Brooks v. One Motor Bus Carrying 1937-38 South Carolina License V 1357, Motor 45590, Serial 40476
| Decision Date | 24 May 1939 |
| Docket Number | 14881. |
| Citation | 3 S.E.2d 42,190 S.C. 379 |
| Parties | BROOKS v. ONE MOTOR BUS CARRYING 1937-38 SOUTH CAROLINA LICENSE V 1357, MOTOR NO. 45590, SERIAL NO. 40476. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hemphill & Hemphill, of Chester, for appellant.
Douglas & Douglas, of Winnsboro, for respondent.
By this appeal we are asked to determine whether a school district bus, actively in use for the transportation of children to and from school, comes within the purview of Section 8785 of the Code of Laws, 1932. The statute in question in broad terms imposes liability on any motor vehicle where injury or damage results from its negligent operation, or when operated in violation of the provisions of law. It likewise provides for the attachment of such offending motor vehicle, and creates a lien thereover next in priority to the lien for state and county taxes.
This is an action in rem, solely against the respondent, school bus which is the property of School District No. 9, of Fairfield County. Appellant, claiming to have suffered damages to his car and person as a result of the alleged negligent and unlawful operation of the bus on one of the public highways of Fairfield County, had it attached on the school grounds by the sheriff of Fairfield County while the school was in session, and at a time when the bus was being held in readiness to transport the pupils back to their homes. It is owned and operated by the school district solely for the purpose of transporting pupils, and is one of the school facilities furnished by the District in aid and furtherance of its educational system.
The lower Court, upon motion of the School District, dissolved and set aside the attachment, and the bus was thereupon delivered to the District. The Court in a comprehensive order held that motor vehicles owned by the State or by any political subdivision of the State do not fall within the terms of the statute, and may not be levied upon and sold under legal process.
We entertain no doubt as to the correctness of this judgment.
In this State neither the commonwealth nor any of its political subdivisions is liable in an action ex delicto unless made liable by express enactments of the General Assembly, except where the acts complained of, in effect, constitute a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Sherbert v. School Dist. No. 85, Spartanburg County 169 S.C. 191, 168 S.E. 391; Chick Springs Water Company v. State Highway Department, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842; Randal v. State Highway Department, 150 S.C. 302 148 S.E. 57; Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151; Lowry v. Thompson, 25 S.C. 416, 1 S.E. 141.
It was held in United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Department of South Carolina, 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E. 887, that statutes permitting suits against a state, and especially those statutes allowing suits against towns, cities, and counties, political subdivisions of the state, for damages to property and persons, being in derogation of sovereignty, should be construed strictly.
As we understand the rule relating to the immunities attaching to sovereignty, such attributes are never to be considered as waived or surrendered by any inference or implication. The surrender of an attribute of sovereignty being so much at variance with the commonly accepted tenets of government, so much at variance with sound public policy and public welfare, the Courts will never say that it has been abrogated, abridged, or surrendered, except in deference to plain, positive legislative declarations to that effect. Herman Const. Co. v. Capper, 105 Kan. 291, 293, 182 P. 386.
Our legislative history amply shows that the General Assembly has been fully cognizant of this sound principle of law. It has in several instances by express enactment prescribed the cases in which actions are allowed against counties, cities, towns and the State Highway Department. And in those enabling statutes the Legislature has invariably set forth with care and precision the terms and conditions upon which suit may be brought. In the permissible actions referred to only the recovery of general judgments is allowed. We look in vain to these statutes for any express or implied provision authorizing any specific lien over any governmental property of any governmental agency, or for any authority authorizing the issuance of executions, and levy and sale thereunder.
When a judgment is rendered against a county, it is the duty of the board of supervisors to apply funds in the treasury of the county, not otherwise appropriated, to its payment, or, if there are no such funds, it is its duty to budget the judgment as a county expense and levy a tax, if authority exists therefor, to pay it. There is nothing in our legislative history to show that any other method of payment was ever contemplated. We are unable to find, nor has our attention been called to, any such statute in this State expressly giving authority to levy an execution, and sell property of political subdivisions of the State for a debt.
It is a general rule, to which we subscribe, that neither the State nor any of its political divisions, is bound by general words in a statute restrictive of a prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. 17 R.C.L., Sec. 43, Page 145; Emery County v. Burresen, 14 Utah 328, 47 P. 91, 37 L.R.A. 732, 60 Am.St.Rep. 898, Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, Sec. 161; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 15 Am.Dec. 379; Sedgw.Stat.Constr., 2nd Ed. 337; Leonard v. Brooklyn, 71 N.Y. 498, 27 Am.Rep. 80; Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 595.
It is also the law that no execution can be levied against the property of a county, state, or any political subdivision of the state, in the absence of a statute expressly granting such right in express terms. 17 R.C.L., Levy and Seizure, Sec. 43, page 145; 10 R.C.L., Executions, Sec. 9, page 1222, 23 C.J. Executions, § 105, page 355.
Under the foregoing authorities, the principle is adhered to that property held for public uses, such as public buildings parks, wharves, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, court houses, jails, school houses, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject...
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