Brown Hotel v. Levitt
| Decision Date | 23 January 1948 |
| Citation | 209 S.W.2d 70,306 Ky. 804 |
| Parties | BROWN HOTEL v. LEVITT. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied March 26, 1948.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch Second Division; B. H. Farnsley, Judge.
Action by Bertha Levitt against Brown Hotel for damages from a fall on steps. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff the defendant appeals.
Judgment reversed.
Robert F. Vaughan, of Louisville, for appellant.
Steinfeld & Steinfeld, of Louisville, for appellee.
Appellant Brown Hotel, prosecutes this appeal from a judgment for $1,000 in favor of appellee, Bertha Levitt.
On the morning of September 19, 1945, Mrs. Levitt and her husband who were guests of the Brown Hotel, descended in the elevator to the lobby floor of the hotel, passed by the clerk's desk for mail, and then proceeded to the street floor by the stairway leading from the lobby floor to the street floor. The stairway is constructed of marble and is 11 feet wide and consists of two portions with a landing dividing the upper and lower portions. When Mr. and Mrs. Levitt were about half way down the upper portion, a man behind them fell and struck Mrs. Levitt about the calf of her legs knocking her feet from under her, precipitating her fall, and thereby causing injuries for which she sought damages.
In her petition she alleged that the stairway exceeded 8 feet in width and that at the time and place of the accident the defendant hotel was grossly careless and negligent in the construction and maintenance of the stairway.
The defendant filed motion to require plaintiff to make her petition more definite and certain, especially insisting that plaintiff should say whether the stairway referred to was negligently constructed or whether it was negligently maintained, and also to point out what defects were in the construction or the maintenance which caused the alleged fall and the consequent injuries.
Before this motion was ruled upon the plaintiff filed an amended petition in which she alleged that by virtue of an ordinance of the City of Louisville, wherein the hotel building is located and maintained by the plaintiff, it is provided as follows:
In this amended petition plaintiff alleged that because of the failure of the defendant to provide the handrails 'plaintiff was unable to prevent herself from falling while descending said stairway and by reason thereof * * * plaintiff was caused to fall.'
Upon trial the jury rendered a verdict in her favor as above stated, and this appeal followed.
The motion and grounds for a new trial are confined to two questions: (1) The error of the court in overruling the defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction, and (2) The error of the court in its Instruction No. 1.
The unknown person whose fall precipitated the fall of plaintiff, with its resulting injury, almost entirely disappears from the record, and in order to place liability on, and recover from the hotel, appellant invokes the aid of an ordinance requiring the defendant to place railings on each side and in the center where the steps exceed 7 feet in width.
Appellee takes the position that had the railings been constructed in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance her fall could have been averted through her ability to hold on to the rail. It is true there was a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff. It should have conformed to the provisions of the ordinance, and failing so to do there was a breach of duty on the part of the Hotel.
In Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602, 105 S.W.2d 564, 566, we said:
Even though there was a violation of terms imposed expressly by ordinance, it does not necessarily follow that the occurrence of an injury establishes negligence for which the law imposes liability. If there is liability the negligence complained of presupposes that the violation of an existing duty was directly responsible for, or the proximate cause, of the injury. To accept appellee's theory in its entirety would be to adopt the old theory not entirely logical that 'but for' the failure to have the railings the injury would not have resulted. It is obviously necessary to the existence of liability...
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Blue Grass Restaurant Co. v. Franklin
...such latter contention and an intervening cause which precipitated Mrs. Levitt's fall distinguishes this case from Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W.2d 70 (1948). They contend that the well lighted stairway and the absence of handrails were clearly visible to Franklin; that it was......
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Pike v. George
...been violated recovery has been denied where the injury was not the direct and proximate result of the violation. Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W.2d 70 (1948). 'It is a firmly fixed rule that one injured by a violation of a statute may recover from a defendant such damages as he......
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Hinton v. Dixie Ohio Exp. Co., 11228.
...Louisville, Inc. v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 45, 209 S.W.2d 478; Howard v. Fowler, 306 Ky. 567, 571, 572, 207 S.W.2d 559; Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 807, 209 S.W. 2d 70; Murphy v. Homans, 286 Ky. 191, 194, 150 S.W.2d 14; Rodgers v. Stoller, 284 Ky. 108, 110, 111, 143 S.W.2d 1047; Ruther......
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