Brower v. State
| Decision Date | 04 May 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 38732,38732 |
| Citation | 217 Miss. 425,64 So.2d 576 |
| Parties | BROWER v. STATE. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
J. W. Kellum, Sumner, for appellant.
J. P. Coleman, Atty. Gen., Geo. H. Ethridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
P. H. Brower was convicted, under an indictment based on Section 2010, Code, 1942, of the wilful and felonious burning of Longview Church of God. He was sentenced to serve a term of one year in the state penitentiary, and from the judgment entered thereon, he appeals.
The church was situated about 100 yards from a public road. It burned between 12:00 and 1:30 a. m. on June 1, 1952. The weather was fair. The light wires had been disconnected, and no electric current could enter the building. No religious service had been held therein for the past six months. It had been cleaned, sprayed and the windows closed for about a month. A part of the land between the public road and the church was in cultivation. Just after sunup, following the fire, witnesses observed two sets of fresh human tracks crossing the plowed ground from the road toward the church and return. Those approaching the building were of ordinary stride, whereas the tracks leading from the church had a greater stride, indicating that the person was running away. One witness testified that these tracks were made during the night of the fire.
That morning Brower went to Parchman in his truck to obtain bloodhounds. On the way back to the scene he inquired of the keeper as to the proficiency of the dogs, and was told that they were good. Later, when he again asked the same question and was given the same answer, he remarked that he had been to the church and the dogs might run him. When the hounds were put on these tracks, they looked at Brower and manifested no further interest in the trail.
Brower was not a member of the church and had no official connection with it. However, it was developed that, on December 31, 1951, without the knowledge or consent of the church or its officials, he went to Greenwood and procured an insurance agent to write two combination fire policies in the sum of $1,500 each on 'Plainview Church of God'. He paid the premiums and the policies were mailed to him. On Monday morning June 2nd, the day after the fire, he went to the office of the insurance agent and his greeting was, 'Well, that church burned down last night'. When the adjuster went to Brower's home the next day to investigate the loss, he found out that Brower had no connection with the church. Then, for the first time, the trustees learned about the insurance.
Thereafter Brower made a free and voluntary confession of the burning and gave in detail his plan and movements on the night of the fire, and the way and manner in which he had set it. He gave as his motive that on account of confusion in the church he thought it would be best to burn it down.
The assignments of error in effect raise three points, to wit: (1) the indictment was insufficient on account of its failure to charge that the burning was done with malice; (2) the insurance was issued on Plainview, instead of Longview, Church of God, and was procured by Brower without any authority so to do, was invalid, and he, therefore, committed no crime; and (3) the State's evidence, aliunde the confession, was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
In response to appellant's point (1), attention is directed to sections 2006-2009, Code 1942, which specifically deal with arson. In each instance, the burning, or attempt, must be done 'wilfully and maliciously'. These sections designate the offenses as arson in the first, second, third and fourth degrees, respectively. But section 2010 thereof is as follows: 'Any person who wilfully and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts so to do or who causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any building, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class or character, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall at the time be insured by any person, company or corporation against loss or damage by fire, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.'
It is thus provided that the offender thereunder 'shall be guilty of a felony' and there is no express designation of the offense as arson.
Omitting the formal parts, the indictment charged that Brower 'did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to and burn the church building * * * of the Longview Church of God, the property * * * of W. H. Purnell, H. T. Purnell & Edgar Earp, as Trustees for the Congregation of said Church, the said P. H. Brower knowing then and there that said Church building was insured against damages and loss by fire under a contract of insurance issued by Louisville Fire & Marine Ins. Co. * * * a * * * corporation, with the intent then and there * * * to wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously injure and defraud the said Louisville Fire and Marine Insurance Company'. It is in the language of the statute, and was sufficient to charge the statutory offense. Hence the demurrer was properly overruled.
Replying to appellant's point (2) the record shows that, at the time of the application for the insurance, there was considerable conversation between Brower and the agent with reference to the location, size and construction of the church building. The clear purpose was to insure this particular building. Shortly after the fire, Brower reported to the agent, 'Well, that church burned down last night', evidently referring to the one on which he had procured the insurance. If the policies had been valid in all other respects, obviously they were subject to reformation as to the name. He represented that he had authority to purchase the insurance, paid the premiums, obtained the policies, and evidently thought that the contract was enforceable.
The test is not whether the policies were in fact enforceable, but whether he believed them so to be.
A good discussion of this question is found in 17 A.L.R. pages 1182-1183, where it is said:
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