Brooks v. Western Union Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1892
• Citation: 19 S.W. 572
• Parties: BROOKS v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 572

19 S.W. 572

BROOKS v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 21, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Garland county; JAMES B. WOOD, Judge.

Action by J. B. Brooks against the Western Union Telegraph Company for a statutory penalty for failure to deliver a message. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Chas. D. Greaves, for appellant. U. M. & G. B. Rose, for appellee.

COCKRILL, C. J.

The act of March 31, 1885, imposes a penalty upon a telegraph company for refusing to "transmit over its wires to localities on its line" any message tendered to the company for transmission. The controlling question in this case is, does this language impose a penalty for the company's refusal to deliver a message to the addressee after it has been transmitted over its wires to the locality on its line to which it is addressed? There is no doubt but that the company undertakes to deliver, under reasonable rules and regulations, messages transmitted over its wires, and that it must respond in damages to those who are injured by its neglect of duty. But the question is, has the legislature imposed a penalty for the refusal to perform that duty as it has for the refusal to perform the duty of transmitting a message? The terms of the act are confined to a refusal to "transmit over the wires" The language is not to "transmit and deliver the message," as in the Indiana act referred to in argument; nor is it simply "to transmit," as in the act of 1868, which was construed to mean to transmit to the addressee, in Telegraph Co. v. Davis, 41 Ark. 79; but the terms of the present act confine the penalty to the refusal to transmit over the wires to the locality on the line to which the message is addressed. The statute is penal, and its terms cannot be extended beyond their obvious meaning. Where there is a doubt, such an act ought not to be construed to inflict a penalty which the legislature may not have intended. This is a familiar rule of construction. Applied to this case, it resolves the question in favor of the company, for it cannot be said that the language plainly implies the intention to visit a penalty for a refusal to deliver. It follows that it is only when a telegraph company doing business in this state refuses to transmit a message tendered to it that the penalty is incurred. Frauenthal v. Telegraph Co., 50 Ark. 78, 6 S. W. Rep. 236. When the message is transmitted, and the company neglects or refuses to deliver it, when its...