Brown ex rel. Brown v. Commissioner of Social Sec.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 02-2287-DJW.,CIV.A. 02-2287-DJW. |
| Citation | 311 F.Supp.2d 1151 |
| Parties | Elizabeth BROWN o/b/o Cathy Brown, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Daniel J. Devine, Kansas City, MO, Henry M. Stoever, Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiff.
David D. Zimmerman, Office of United States Attorney, Kansas City, KS, for Defendant.
Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor daughter Cathy, seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her daughter's application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. The parties have filed their consent to jurisdiction by Magistrate Judge (doc. 8) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. Plaintiff has filed a brief (doc. 21) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner has filed a brief in opposition (doc. 22).
The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the parties' briefs. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a court may render "upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." The court reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.1 "Substantial evidence" is "more than a mere scintilla" and is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."2 In reviewing the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, the court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner.3 Evidence is not considered substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion."4
The court also reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.5 The Commissioner's failure to apply the proper legal standard may be sufficient grounds for reversal independent of the substantial evidence analysis.6 Accordingly, the court reviews the decision of the Commissioner to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision and to determine whether the correct legal standards were applied.7
On February 25, 2000, Plaintiff, on behalf of her daughter, protectively filed an application for child's SSI based on disability under Title XVI. (See Certified Transcript of the Record ("Tr.") at 65-67.) The Commissioner denied the claim initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 42, 48-51) On July 5, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing on Plaintiff daughter's claim. (Tr. 25-38) Plaintiff and her daughter appeared at the hearing in person and with their attorney, Daniel J. Devine. (Tr. 27)
On August 10, 2001, the ALJ issued his decision, in which he concluded that Plaintiff's daughter is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 15-23) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ determined that while Cathy's mild mental retardation qualifies as a severe impairment, it does not meet or equal in severity the criteria for any listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 17) As part of this determination, the ALJ found Cathy's claimed asthmatic condition to be not severe as it results in no more than minimal functional limitations. (Tr. 17) The ALJ further concluded that Cathy's impairments are not functionally equivalent in severity to any listed impairment in that they did not result in "marked" limitations in two functional domains or "extreme" limitations in one functional domain. (Tr. 23)
On September 12, 2001, Plaintiff requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 7-8) The Appeals Council denied the request for review on April 25, 2002. (Tr. 5-6) The findings of the ALJ therefore stand as the final decision of the Commissioner in this case.
Plaintiff alleges in her daughter's application for benefits that her daughter became disabled and eligible to receive benefits on February 25, 2000. (Tr. 66) Plaintiff claims that her daughter is disabled due to learning disabilities and asthma under control. (Tr. 74)
At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, Cathy was eleven years of age (Tr. 16) and was in sixth grade. (Tr. 34-37) Although she was in sixth grade, she attended special education classes and read at a second grade level. (Tr. 34-35, 121)
In his decision of August 10, 2001, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. Claimant ... is a child under the age of 18, and is currently 11 years of age.
2. Claimant has never performed substantial gainful activity.
3. Claimant has the following medically determinable impairment which is "severe" within the meaning of 20 CFR § 416-924(c): mild mental retardation . Claimant also has an asthmatic condition which is found to be not severe as it results in no more than minimal functional limitations.
4. Claimant's impairment(s) are not of a severity which medically meets or equals the severity of any impairment listed in Part B of Appendix 1 to Subpart P, 20 CFR Part 404 ("Listing of Impairment"). None of claimant's impairments are functionally equivalent in severity to any listed impairment.
5. Claimant does not have "marked" limitations in two functional domains or "extreme" limitations in one functional domain.
6. Subjective complaints are considered credible only to the extent that they are supported by the evidence of record as summarized in the text of this decision.
7. Claimant is found to be "not disabled" within the meaning of the Act.
Disabled children under the age of eighteen from low-income families are entitled to receive cash benefits known as SSI under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.8 In order to qualify for SSI: (1) the child's income and assets (including those imputed from the child's parents) must fall below a specified amount; and (2) the child must be "disabled," i.e., must have a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."9 The claimant seeking benefits bears the burden of proving that his or her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.10
Social Security Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, effective January 1, 2001, establish a three-step sequential evaluation process to be followed in a child disability case.11 In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the child is engaging in substantial gainful activity; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied.12 If the child is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to the second step to determine whether the child has a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments.13 If the child is found to have an impairment that is severe, the Commissioner proceeds to the third and final step, in which the Commissioner determines whether the child's impairment meets or medically or functionally equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing").14 An impairment will be found to cause "marked and severe functional limitations" if it meets or medically equals a listed impairment, or if it is functionally equal in severity to a listed impairment.15 To be functionally equivalent, the child's limitations must be at least equal in severity and duration to limitations associated with a listed impairment.16 Furthermore, the child's impairment must also meet the durational requirement of lasting or can be expected to last twelve months before the child can be found disabled.17
The "functionally equivalent" analysis requires the Commissioner to analyze six domains, which are "broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do."18 The six domains are: (i) acquiring and using information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating with others; (iv) moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for oneself; and (vi) health and physical well-being.19
The regulations explain that in evaluating a child claimant's ability to function in each of these domains, the Commissioner will seek information to help answer the following questions about whether the claimant's activities are typical of other children the claimant's age who do not have impairments: (1) What activities can the claimant perform? (2) What activities is the claimant unable to perform? (3) Which of the claimant's activities are limited or restricted compared to other children the claimant's age who do not have impairments? (4) Where does the claimant have difficulty with his/her activities-at home, in child care, at school, or in the community? (5) Does the claimant have difficulty independently initiating, sustaining, or completing activities? (6) What kind of help does the claimant need to do his/her activities, how much help is needed, and how often is the help needed?20
A finding of functional equivalence will be made only if a child has "marked"...
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