Brooks v. De Soto Oil Co

• Decision Date: 15 January 1912
• Docket Number: 15,431
• Citation: 100 Miss. 849,57 So. 228
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SI BROOKS v. DE SOTO OIL CO

57 So. 228

100 Miss. 849

SI BROOKS v. DE SOTO OIL CO

No. 15,431

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 15, 1912

October, 1911

APPEAL from the circuit court of Washington county. HON. J. M CASHIN, Judge.

Suit by Si Brooks against the De Soto Oil Co. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff appeals.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to the declaration of appellant (who was plaintiff below). The declaration contains two counts, which are substantially as follows:

First count: At the time of the occurrence of the injuries complained of, appellee was operating an oil mill, and among other departments thereof it was operating a linter department, where the lint remaining on cotton seed was ginned off and baled, and that as a part thereof it was operating a huller; that for the purpose of operating the machinery necessary to do the hulling and linting, as a part of the motor power thereof, there was a shaft in the linter department, which was run by a belt from the engine below and on which shaft there was a pulley, over which ran a belt that was connected with and operated what is known as a feeder to the hullers, which pulley was fastened on said shaft and kept tight thereon by a set screw, the head of which protruded two and one-half inches above the neck of the pulley, and was left unprotected and uncovered, and was dangerous to operatives who might go near it in performance of their duties; that when said machinery and pulley were running the set screw was not visible, and when said machinery was not running said set screw was largely obscured from view by the rim of the pulley; that the belt which run over the pulley and operated the feeder to the hullers occasionally ran off of the pulley onto the shaft, and it thereby became necessary to replace it on the pulley, and that such was done while the machinery was in motion, which was not of itself a dangerous act to attempt to do, except for the dangerous condition of said set screw; that, at the time of the injuries complained of, appellant was employed by appellee in the capacity of huller, whose duties were to take the lint from the huller to the press and bale the same, and while he was thus engaged in this employment he was, without first being notified by appellee of the dangerous condition of said set screw, directed and ordered by his supervisor who was foreman or boss of that department to replace the belt on the pulley, said belt having run off thereof onto the shaft, which appellee proceeded to attempt to do in obedience to orders, and while attempting to do so he was caught in his clothes by said set screws, and thrown over and over the shaft, and thereby greatly bruised, injured, and maimed having, among other injuries, his right leg and foot so crushed as to render amputation necessary, and otherwise causing him great suffering, etc.

Second count: The second count alleges substantially the same facts as set forth in count 1, further alleging in addition thereto that appellee well knew of the dangerous condition of said set screw, and had failed to notify and warn him of such dangerous condition.

To the above declaration appellee interposed the following demurrer, to-wit:

(1) That neither count stated a cause of action.

(2) The declaration shows plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.

(3) That both counts of the declaration show clearly that appellant knew of the alleged danger and defects in said set screw, and the danger was such that no prudent man would have obeyed the orders of the alleged superior to replace the belt, and that plaintiff knew the risks arising from replacing said belt.

This demurrer was sustained by the court, and, appellant declining to amend his declaration, the court dismissed the same, and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Reversed and remanded.

Watson & Jayne, for appellant.

This case, as we understand it, is one of first impression in Mississippi, while the courts in other jurisdictions are divided as to what is the better rule in what are known as set screw cases. We frankly admit, and from a juristic standpoint, will say, that we regretfully admit that the weight of authority is adverse to our contention in this case.

We cannot add anything in strength to the terse and telling language of condemnation of the majority of the set screw cases used by Judge Thompson in his work on Negligence.

In Thompson on Negligence, section 4022, this author says: "Injuries to servants from unguarded set screws have been of such frequent occurrence, and the means of preventing them being so obvious and inexpensive, there is something peculiarly atrocious in those judicial decisions which condone the use of this specie of murder machine. It is gratifying to note that the exposed or unguarded set screw on revolving shafts is now rapidly going out of use, not in consequence of judicial decisions condemning it, but under the compulsion of statutes. A few decisions justifying the retention of this infamous contrivance, even in factories where children are employed, linger in the books.

In happy contrast to the cases cited by Judge Thompson is the rule adopted by the Canadian court. Thompson on Negligence, section 4023; George Matthews Co. v. Bouchard, 28 Can. S. C. 580. As is also the rule expressed in Mountain Copper Co. v. Pierce, 13 F. 150.

The case made by the declaration, however, is a stronger case than those in the majority of cases cited by Judge...