion of such an evidentiary review, the appellate court must determine whether the verdict rendered is "`palpably or flagrantly' against the evidence so as `to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.'"
Id. at 461-62 (internal citations omitted). Thus, our review is independent of the grounds relied on or stated by the trial court to deny the directed verdict motion. Rather, we must make our own review of the entire record to determine whether the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. See Roethke v. Sanger, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 352, 365 (2001). Upon this review, we conclude that the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous.
First, we conclude that the reason relied on by the trial court was not, in isolation, a legitimate reason for not initially hiring Brooks as an assistant manager.
The trouble with the Housing Authority's argument that it could not hire Brooks for the assistant housing manager position because it hired her as a work order clerk is that there is no evidence as to the timing of these two employment decisions. That is, if the decision to readvertise the assistant housing manager position was made before Brooks was offered and accepted the work order clerk position, then the Housing Authority's asserted reason is no reason at all. If the decision to readvertise the assistant housing manager position was made concurrently with the decision to hire Brooks as a work order clerk, then, again the Housing Authority's asserted reason is no reason at all, because the decision to hire her as a work order clerk necessarily included a simultaneous rejection of her for the assistant housing manager position. That is, under the concurrent decision scenario, the Housing Authority's decision to hire Brooks as a work order clerk had no bearing on the decision to readvertise the assistant housing manager position. The Housing Authority's asserted reason is only a legitimate reason if the decision to hire Brooks for the...
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