Brooks v. State, No. 98-3855
| Decision Date | 08 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-3912., No. 98-3855 |
| Citation | 745 So.2d 1113 |
| Parties | Georgia M. BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Charles E. Roberts, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellants.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Terri Leon-Benner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
In these two consolidated appeals, appellants, Georgia M. Brooks and Charles E. Roberts, contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence which was seized as a result of an unlawful stop. We agree and therefore reverse and remand with directions to discharge appellants.
The state maintained below that Officer Bates approached appellants' vehicle, which had pulled off the side of the road to change drivers, in a consensual police-citizen encounter and that appellants were free to leave at any time. Bates admitted that he did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he approached appellants' vehicle, and he said the encounter was not an investigatory stop. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (). And see § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1997) (Florida's Stop and Frisk Law).
We conclude that the trial court's finding of an consensual encounter is clearly erroneous. Officer Bates activated his flashing blue lights when he pulled up behind appellants' stopped vehicle. As Brooks was driving the vehicle onto the roadway, she stopped when she saw the flashing lights and uniformed police officer approaching the car. Section 316.2397, Florida Statutes (1997), allows only police vehicles to have blue flashing lights, and section 316.126, Florida Statutes (1997), requires all vehicles to pull to the closest edge of the roadway upon the approach of a vehicle displaying blue or red lights. Bates admitted he makes traffic stops with his flashing lights and siren. While Bates testified that he activated the lights as a safety precaution, a reasonable person under such circumstances would not have believed he or she was free to leave and terminate the encounter. See State v. Ferrell, 705 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Jones v. State, 658...
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G.M. v. State
...DCA 2002); Siplin v. State, 795 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. State, 780 So.2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); and Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), as cases in Below, one judge agreed with the decision to certify conflict to this Court, but dissented from the majority ......
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