Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Brown
| Decision Date | 30 March 1937 |
| Docket Number | 27126. |
| Citation | 71 P.2d 742,180 Okla. 489,1937 OK 201 |
| Parties | BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. BROWN. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1937.
Application for Leave to File Second Petition for Rehearing Denied May 25, 1937.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where the beneficiary under a benefit certificate sues to recover the benefits thereunder, and the defendant defends upon the ground that it has paid such benefits to the assignee of the beneficiary by virtue of an assignment executed by beneficiary, and the beneficiary thereupon alleges her signature to the assignment was obtained by the agents of defendant by means of fraud and misrepresentation and the case is tried upon the issue of how and why she signed the assignment, the action is one in equity and not law; since the money judgment she seeks and admittedly is entitled to if she can escape the effect of the assignment is dependent upon her ability to cancel the assignment because of the alleged fraud in obtaining it.
2. Where A, who can read and write, executes an instrument without reading it and upon the statement of another person as to its nature and legal effect, and thereafter seeks to escape the legal effect of such instrument, upon the ground of fraud and misrepresentation of the nature and legal effect thereof by such person, A has the burden of proving such fraud by clear, cogent, and convincing proof, which preponderates to the degree of overcoming all opposing evidence as well as the presumptions of good faith adhering thereto.
3. Fraud is never presumed, but must be alleged and proved, and it will not be inferred from facts as susceptible of good faith as of fraud.
4. Record examined; held, judgment of the trial court against the clear weight of the evidence.
Appeal from District Court, Creek County; Arthur Cochran, Judge.
Action by Maud L. Brown against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a fraternal insurance organization. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
See also, 170 Okl. 67, 38 P.2d 529.
Harper & Lee, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
Glenn O. Young, of Sapulpa, for defendant in error.
Maud L. Brown, formerly Garletts, claiming to be the beneficiary named in a benefit certificate issued to her son, Fred O. Garletts now deceased, by Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a fraternal insurance organization, instituted an action in the district court of Creek county, Okl., to recover under said policy. The judgment of the trial court, based upon the verdict of the jury, was in her favor and the defendant appeals.
The allegations of her petition pleaded the issuance of the policy naming her beneficiary, the continued existence thereof, in full force and effect, the death of the insured, due proof of loss, and the failure and refusal of the defendant to pay to her the benefits provided.
The defendant's answer specifically admitted all of these allegations, but alleged it had paid the benefits due under the certificate to Mrs. Martha Ann Garletts, widow of the deceased son, by virtue of an assignment thereof from the plaintiff to said widow.
The plaintiff thereupon replied denying the execution of said assignment, and alleging further, that if she did execute it her signature thereto was obtained by the agents of defendant by fraud and misrepresentation. Upon these issues the case went to trial before a jury.
When the opening statements of counsel had been made, which are not in the case made, the defendant assumed the burden of proof. Evidence was introduced by both parties relating to the circumstances under which plaintiff affixed her signature to the various papers presented to her. From the whole record we are of the opinion that the only issue tried by the parties was whether plaintiff voluntarily and wittingly assigned the benefits to the son's widow; or, whether her apparent assent and her signature to the assignment were obtained by misrepresenting the nature and effect of the instruments she did actually execute.
The first proposition argued by defendant covers several assignments of error all relating to the law applicable to the issue of fraud and misrepresentation as involved by the courts rulings on defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, its motion for directed verdict, the weight of the evidence in support of the judgment, and motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
To properly approach the consideration of this argument, we must first determine the nature of the action tried and whether the trial judge was acting as a chancellor or law judge. This action in its inception was one at law to recover a money judgment. However, it did not remain such. It eventually resolved itself into an equitable action by which the plaintiff admittedly was entitled to judgment for the money, if she could cancel the executed assignment as fraudulent. In other words, she was seeking to escape the legal effect of an executed instrument, which was all that stood between her and the money. The money judgment relief was wholly dependent upon the equitable relief, the cancellation of the assignment. We are impressed with the analogy between this case and Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. v. Sharrock, 162 Okl. 127, 20 P.2d 154. We therefore hold that the action as tried was equitable, and the jury acted in an advisory capacity only. The judgment can only be set aside in the event this court weighs the evidence and finds the judgment against the clear weight of the evidence in the light of the principles by which such weight is to be determined.
The plaintiff is in the position of having asserted actionable fraud. She occupies the position of one seeking to cancel an instrument she has executed, and to escape its legal effect. This court has had numerous occasions to announce the rules by which plaintiff seeks her relief and the burden of proof she must assume and carry forward.
As a rule, fraud is never presumed. Herron v. M. Rumley Co., 29 Okl. 317, 116 P. 952; Gordon v. Slate, 169 Okl. 399, 37 P.2d 270; and Cromwell v. Ream, 175 Okl. 408, 52 P.2d 752, and other cases.
We have said that the proof must be clear, cogent, convincing, positive, and satisfactory. Davis v. Howe, 99 Okl. 118, 226 P. 316; Garland v. Carpathia Petroleum Co., 99 Okl. 210, 226 P. 379, and other cases.
We have said that the evidence of fraud must preponderate to the degree of overcoming all opposing evidence and repelling all presumptions of good faith. Rogers v. Harris, 76 Okl. 215, 184 P. 459; Owen v. U.S. Surety Co., 38 Okl. 123, 131 P. 1091; and Hembree v. Douglas, 169 Okl. 403, 37 P.2d 314, and other cases.
Where a transaction is fairly susceptible of two constructions, the one which will free it of the imputation of fraud will be adopted. Clark v. Lockstone, 170 Okl. 316, 39 P.2d 971; Cromwell v. Ream, supra, and Gungoll v. Elsberry, 177 Okl. 301, 58 P.2d 852, and other cases. Likewise, where fraud is alleged, it must be proved and cannot be inferred from facts consistent with honesty of purpose. Cromwell v. Ream, supra.
With these cardinal rules to guide us, we must weigh the evidence and adjudge the alleged error of the trial court in the light thereof. The facts are these: The insured son lived in Pennsylvania; he was employed by a railway company and was a member of the defendant organization which is a labor union embodying fraternal insurance features; and, while yet a single man he procured the benefit certificate sued on and named his mother, the plaintiff, who was then Maud L Garletts, beneficiary. She then was, or later became a citizen of Oklahoma, and was such when the son died. Thereafter, he married and Martha Ann Garletts was his wife and is now his widow. He died without having changed the beneficiary under the policy. There was some testimony that he desired to make this change while in the hospital on his death...
To continue reading
Request your trial