Broughton v. Crews

• Decision Date: 06 September 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 15-22925-CIV-ALTONAGA/O'Sullivan
• Parties: JOSHUA BROUGHTON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL D. CREWS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

JOSHUA BROUGHTON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL D. CREWS, Respondent.

CASE NO. 15-22925-CIV-ALTONAGA/O'Sullivan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

September 6, 2016

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Petitioner, Joshua Broughton's ("Petitioner['s]") Petition for Relief . . . ("Petition") [ECF No. 1], filed August 4, 2015. Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan entered a Report . . . ("Report")¹ [ECF No. 18] on January 28, 2016, recommending the Court deny the Petition. Petitioner timely filed his Objections . . . ("Objections") [ECF No. 25] on April 6, 2016; and Respondent, Michael D. Crews, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections ("Respondent") filed his Response to Objections ("Response to Objections") [ECF No. 29] on May 24, 2016. The Court has carefully reviewed the Report, Objections, Response to Objections, record, and applicable law.

I. BACKGROUND²

On May 13, 2009, Petitioner was found guilty in Florida state court of: (1) robbery with afirearm; and (2) dealing in stolen property. (See Report 27-28).³ The State entered a nolle prosequi as to a charge of unauthorized use of a credit card on the first day of trial, and Petitioner was acquitted of all other charges. (See id. 19, 28). Petitioner's conviction is the result of his involvement with co-defendant, Anthony Sanders ("Sanders") in the armed robbery of a married couple, Steven ("Steven") and Maria Marin ("Maria"), on December 14, 2007 in Miami-Dade County, Florida. (See id. 2-3). Following his conviction, Petitioner was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment for robbery with a firearm and 30 years' imprisonment for dealing in stolen property, both sentences to run concurrently. (See id. 30).

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on statements made by the prosecution during trial. (See id. 30). The Third District Court of Appeal heard oral argument and subsequently issued a per curiam order affirming the trial court's decision without a written opinion. (See id. 31).

On March 29, 2012, Petitioner, pro se, filed his first motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed the denial, and the Third District Court again affirmed without a written opinion. (See id. 33-36).

Nearly one year later, on March 28, 2013, the pro se Petitioner filed a second motion for post-conviction relief. (See id. 37). The state court denied the second post-conviction motion as successive and stated: "Defendant does not allege any new grounds in his instant motion." (Id. 38 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Resp., Ex. GGGGG [ECF No. 14-14])). Judge O'Sullivan notes the "state post-conviction court's order is incorrect in its assessment that the petitioner did not raise any new grounds. All eight grounds raised in the second motion for post-conviction relief were new grounds." (Id. 39). Petitioner appealed and the Third District Court issued a percuriam decision affirming the lower court without a written opinion. (See id.).

On July 29, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the state appellate court, which was denied. (See id. 39-40). On August 4, 2015, he filed the instant Petition, asserting five grounds for relief:

a. The State Trial Court's Failure to Grant a Mistrial Following Detective Lopez's Reference (Erroneously) to Out of Court Identifications of Broughton by Non-Testifying Witnesses Violated Clearly Established State and Federal Law and Constitutes a Violation of Crawford and the Fourteenth Amendment; Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Call Garcia and Lamy as Rebuttal Witnesses ["Ground One";]

b. Trial Counsel's Failure to Seek Admission of Broughton's Co-Defendant's Exculpatory Confession Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the State Postconviction Court's Refusal to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue was Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law and an Unreasonable Determination in Light of the Evidence Presented ["Ground Two";]

c. Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to the 'Possession of Property Recently Stolen' Jury Instruction Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the State Postconviction Court's Refusal to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue is Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law and an Unreasonable Determination in Light of the Evidence Presented ["Ground Three";]

d. The State's Failure to Produce the Videotaped Confession of Co-Defendant Anthony Sanders and to Preserve the '911 Call' Placed Following the Incident Constitutes a Violation of Brady and Trombetta and Deprived Broughton of Directly Exculpatory Evidence ["Ground Four"; and]

e. Trial Counsel's Failure to Call a Material, Exculpatory, and Available Alibi Witness Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the State Postconviction Court's Refusal to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue was Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law and an Unreasonable Determination in Light of the Evidence Presented ["Ground Five."]

(Memorandum in Support of Petition . . . ("Memorandum") [ECF No. 1-1] 1-2 (alterations added; bold omitted)).

Respondent, pursuant to Judge O'Sullivan's Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 5], filed aResponse . . . ("Response") [ECF No. 14]; and Petitioner filed a Reply . . . ("Reply") [ECF No. 17]. Judge O'Sullivan then entered his Report to which Petitioner timely filed his Objections, and Respondent timely filed his Response to Objections.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Habeas Corpus

A district court may not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, without discussion, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits under section 2254(d) and therefore warrants deference. See Wright v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." (alteration added; citations omitted)); Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 2003) ("All that is required under § 2254(d)(1) is an adjudication on the merits, not a full state court opinion." (citations omitted)).

Section 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses are separate bases for reviewing a state court's decision. As explained in Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2001), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if either:

(1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or(2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case.

Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). A state court conducts an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if:

it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case. . . . [or] unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context. Notably, an "unreasonable application" is an "objectively unreasonable" application.

Id. (alterations added; internal citations omitted).

B. Standard of Review

When a magistrate judge's "disposition" has properly been objected to, district courts must review the disposition de novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). "[T]he plain language of the statute governing review [of the report] provides only for de novo review of 'those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.'" Wanatee v. Ault, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (alterations added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 itself is silent on the standard of review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress's intent was to only require a de novo review where objections have been properly filed, not when neither party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) ("It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge]'s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings." (alteration added)). The "[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]'s factual findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings." Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988) (alterations added) (citing Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One

Petitioner raises two claims in Ground One: (a) the state court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based on Detective Lopez's testimony ("Ground One, Claim One"); and (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call George Garcia ("Garcia") and Samuel Lamy ("Lamy") as rebuttal witnesses ("Ground One, Claim Two"). (See Report 47).⁴ Judge O'Sullivan recommends the Court deny Ground One as procedurally defaulted. (See id. 62). Petitioner argues as "a pro se litigant, for the purposes of exhaustion, his petition should be held to a more lenient standard" (Objs. 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), and the Court should find he fairly presented his claims to the state court (see Objs. 2-4).

A state prisoner must first exhaust his state-court...