Browder v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 19 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 0597-21-2 |
| Parties | DEVONTAY TESHORN BROWDER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DFNWIDDIE COUNTY Joseph M. Teefey, Jr. Judge.
David G. Moss (The Law Office of David G. Moss, PLLC, on brief) for appellant.
Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton
Devontay Teshorn Browder ("Browder") was convicted by the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County ("trial court") of a variety of felonies: robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and credit card theft.[1] On appeal, in his sole assignment of error, Browder argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of these crimes because there was no evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that he was at the scene while the crimes were being committed. For the following reasons, we affirm.
"On appeal, an appellate court is required to consider the evidence and all inferences fairly deducible from it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Lambert v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 510, 515 (2020). "In doing so, we discard any of appellant's conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence." McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 516 (2020). So viewed, the evidence shows as follows.
On June 17, 2020, around 11:00 p.m., Nadine Jackson ("Jackson") arrived at the Dinwiddie Health and Rehab Center for work. As Jackson sat in her car and gathered her things, a silver car pulled up behind her, preventing her from leaving. A young man from the silver car approached Jackson, asking if she could help him. She said, "Sure," and asked what he wanted. Thinking that he wanted money, she began looking for her change purse, but when she turned back to the man, he pointed a gun in her face and demanded money. Jackson surrendered her wallet, which contained cash and credit cards.[2] The gunman started toward the silver car but returned and told her there was no money in the wallet. Jackson told him the wallet contained credit cards that would "work." The gunman returned to the silver car and told someone inside the car that "she said the [credit] cards would work." The gunman entered the passenger side of the car, and they drove away. Jackson called the police and reported the incident.
Earlier that same evening, Dinwiddie County Sheriff's Deputies Hazelton ("Deputy Hazelton") and Owen ("Deputy Owen") responded to the larceny of a motor vehicle at a gas station on Route 1 in Dinwiddie County, about two miles from the Dinwiddie Health and Rehab Center. Kenneth Tucker ("Tucker"), the owner of the stolen car, informed Deputy Hazelton that he left his keys in the ignition of his silver 2010 Nissan while he went inside to pay for gas, and while he was in the store, someone drove away in his car. As Tucker was explaining the incident to Deputy Hazelton, he "grabbed" Hazelton's shoulder, and pointed out a car travelling northbound on Route 1, and said it was his car.
Deputy Hazelton and Deputy Owen then engaged in "a lengthy pursuit" of the silver car on Interstate 85 for several miles, ending in Petersburg. Sometime after midnight, Petersburg Police Officer Peyton Stewart ("Officer Stewart") learned that the car was approaching Petersburg. When he saw the car and the Dinwiddie deputies in pursuit, he joined the chase. The chase ended on Grigg Street, where the occupants exited the car on foot, one from the driver's side, and another from the passenger's side. Officer Stewart chased the driver, detained him, and at trial identified him as Browder. Subsequently, Deputy Hazelton arrived, confirmed the silver vehicle was Tucker's stolen car, and arrested Browder. Deputy Hazelton found Tucker's identification card in the car and a wallet containing Jackson's information on the passenger-side floorboard.
Dinwiddie County Sheriff's Investigator Steve Shifflett ("Investigator Shifflett") arrived at the Dinwiddie Health and Rehab Center and interviewed Jackson about the robbery. Investigator Shifflett learned of the police pursuit on the radio and believed it was the same car involved in Jackson's robbery. Investigator Shifflett drove Jackson to Petersburg, where she confirmed that it was the same car. She also identified the passenger as the gunman.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Browder moved to strike, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence because the evidence was circumstantial and did not constitute an "unbroken chain" of events. Browder argued that the Commonwealth failed to exclude the hypothesis that he "got[] into the vehicle at some point after all of these other inciden[ts] . . . occurred." The trial court denied Browder's motion.
Browder rested his case without presenting any evidence and incorporated a renewed motion to strike in his closing argument. The trial court found that the evidence established the robbery, credit card theft, and use of a firearm. Addressing the conspiracy charge, the trial court found that someone other than the gunman was driving the silver car at the time of the robbery and blocked Jackson's car in so she could not leave. With respect to identity and Browder's suggestion that he entered the car after Jackson was robbed, the trial judge first noted the short time between the robbery and Officer Stewart's apprehension of Browder, approximately an hour. It further found that Browder attempted to elude police twice, by car and on foot, which indicated guilt. Concluding that Browder was the driver of the silver car at the time of the robbery, the trial court convicted Browder on all four counts. The trial court sentenced Browder to thirty-three years in prison, with eighteen years suspended. This appeal followed.
In a sufficiency case, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are "plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them]." Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). The trier of fact is required "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Brown v. Commonwealth, 68 Va.App. 44, 55 (2017) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). There was sufficient evidence if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Dietz v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 123, 132 (2017) (quoting Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 496-97 (2015)). Just because another trier of fact "might have reached a different conclusion" about what the evidence showed does not mean that this Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018) () (quoting Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 953 (1929)).
Browder argues that the Commonwealth's evidence did not justify the trial court's conclusion that Browder was the driver of the silver car at the time Jackson was robbed. He conceded at trial that if he was in fact the driver during the robbery committed against Jackson, the evidence would justify all four convictions. His entire argument rests on the hypothesis that he entered the car between the robbery and the end of the police chase. We affirm because the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Browder was the driver during the entire incident.
To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Browder was the driver during the robbery, the Commonwealth needed to present evidence justifying the trier of fact in rejecting any reasonable hypothesis of innocence supported by the evidence. Case v. Commonwealth, 63 Va.App. 14, 22 (2014) (citing Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388 (1970); Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 263, 277 (2004)). Even if "some evidence . . . support[s] the appellant's hypothesis of innocence," we must affirm if "any reasonable [fact finder], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected [the appellant's] theories in his defense and found him guilty of [the charged crime] beyond a reasonable doubt." Emerson, 43 Va.App. at 277 () (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). A reasonable fact finder may reject theories advanced by the defendant even if they are supported by some evidence, so long as it could reasonably infer from all the other evidence a theory of the case consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464-65 (2017) (citations omitted).
The evidence presented in this case contained several...
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