Brown v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 15 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CV-04064-DDC |
| Parties | DONNA S. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended. Plaintiff has filed a Brief (Doc. 9) requesting judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner filed her Response Brief (Doc. 12) and submitted the administrative record with her Answer (Doc. 6). Because plaintiff filed a Reply Brief (Doc. 13), this matter is now ripe for decision. Having reviewed the administrative record and the briefs of the parties, the Court reverses the decision of the Commissioner, orders that judgment be entered under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and remands the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability insurance ("SSD") benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, alleging disability beginning February 28, 2011. (R. 155) The Commissioner denied plaintiff's application on August 22, 2011 (R. 91), and againdenied it upon reconsideration on January 23, 2012 (R. 101). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on January 30, 2012. (R. 110) Following a hearing on September 5, 2012, the ALJ denied plaintiff's application for SSD benefits, determining that plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act (R. 8). 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d).
On May 15, 2014, the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied plaintiff's administrative appeal (R. 1), rendering the Commissioner's decision final. Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies and now seeks judicial review of the final decision denying her SSD benefits.
Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code grants authority to federal courts to conduct judicial review of final decisions of the Commissioner and "enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits is limited, extending only to the issues: (a) whether substantial evidence in the record supports the factual findings; and (b) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 2014); Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "If supported by substantial evidence, the [Commissioner's] findings are conclusive and must be affirmed." Sisco v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. It must be "more than a scintilla," but it need not amount to a preponderance. Id. While courts "consider whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases," they do not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for the Commissioner's. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But they do not accept "the findings of the Commissioner" mechanically or affirm those findings "by isolating facts and labeling them substantial evidence, as the court[s] must scrutinize the entire record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are rational." Alfrey v. Astrue, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Kan. 2012) (citation omitted). When determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, the courts "examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Commissioner's decision." Id. (citation omitted). "'Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence, particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.'" Lawton v. Barnhart, 121 F. App'x 364, 366 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987)).
A "failure to apply the proper legal standard may be sufficient grounds for reversal independent of the substantial evidence analysis." Brown ex rel. Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994)). But such a failure justifies reversal only in "appropriate circumstances"—applying an improper legal standard does not require reversal in all cases. Glass, 43 F.3d at 1395; accord Lee v. Colvin, No. 12-2259-SAC, 2013 WL 4549211, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 2013) (). Some errors are harmless, requiring no remand or furtherconsideration. See, e.g., Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161-63 (10th Cir. 2012); Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004); Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004).
Claimants seeking SSD benefits carry the burden to show that they are disabled. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1062 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In general, the Social Security Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner follows "a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003) (). As summarized by our Circuit, this familiar five-step process is as follows:
Step one requires the agency to determine whether a claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the agency proceeds to consider, at step two, whether a claimant has a medically severe impairment or impairments. . . . At step three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant's medically severe impairments are equivalent to a condition listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation. If a claimant's impairments are not equivalent to a listed impairment, the ALJ must consider, at step four, whether a claimant's impairments prevent [the claimant] from performing [the claimant's] past relevant work. Even if a claimant is so impaired, the agency considers, at step five, whether [the claimant] possesses the sufficient residual functional capability [("RFC")] to perform other work in the national economy.
Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(g). The claimant has the "burden of proof on the first four steps," but the burden shifts to the Commissioner "at step five to show that claimant retained the RFC to 'perform analternative work activity and that this specific type of job exists in the national economy.'" Smith v. Barnhart, 61 F. App'x 647, 648 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988)). The analysis terminates if the Commissioner determines at any point that the claimant is or is not disabled. Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).
The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the following "severe impairments:" fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status-post decompressive laminectomy, asthma, obesity, and adult attention deficit disorder ("ADD"). (R. 10) But the ALJ concluded that plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404." (R. 12) Instead, the ALJ determined that the record evidence supported a finding that plaintiff has the RFC:
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except that claimant can lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand and/or walk up to two hours in an eight-hour day, and sit up to six hours in an eight-hour day. She can occasionally balance, climb, crouch and crawl, and she can frequently stoop and kneel. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, humidity, and excessive vibration. She must avoid moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poorly ventilated areas. She must avoid hazards such as unprotected heights and machinery. The claimant can perform tasks involving simple to intermediate instructions.
(R. 14-15) The ALJ also found that plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 20) But due to plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that plaintiff possessed skills that are "transferrable to other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy." (R. 20)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made five kinds of errors. She contends that: (1) the ALJ erred at step two of her sequential evaluation by concluding that plaintiff's anxiety, depression,and dysthymic disorders were not severe impairments; (2) the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards when assigning weight to the record medical opinions; (3) the ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's credibility is not supported by substantial evidence; (4) plaintiff's RFC is a vague statement lacking the required function-by-function analysis; and (5) the ALJ erred at step five by...
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