Broussard v. Tian
| Citation | 156 Tex. 371,295 S.W.2d 405 |
| Decision Date | 07 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. A-5909,A-5909 |
| Parties | Josie V. Daniel BROUSSARD, Petitioner, v. M. J. TIAN et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Roberts, Baker, Richards, Elledge & Cunningham, Houston, F. B. Kimbell, Groesbeck, Fred C. Reeder, Corpus Christi, for petitioner.
Dodson & Reagan, Marlin, for respondents.
This suit is one by the petitioner-plaintiff, Mrs. Broussard, for her half of an alleged 10/13 community interest in 520.5 acres of land in Limestone County, which latter was purchased by her former husband, the defendant-respondent, Tian, during their marriage, from the Federal Land Bank, the total consideration of $2,080 being $480 cash, which was paid out of the separate property of Tian, and $1,600 evidenced by a vendor's lien executed by him. Joined as codefendants were certain grantees or successors in title to Tian, but the rights of these additional parties (including Francis M. and Inez James, who admittedly may be now considered as without interest in the property) are not alleged to be any better than those of the respondent-defendant, Tian. The judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, 290 S.W.2d 372, was against the petitioner-plaintiff. Our holding is to the contrary.
There is no written purchase contract in evidence. The deed, which ran to Tian, and the vendor's lien note and deed of trust, which he alone executed, contained no recitals purporting to deal with the community or separate status of the purchase or source of the consideration. However, not only the aforementioned $480 cash payment, but also several substantial payments of principal and interest on the note, were made out of the separate property of Tian, the balance due on the note being paid by his codefendant-grantees, and the community estate having thus paid out no money at all on the purchase.
(1, 2) On the other hand, as appears to be conceded-and necessarily so-by the respondents-defendant, the vendor's lien note being executed during the marriage by the husband, who is the community manager, and there being nothing in the note or related instruments to the contrary, the note is by presumption and in legal effect a community obligation, unless somehow lawfully shown to be otherwise. In the absence of any such showing, the result would necessarily be that, to the extent of the face of the note, the community furnished the original consideration for the purchase and thereby acquired a pro tanto ownership in the property, to wit, a 1600/2080 or 10/13 interest, of which the wife's half would be 5/13. The fact that the actual payment of all or some of the installments of the note were later made out of separate funds of the husband would not affect the community ownership, but would merely give rise to a debt or charge in favor of his estate against the community enforceable by appropriate proceedings. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881, in our view amply supports the foregoing statements. See also Solether v. Trinity Fire Ins. Co., 124 Tex. 363, 78 S.W.2d 180.
(3) It is also necessarily conceded that, assuming the above-mentioned showing as to the noncommunity character of the note could be made by parol, as, under the facts here, it would have to be if made at all, the respondents-defendant had the burden of making it. In this connection they introduced, over the objection of the petitioner-plaintiff, testimony of Tian which, when taken with other circumstances in evidence, they contend to be proof of an agreement between the grantor, Federal Land Bank, and Tian, sufficient under the above cited decisions, to make the note a separate property obligation of Tian and the property therefore entirely his separate estate. The single jury issue in the case was submitted under this theory, in response to which the jury found that there was such an agreement that the note 'would be paid out of the separate property of M. J. Tian.' If that finding is invalid, the judgment of the courts below against the petitioner-plaintiff cannot be sustained.
The petitioner-plaintiff asserts, in addition to other contentions, that the finding is wholly unsupported by the above-mentioned proof tendered by the respondents-defendant, even if parol evidence of such an agreement were admissible. We agree with this...
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Hatten v. City of Houston, 14255
...named defendants under the terms of Article 717m. Broussard v. Tian, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W.2d 372, reversed on other grounds 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d 405; Mizell Const. Co. & Truck Line, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 345 S.W.2d 835; Tolson v. Carroll, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 131......
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Duncan v. United States, 16310.
...of actual ownership in the ratio that funds from each source were used, Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881; Broussard v. Tian, Tex., 295 S.W.2d 405; Hartman v. Hartman, Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W.2d 480; Moor v. Moor, 24 Tex.Civ.App. 150, 255 S.W. 231, where the maximum contribution i......
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Welder v. Welder
...App.1935, opinion adopted); Gleich v. Bongio, 99 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex.Comm'n App.1937, opinion adopted); See also Broussard v. Tian, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex.1956); Glover v. Henry, 749 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1988, no writ); Holloway v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Tex.App.-......
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Swoboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp.
...169-71 (Tex.1975) (it is well settled that debts undertaken during marriage are presumed to be community debts); Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex.1956) (note executed during marriage is presumed to be community obligation). Either spouse can be held liable on a comm......