Brooks v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. SC94308.,SC94308. |
| Citation | 787 So.2d 765 |
| Parties | Lamar Z. BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Kepler B. Funk and Keith F. Szachacz of Funk & Szachacz, P.A., Melbourne, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court adjudicating guilt of first-degree murder and imposing the death penalty upon Lamar Brooks. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Because of the prejudice resulting from the erroneous admission of extensive hearsay testimony, we reverse Brooks' convictions and remand for a new trial.
In the late night hours of April 24, 1996, Rachel Carlson and her three-month-old daughter, Alexis Stuart, were found stabbed to death in Carlson's running vehicle in Crestview, Florida. Carlson's paramour, Walker Davis, and Brooks were charged with the murders. Davis was married and had two children, and his wife was pregnant with their third child. However, the victim believed Davis was also the father of her child and demanded support from him.1 Davis became concerned about this pressure. He was convicted of the murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. However, he did not testify at Brooks' trial.
Brooks lived in Pennsylvania but had traveled to Florida from Atlanta with his cousin Davis and several friends on Sunday, April 21, 1996. Brooks stayed with Davis at Eglin Air Force Base for a few days before returning to Pennsylvania. In interviews with the police, he informed them that on the following Wednesday evening, the night of the murders, he helped Davis set up a waterbed, watched some movies, and walked Davis's dog.
Contrary to Brooks' statements, several witnesses placed him and Davis in Crestview on the night of the murders, although no physical or direct evidence linked him to the crimes. Mark Gilliam testified about a conversation between Davis, Brooks and himself wherein all three men allegedly joked about various ways they would kill Carlson because of pressure she exerted on Davis to support her child. Gilliam testified that he did not take the conversations seriously and thought it was all a joke. In exchange for his testimony, the State promised Gilliam he would not be prosecuted in any manner for his involvement in the murders of Carlson and Stuart. The State also presented the testimony of Terrance Goodman, a jailhouse informant and six-time convicted felon incarcerated with Brooks, who testified about comments Brooks made concerning the murders. In return for Goodman's testimony against Brooks, the State agreed to reduce a first-degree murder charge against him to a third-degree murder without a firearm charge and agreed to recommend a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines.
In addition to Gilliam and Goodman, the State was permitted to introduce, over objection, numerous hearsay statements made by Davis that were used against Brooks. Brooks was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. As noted, Davis had been previously convicted and sentenced to life, and his convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See Davis v. State, 728 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
.
Brooks raises fifteen issues in this appeal.2 In light of our remand for a new trial, we find all the issues raised by Brooks moot, except those relating to the hearsay statements and issues (8) and (9) as they may affect the subsequent retrial of the case.
Brooks asserts that his constitutional right to confront his accusers and the evidence against him by cross-examination and otherwise was violated throughout the trial by the admission of numerous hearsay statements made by persons who did not testify at trial. Most of the statements complained of were focused solely on Davis and his motives and plans to kill the victims. Indeed, Brooks claims that his trial was really a retrial of Davis, rather than a trial limited to evidence about Brooks.
Initially, Brooks alleges that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by Carlson to her friends on the night of the murders as to her relationship with Davis and her intended activities, as well as numerous statements made by Davis evidencing his intent to kill Carlson and her baby, his purchase of a life insurance policy for the baby, which named him as the primary beneficiary, and his intent to purchase an expensive vehicle in cash.
Brooks argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements by Carlson to her coworkers, along with an e-mail sent by Carlson to Davis, evidencing her intent to drive to Crestview with Davis on the night of the murders. Several of Carlson's coworkers and friends testified that Carlson had told them that she and Davis were going to visit Davis's aunt in Crestview on the evening of April 24. Several of these people also testified she had told them that she needed some money from him and that she wanted him to sign some paternity papers. Michael Lynes, a computer employee at Eglin Air Force Air Base, testified that he retrieved an e-mail message sent by Carlson to Davis. The message was dated April 24 and read as follows: This message was deleted from Davis's computer at work at 7:03 a.m. on April 25, the morning after the murders.
The trial court allowed this testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides an exception for evidence of the state of mind of the maker of the statements when such state of mind is relevant to an issue at trial. Brooks claims this was error because a statement admitted to show state of mind is only allowed to prove the state of mind or subsequent act of the declarant, not of a defendant. Here, Brooks alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce these statements directly against Brooks to show that Davis traveled to Crestview with Carlson on the night of the murders. We agree.
Hearsay is defined as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
§ 90.803(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). Under this exception, however, a declarant's statement of intent under section 90.803(3) is only admissible to infer the future act of the declarant, not the future act of another person. See Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
(). Further, ordinarily, a victim's state of mind is not a material issue, nor is it probative of a material issue in a murder case. See Woods v. State, 733 So.2d 980, 987 (Fla.1999). However, there are some exceptions to this general rule.
First, a victim's state of mind may be relevant to an element of the crime. See Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870 (Fla.2000)
. Second, "the victim's state of mind may become relevant to an issue in the case where the defendant claims: (1) self-defense; (2) that the victim committed suicide; or (3) that the death was accidental." Id. at 874-75 (citing Woods, 733 So.2d at 987-88); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.3a (2000 ed.). Finally, the state of mind of the victim-declarant may become an issue in a case when it is used "to rebut a defense raised by the defendant." 762 So.2d at 875 (citing State v. Bradford, 658 So.2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)).
However, in the instant case, as in Stoll, the victim's state of mind was not relevant to an element of the crime. Moreover, Brooks did not claim either self-defense, that Carlson committed suicide, or that the death was accidental. Further, the record does not demonstrate that Carlson's state of mind became relevant to rebut a defense raised by the defendant Brooks. At trial, Brooks asserted no alibi defense and did not dispute that he was in Crestview on the night of the murders.
Moreover, we find that Bradford is inapplicable here. In Bradford, the defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of his ex-girlfriend. Part of the evidence against the defendant was the presence of his fingerprints in the victim's new car. In response to this evidence, the defendant claimed that his fingerprints were in her car because even after their break-up, the victim would visit him and would allow him into her car. To rebut this explicit claim, the State sought to introduce statements under § 90.803(3)(a)(1) made by the victim to her daughter expressing fear of her ex-boyfriend. These statements included the victim's changing of apartments and vehicle so that the defendant would not be able to find her. The trial court disallowed these statements. On appeal, the Fifth District disagreed and held:
The victim's statements of fear are not admissible as proof that it was the defendant who killed her, but her statements of fear are admissible to rebut the...
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