Broussard v. United States
| Docket Number | 21-30376 |
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Citation | 52 F.4th 227 |
| Parties | Nathaniel BROUSSARD, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant—Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John Lee Hoffoss, Jr., Esq., Lee Hoffoss Injury Lawyers, L.L.C., Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Karen Julian King, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before Wiener, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
After an alleged collision with a mail vehicle, Nathaniel Broussard submitted a claim to the U.S. Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), seeking about $15,000 for damage to his truck. The postal service denied his claim because Broussard's insurance covered it. Under the FTCA, this triggered a six-month window in which Broussard could either seek reconsideration or sue. He did neither. Instead, over eight months later, Broussard filed a second claim with the postal service, now seeking $2 million for back injuries from the same incident. Broussard's claim was denied. He sued. The district court dismissed his suit as time-barred. We affirm.
Broussard claims he was involved in a car crash with a U.S. Postal Service ("USPS") driver in Sulphur, Louisiana, on November 14, 2019. The postal vehicle allegedly pulled out of a private driveway and struck Broussard's Ford F-150. As a result, Broussard filed a Standard Form 95 ("SF-95") with the USPS on December 2, 2019, seeking $15,169.58 in property damage. He did not list any damages under the "Personal Injury" and "Wrongful Death" sections of the SF-95. Under the section asking about the extent of his injuries, Broussard wrote "None so far."
The USPS denied Broussard's claim in a letter sent on March 26, 2020. The basis for the denial was that Broussard had submitted a claim to State Farm Insurance for the same incident. The letter also notified Broussard of his options if he was unhappy with the denial. He could sue in federal court "no later than six (6) months after the date the Postal Service mails the notice of that final action," or, also within six months, he could "file a written request for reconsideration with the postal official who issued the final denial of the claim."
Broussard did neither. Instead, on December 1, 2020, Broussard—now represented by an attorney—sent in another SF-95. This SF-95 described the same November 14, 2019 collision but now claimed Broussard "sustained injuries to his lower back." It requested $2,000,000 in personal injury damages and $0 in property damages. The USPS denied Broussard's claim again. By letter dated February 2, 2021, the USPS stated Broussard's six-month period for suing or seeking reconsideration had elapsed on September 26, 2020. The letter added that Broussard was "not entitled to submit more than one claim resulting from the November 14, 2019 motor vehicle collision," and noted that, to the extent the second SF-95 meant to seek administrative reconsideration, it was untimely.
On February 9, 2021, Broussard sued the United States under the FTCA, seeking damages for his injuries from the November 14, 2019 incident. The government moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing Broussard's claim was untimely because he did not sue within six months of the March 2020 denial. In response, Broussard argued the six-month period began upon the mailing of the February 2021 denial of his second SF-95. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, concluding Broussard could not restart the limitations period by filing a second SF-95 for the same accident. The court also found no basis to allow equitable tolling. Broussard timely appealed.
"We review summary judgments de novo , applying the same standards as the district court." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin , 37 F.4th 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 2022) ; see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "We review a district court's determination that equitable tolling does not apply for abuse of discretion." Roe v. United States , 839 F. App'x 836, 842 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fisher v. Johnson , 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) ).
On appeal, Broussard contests the district court's ruling that his suit was time-barred. He contends that, while the USPS denied his claim for property damages in his first SF-95, it never denied his personal injury claim in his second SF-95. Alternatively, Broussard argues the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. We disagree on both points.
The FTCA provides the "exclusive" remedy for tort claims against the federal government and its employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) ; see 39 U.S.C. § 409(c) (suits against USPS); 39 C.F.R. § 912.11 (exclusiveness of remedy). It "authorizes civil actions for damages against the United States for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of a government employee under circumstances in which a private person would be liable under the law of the state in which the negligent act or omission occurred." Quijano v. United States , 325 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674 ). An FTCA claim must be "presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing ... of notice of final denial of the claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Failure to meet either of these deadlines means a claim is "forever barred." Id.
Broussard argues that because he claimed "[n]one so far" under the personal injury section of his first SF-95, a valid claim with respect to his personal injuries was never presented. And because it was not presented, it could not have been denied. He cites two cases for this proposition: Montoya v. United States , 841 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1988), and Green v. Warden, MCC Chicago , 2008 WL 4866329 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008). Neither supports his argument.
In Montoya , we explained that a "valid [FTCA] notice requires a writing that informs the agency of the facts of the incident and the amount of the claim." 841 F.2d at 105. That case involved plaintiffs who provided insufficient facts about their injuries and failed to include any specific sum of damages. See id. at 104–05 ; see also 39 C.F.R. § 912.5 (requiring a "sum certain"). Broussard's case is different. Unlike the Montoya plaintiff, he provided adequate facts to put the USPS on notice of the relevant incident. He also provided a specific sum—$15,169.58—representing his claimed amount of property damage. This damages amount could have been (but never was) supplemented with personal injury damages through procedures that allow for amendment of one's claim or reconsideration of a denial. See 39 C.F.R. §§ 912.5(b), 912.9(b) – (d).1
In Green , the district court considered whether the Bureau of Prisons had denied the plaintiff's entire administrative claim or merely the portion respecting property damage. 2008 WL 4866329, at *6. The court ultimately ruled the plaintiff could proceed with his personal injury claims because the denial letter explicitly referred only to a property claim. Ibid. Again Broussard's case is different. The USPS's March 2020 denial letter referred to Broussard's entire "administrative claim" and stated "this claim is denied." In no way did the USPS limit its denial only to property damage claims.
Ultimately, Broussard's first SF-95 presented his entire claim based on the November 14, 2019 accident. This claim could have been amended to include personal injury damages or appealed—all consistent with the procedures outlined in the FTCA. When the USPS denied that claim on March 26, 2020, the six-month clock started running, and it stopped ticking on September 26, 2020. During that time, Broussard neither sought reconsideration nor filed suit. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Broussard's action is untimely and his claim is therefore "forever barred." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Broussard's argument assumes a crucial premise: that his second SF-95 presents a claim distinct from his first one because it seeks personal injury instead of property damages. That is mistaken. His second SF-95 refers to the same November 14, 2019 incident as his initial SF-95. Broussard offers no authority for the proposition that the two SF-95s, despite arising out of the same incident, present distinct claims for purposes of the FTCA's six-month limitations period. To the contrary, "one bite at the apple is all that the FTCA's claim-filing scheme allows." Román-Cancel v. United States , 613 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2010). And limitations on the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the United States. See, e.g., Leleux v. United States , 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting authorities). Filing a duplicative claim more than six months after filing the first one, as Broussard has done here, cannot restart the six-month clock.2
Having established that Broussard's suit is untimely, we briefly consider Broussard's argument regarding equitable tolling. Equitable tolling is "applied ‘sparingly,’ " Granger v. Aaron's, Inc. , 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011), and is justified when a plaintiff has pursued his rights diligently but " ‘some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented a timely filing," Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). Broussard identifies no such extraordinary circumstance here, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Weeks after the alleged accident, Broussard submitted an FTCA claim for damage to his truck. Under the section for the extent of his personal injuries, Broussard wrote "None so far," and under the section for personal injury damages, he wrote "N/A". The USPS denied the claim because Broussard...
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