Brown & Bennett v. Powers
| Decision Date | 09 April 1910 |
| Citation | 125 N.W. 833,146 Iowa 729 |
| Parties | BROWN & BENNETT, ED. BROWN and DEL BENNETT, Appellants, v. F. M. POWERS, Judge, and ARLA BUCK, Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Certiorari from Carroll District Court.--HON. F. M. POWERS Judge.
THIS is a certiorari proceeding in the nature of an appeal from an order of the defendant as district judge, wherein the petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt of court for the violation of a liquor injunction.--Modified and affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
L. H Salinger and B. I. Salinger, for appellants.
M. S. Odle, for appellees.
Some time prior to February, 1909, an injunction proceeding was brought by one E. V. Tuttle against the defendants, and in such proceeding a permanent injunction was issued against said defendants, restraining them from the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. The defendants in such case and the petitioners herein are Brown & Bennett, E. Brown, and Del Bennett; the last two named defendants being copartners and constituting the firm of Brown & Bennett. In February, 1909, defendants therein were charged with contempt upon the relation and information of one Arla Buck. Upon a hearing in such contempt proceedings, the trial court dismissed the defendants. Thereupon the relator sued out a writ of certiorari, whereby such contempt proceedings were brought before this court for review. Upon review of the case here, the order of the trial court in dismissing the defendants in the contempt proceedings was annulled. See Buck v. Powers (Iowa), 121 N.W. 1042. Thereupon, after procedendo, the trial court issued an order and caused the same to be served upon such defendants, requiring them to show cause why punishment should not be inflicted in the contempt proceedings. The defendants therein appeared, and pleaded the protection of the former adjudication, and that they were not parties to the proceeding in the Supreme Court, where such adjudication was reviewed, and had no notice thereof, and were not bound thereby. This plea was in effect overruled by the trial court, and punishment was imposed. Thereupon such defendants sued out this writ of certiorari, and appear herein as the petitioners, and ask a review of such order of the trial court.
It is not their contention here that any question of previous jeopardy is involved, and they concede in their reply argument that contempt proceedings are only quasi criminal and furnish no basis for a plea of former jeopardy. They urge, however, that the former order of discharge entered at the first trial was an adjudication, and that as such they were entitled to plead it, and that they could not be deprived of the benefit of such adjudication by any order of annulment or reversal in a proceeding to which they were not a party, and of which they had no notice. The point made is not wanting in plausibility, but we reach the conclusion that it can not be sustained. The statute fixes the degree of protection afforded to a party by a prior adjudication. It makes such adjudication available to the successful party until set aside, reversed, or modified. The methods whereby such an adjudication may be set aside are all provided by statute. Every party who obtains an adjudication in his favor is subject nevertheless to the statutory contingencies. The proceeding by writ of certiorari is one of the methods whereby the proceedings of the trial court may be reviewed, and its judgment set aside or annulled. The course of procedure in certiorari proceedings is all statutory. The statute does not in such case require that notice be given to the party in whose favor the adjudication was made, and this is a conclusive answer to the contention of petitioners.
They urge that their constitutional rights are invaded, in that they are deprived of the adjudication without due process of law. But the proceedings which resulted in the annulment of the adjudication were strictly in accord with the statute, and were therefore due process of law, unless the statute itself be unconstitutional. The constitutionality of this statute is not attacked. We have no occasion, therefore, to go into that particular question. It is sufficient to say that we think no constitutional right of the petitioners is violated either by the statute or by the order of the trial court.
The statutory proceedings for the review of the judgment of the lower court are essentially a part of the original proceedings, regardless of the particular form of such proceedings. Being statutory, all parties have notice in advance, and are charged with the burden of ascertaining the status of their case in all its stages. Whether formal notice should be given for the purpose of obtaining a review is a question wholly of legislative discretion. In regular appeals such notice is provided for. But such notice is not essential to the constitutionality of the statute conferring the right of appeal.
The statutory procedure in certiorari proceedings does not in fact result in surprise or practical injustice to the litigants below. We cannot wholly overlook the universal practice which obtains in such proceedings, whereby the attorney for the successful party in the trial court appears for the defendant judge in the certiorari proceedings, and defends here the correctness of the proceedings below. This practice was, in fact, observed in the particular case under consideration.
II. The petitioners set up the following as count two of their defense in the contempt proceeding:
For further defense, your defendants say that so much of the statutes of Iowa as provide for the granting of an injunction restraining the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, and as punish violation of such injunction by contempt proceedings and...
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Brown v. Powers
... ... V. Tuttle against the defendants, and in such proceeding a permanent injunction was issued against said defendants, restraining them from the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. The defendants in such case and the petitioners herein are Brown & Bennett, E. Brown, and Del Bennett; the last two named defendants being copartners and constituting the firm of Brown & Bennett. In February, 1909, defendants therein were charged with contempt upon the relation and information of one Arla Buck. Upon a hearing in such contempt proceedings, the trial court ... ...