Broome v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Jax, Inc., RENT-A-CAR

• Decision Date: 25 January 1966
• Docket Number: RENT-A-CAR,No. G-420,G-420
• Citation: 182 So.2d 26
• Parties: Lillian BROOME and Harry Broome, her husband, Appellants, v. BUDGETOF JAX, INC., a Florida corporation, and Walter F. Wedberg, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 26

182 So.2d 26

Lillian BROOME and Harry Broome, her husband, Appellants, v. BUDGET RENT-A-CAR OF JAX, INC., a Florida corporation, and Walter F. Wedberg, Appellees.

No. G-420.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 25, 1966.

Arthur J. Gutman, Jacksonville, for appellants.

Howell, Kirby, Montgomery & Sands, Jacksonville, for appellee.

RAWLS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Lillian Broome was injured as a result of an accident caused by an automobile owned by Budget and driven by one Walter F. Wedberg. The accident occurred in Mrs. Broome's driveway as she was getting out of the automobile. The instant suit was filed and opin trial thereof the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to Wedberg and assessed damages against Budget in the sum of $35,000 for Mrs. Broome and $10,000 for her husband. Budget timely filed its post-trial 'Motion for Judgment in Accordance With Motion for Directed Verdict or for New Trial.' The trial judge entered judgment in favor of defendant Budget notwithstanding the verdict and further ordered '* * * that in the event that judgment for the defendant to be entered herein be reversed on appeal, the alternative motion of the defendant for a new trial is granted * * * .' It is from this judgment that plaintiffs have perfected this appeal.

The real issue that must be decided is: Was there substantial competent evidence in the record by which a jury could conclude that Plaintiff Lillian Broome's injuries were incurred as a proximate cause of a negligent act or omission on the part of Budget? We conclude there was such competent evidence and the trial judge's order must be reversed.

Additional facts which must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict are: The automobile involved in this accident, a 1963 Ford Falcon Convertible, was owned by Defendant Budget in connection with its business of renting automobiles to the general public. The Falcon was equipped with a Fordomatic automatic transmission which was operated by the driver moving a shift lever mounted on the steering column. As the lever is moved, an arrow points to letters set out upon a quadrant which letters are arranged in the following order: 'P' for Park, 'R' for Reverse, 'N' for Neutral and 'D' for Drive. Thomas St. Denis, who was the resident manager for Budget, testified that the Falcon was designed to start only when the arrow indicated park or neutral and that on Christmas night prior to this accident, a lady who had rented the Falcon called and advised it would not start. He went to where it was parked and by 'jiggling the lever' was able to start it. Other testimony of this witness was that he had knowledge prior to Christmas that at times the shift lever had to be jiggled to actuate the starting mechanism; that the lever did not require moving more than a quarter of an inch; that Budget had received complaints as early as the month of June, 1963, about the Falcon, and 'We would tell people if the car didn't start, touch the gearshift lever, or jiggle the gearshift lever, and it would start'; that Budget had incurred the same trouble with other Falcons but 'not to an aggravated degree'; and that this Falcon Convertible did not rent as frequently as other cars, so the daily rental was reduced. Another witness testified that he had rented the Falcon in early December and had reported to Budget that the starting mechanism was out of adjustment.

The driver of the Falcon testified that on the day of the accident (the early afternoon of January 3, 1964) he had parked it on the Broome's concrete driveway while visiting them. As he prepared to depart Mrs. Broome assisted him in locating his keys which she found in the ignition. Wedberg and Mrs. Broome were in the car and the gear lever was in 'park.' He turned the ignition key and nothing happened. While Mrs. Broome was getting out of the car or immediately after she had stepped out, he jiggled the gearshift lever and turned the key; the car jumped back about a foot and knocked Mrs. Broome down.

It was upon the foregoing basic facts that the jury reached its verdict, holding Budget liable for Mrs. Broome's injuries and finding the driver Wedberg not guilty of any negligent act. The judgment in favor of Wedberg has not been questioned on this appeal.

Automobiles have long been recognized to be dangerous instrumentalities in this jurisdiction. Budget was engaged in the business of renting automobiles to the general public. It rented the subject automobile with a known defect within it failed to correct over a long period of time. The fact that Budget was guilty of a negligent act is not controverted. This brings us to the real question involved in this lawsuit, Was Budget's negligent act such that a jury could conclude that it was the proximate cause of the accident? In holding that Budget's negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident, the trial judge stated:

'To repeat, there was no evidence that the car ever jumped backward before the time of Mrs. Broome's injury. Thus this is not a case of erecting inference upon inference because there is no foundation for entertaining even a first inference that the backward movement of the car was the result of the defective shift mechanism. It is clear that the evidence does not exclude other tenable conclusions, e. g., that the defendant Wedberg himself placed the shift lever in reverse position.'

The observation by the trial judge as to 'other tenable conclusions's was resolved by the jury. In finding that defendant Wedberg was not guilty, the jury necessarily concluded that the accident did not occur as a result of his negligently placing the shift lever in reverse position. It obviously concluded that the movement of the vehicle was occasioned by the negligence of Defendant Budget in renting to Wedberg an automobile which oftenting would not start unless the shift mechanism was 'jiggled' when in the positions of Park and Neutral.

We are therefore confronted with the question of whether 'proximate cause' when considered in light of the facts present in this case was properly submitted to the jury by the trial judge. Probably no other segment of the law of negligence has...