Brooks v. Miller, 96-9284

• Decision Date: 30 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-9284,96-9284
• Citation: 158 F.3d 1230
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 207 Tyrone BROOKS, Lanett Stanley, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Zell MILLER, Governor of Georgia, Georgia State Board of Elections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1230

158 F.3d 1230

12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 207

Tyrone BROOKS, Lanett Stanley, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Zell MILLER, Governor of Georgia, Georgia State Board of

Elections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-9284.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 30, 1998.

Neil Bradley, Laughlin McDonald, Maha Zaki, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thurber E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Carol Atha Cosgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., David F. Walbert, Walbert & Mathis, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and PROPST ^*, Senior District Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

In this voting rights action, Plaintiffs, 27 black Georgia residents and voters, challenge the majority vote requirement for primary elections in Georgia, set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-501. The complaint was certified as a class action on behalf of all present and future black registered voters in Georgia. Plaintiffs contend that the majority vote requirement, also known as the primary runoff requirement, violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as well as the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Georgia's majority vote provision for primary elections is constitutional and does not violate § 2.

I. FACTS

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-501 originally required that a candidate in a primary or general election receive a majority of the votes cast in order to be nominated or elected and provided for a runoff election in the event that no candidate received a majority. In 1994, after the filing of this action, Georgia's General Assembly repealed the majority vote requirement for all general elections, except those for certain constitutional offices not at issue here, and replaced it with a 45 percent plurality rule. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-501(b), as amended by Ga. L.1994, p. 279, § 11; O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(18.1) (defining plurality as 45 percent of the total votes). In this action, Plaintiffs do not challenge the 45 percent plurality rule for general elections or majority voting as it affects multi-member offices such as school boards and county commissions. What Plaintiffs do challenge is the majority vote requirement for primary elections for single member, county-level offices, members of the General Assembly, superior court judges and district attorneys, and judges and justices of the Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court. ¹

In 1990, after conducting a five-day hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion. Shortly thereafter, the United States Department of Justice filed a parallel case which was consolidated with this action. Before trial, the United States filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint which the district court granted.

The district court made extensive findings of fact in this case. The district court relied on testimony presented at the four-day bench trial in 1996 and testimony presented at the hearing held in 1990 on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, along with other exhibits and reports submitted by the parties. In order to resolve the Plaintiffs' claims, the district court focused its findings of fact on two key areas. First, the district court examined evidence relating to the process by which the majority vote provision was enacted into law to determine whether it was passed for a racially discriminatory purpose. Second, the district court considered evidence presented on the issue of whether the majority vote law has a discriminatory impact. The following is a summary of the district court's factual findings.

A. Discriminatory Purpose

The district court acknowledged Georgia's long history of racial discrimination at all levels of government. The voting strength of blacks has historically been diminished in Georgia in numerous ways, including property ownership requirements, literacy tests, and the use of the county unit system which undermined the voting power of counties with large black populations. The county unit system gave each county twice as many unit votes for the purpose of nominating candidates for statewide office as the county had representatives in the Georgia House. This system had the effect of increasing the voting power of rural counties and diluting that of urban areas. In 1962, a three-judge federal panel struck down Georgia's county unit system as unconstitutional. See Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.Supp. 158 (N.D.Ga.1962).

The majority vote provision at issue in this case was enacted as part of a sweeping election reform bill signed into law in 1964 by then-Governor Carl E. Sanders ("Governor Sanders" or "Sanders"). This law was Georgia's first election code. Prior to 1964, Georgia's election system was chaotic. The rules for primary and general elections varied from county to county and election to election. Corruption and manipulation were commonplace. Throughout the state, and particularly in rural counties, groups known as "courthouse crowds" controlled local elections and often manipulated election practices to maintain their own power. Georgia was essentially a one-party state, and a victory in a Democratic primary was tantamount to election.

One form of election manipulation used under the plurality system consisted of entering a "stalking horse" into a local race to split the opposition vote and assure victory to courthouse crowd candidates. Governor Sanders experienced this tactic first hand when he ran against Peter Zack Geer in the 1962 lieutenant governor's race. Sanders withdrew from the race after hearing that Geer planned to enter a candidate named Carl F. Sanders in the race to confuse voters and ensure his own victory. Sanders ran for governor instead and won.

When the Georgia legislature created the first Election Laws Study Committee ("ELSC") in 1957 to examine election practices and propose legislation, members of this committee were interested in maintaining the discriminatory status quo through measures such as literacy tests. The first ELSC did not produce any comprehensive election reform. A second ELSC was formed in 1961 but dissolved without taking any action.

In 1963, after the county unit system had been struck down as unconstitutional, Denmark Groover ("Groover"), a state representative known for his staunch segregationist views, attempted to pass a majority vote requirement. There is no doubt that Groover's majority vote bill was the product of racial animus. He opposed "bloc voting," a euphemism for black citizens voting in a bloc. Groover's bill passed in the House but died in committee in the Georgia Senate.

Governor Sanders called for the creation of a third ELSC in 1963 for the purpose of drafting an election code. There were more racially moderate members on this committee than on the previous ELSCs. The third ELSC recommended a majority vote requirement, in addition to numerous other measures, as part of a comprehensive election code. The General Assembly adopted most of these recommendations, including the majority vote requirement. The ELSC's recommendations included some discriminatory measures such as a scaled-down version of a literacy test. However, some of the proposals of the third ELSC were either not related to race or promoted increased black participation in elections. For example, the 1964 code required that a voting registrar be present at the county courthouse during all business hours and that voter registration remain open until 50 days before an election.

Many supporters of the 1964 election code's majority vote requirement had legitimate "good government" motives. These backers wanted to reduce the power of the courthouse crowds and to eliminate the use of stalking horses and dummy candidates as a method of election manipulation. Governor Sanders was one of the key supporters of the measure. In the context of Georgia politics in the early 1960's, Sanders was regarded as a moderate on racial issues. He opposed the civil rights movement, yet he was not a militant segregationist. Sanders had considerable power over the General Assembly, enabling him to influence the agenda of the legislature. His power in the legislature was so great that he was able to install his friend and supporter, George T. Smith ("Smith"), as Speaker of the House.

Plaintiffs emphasize the racial antipathy of Groover and attempt to impute the improper motivations behind his proposal of the majority vote in 1963 to the supporters of the 1964 code's majority vote requirement. The district court found that Groover's racist motives were not attributable to the supporters of the 1964 law. Groover supported Sanders' opponent in the governor's race and was not involved in the Sanders administration. He was not a member of the third ELSC, and he had no influence over that committee.

The district court also acknowledged that Sanders favored at-large elections in 1962, when he was president pro tem of the Senate, for racially discriminatory reasons as well as some sound government reasons. Again, the district court chose not to impute those discriminatory motives to Sanders's support of the majority vote law in 1964 in the absence of evidence indicating that the 1964 majority vote provision itself was racially motivated.

B. Discriminatory Impact

On the question of the effect of the majority vote law, the district court considered testimony as to the law's impact on individuals considering a run for office as well as statistical analyses of data showing how the law affected actual elections. The district court found that though there was some evidence minimally supporting the theory that black candidates were discouraged from running for office by the prospect of a runoff, the evidence did not...