Brown's Estate, In re, 2150

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: WILLSON, J. H.; SHANNON, C. J., and KANNER
• Citation: 134 So.2d 290
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Edward A. BROWN, Deceased. SIRE PLAN, INC., Appellant, v. Grace R. BROWN, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 2150,2150
• Decision Date: 08 November 1961

Page 290

134 So.2d 290 In re ESTATE of Edward A. BROWN, Deceased.
SIRE PLAN, INC., Appellant,
v.
Grace R. BROWN, Appellee. No. 2150. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. Nov. 8, 1961.

Page 291

Charles J. Collins, Jr., Orlando, for appellant.

Fletcher G. Rush and John T. Pattillo, Orlando, for appellee.

WILLSON, J. H., Associate Judge.

The Sire Plan, Inc., has appealed from an order of the County Judge's Court of Orange County, Florida, assigning dower to the appellee, Grace R. Brown, as widow of Edward A. Brown, deceased, in a fund of $8,000, which appellant claims is its property rather than an asset of decedent's estate.

Page 292

The record shows that decedent had been appellant's attorney. In that capacity he received from it $20,000 for use in purchasing the stock of one James E. Keezel in the Winter Park Loan Corporation. Decedent, for reasons not relevant to this appeal, was to contract for and purchase this stock in his own name.

Decedent did enter into a contract with Keezel for the purchase of the stock, and paid him $20,000 as earnest money, but Keezel, claiming that decedent had defaulted on the contract, refused to deliver the stock and retained the earnest money. Decedent then brought suit against him in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, seeking to recover damages in excess of $20,000.

While this action was pending Brown died, and an administration was opened upon his estate in the County Judge's Court of Orange County, Florida. The only asset listed in the inventory filed by the personal representative was described as,

'Possible interest in a legal action pending in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Orange County, Florida, entitled Edward A. Brown v. James E. Keezel, at Law No. 33989.'

Appellant duly filed a claim against decedent's estate, the pertinent portion of which we set forth verbatim:

'The Sire Plan, Inc., a New York corporation, having its principal office at 115 Chambers Street, City, County and State of New York, hereby asserts claim against the estate of Edward A. Brown for the sum of $20,000.00, or proceeds of said sum, for monies entrusted to decedent, as attorney for claimant, for the specific purpose of purchasing, on behalf of claimant, the interest of James E. Keezel, in and to all issued stock, and all furniture, fixtures, books of account, etc. of Winter Park Loan Corporation, Winter Park, Florida. Decedent paid said sum of $20,000.00 to James E. Keezel, who, thereafter, refused to consummate contract of sale. Decedent brought action against James E. Keezel, in Florida, and, upon information and belief, the sole asset of this estate will be the fund paid in settlement of said lawsuit against James E. Keezel. Annexed hereto and made part hereof is photostatic copy of statement of decedent, dated September 26, 1958, duly acknowledged by decedent, substantiating the aforementioned facts.'

The 'statement of decedent' to which this claim refers, omitting the signature, is as follows:

'Know All Men By These Presents, that I, Edward A. Brown, the undersigned, do hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over unto The Sire Plan, Inc., a New York Corporation, of 115 Chambers Street, New York 7, N. Y., all the avails and proceeds derived from or arising out of a certain action in which I am plaintiff, now pending in the State of Florida against the Winter Park Loan Corporation, of Winter Park, Florida.

'This assignment is made in consideration of fact that all the funds and monies involved in said litigation are the funds and property of said The Sire Plan, Inc.

'Dated: New York, N. Y., September 26, 1958.'

It appears from the record that decedent had no action pending against the Winter Park Loan Corporation, and that the only action which he had pending in the State of Florida was that against Keezel.

Decedent's personal representative was substituted as Plaintiff in the action, and, with the approval of the probate court, accepted $8,000 in settlement.

Appellee then petitioned the probate court to assign her dower in the $8,000 fund as an asset of decedent's estate. Appellant

Page 293

opposed the petition on the ground that it had title to the fund by assignment from decedent. The probate court, after hearing the testimony of the parties, granted the petition.

The other facts disclosed by the record have no bearing on the decisive question in this appeal, viz., did the probate court have jurisdiction to determine whether the title to the $8,000 fund was in appellant or in decedent's estate?

The answer to this problem will be more readily reached if we begin its solution with the relationship between decedent and appellant and its legal consequences. The relationship was that of attorney and client. It was one of trust and confidence. The funds received by decedent from appellant, no matter what form they might have taken, were held in trust. In event decedent had failed to properly account for them, appellant could have chosen to treat them as the corpus of a trust and maintained an appropriate action in equity for their recovery; or he could have treated the obligation of decedent to account for the funds as a matter of contract and brought an action at law for money had and received. Armour & Company v. Lambdin, 154 Fla. 86, 16 So.2d 805. Upon his death the funds did not become an asset of his estate which were subject to dower. 1 A Bogert Trusts and Trustees, 40.

This Court in In re Feldman's Estate, Fla.App., 109 So.2d 407, 410, has pointed out 'the prevalent uncertainty as to the extent of a county judge's jurisdiction' in cases where the title to real property is at issue. There is an even greater uncertainty with respect to disputes over title to personal property. This arises from the broad general terms employed by the makers of the constitution and the legislature in defining the jurisdiction of the county judge's courts, and from the effect upon these terms of other constitutional provisions. There are, however, some well defined principles relating to the jurisdiction of the county judge's court which materially reduce this uncertainty when applied to the instant case.

The county judge's courts have no jurisdiction except that which is conferred upon them by the constitution and by statutory enactment, and such as may be incidentally necessary to the execution of these powers. State ex rel. West's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Cornelius, 110 Fla. 299, 149 So. 332; In re Coleman's Estate, Fla.App., 103 So.2d 237. The county judge's court is not a court of general jurisdiction according to the course of the common law. Mott v. First National Bank of St. Petersburg, 98 Fla. 444, 124 So. 36. In no event does it have jurisdiction in cases at law in which the demand or value of the property involved exceeds one hundred dollars. Section 7(3) of Article V of the Constitution. It has no jurisdiction in purely equitable actions. Ritch v. Bellamy, 14 Fla. 537; Mott v. First National Bank of St. Petersburg, supra; First National Bank of St. Petersburg v. MacDonald, 100 Fla. 675, 130 So. 596; Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783; Moskovits v. Moskovits, Fla.App., 112 So.2d 875; In re Shepherd's Estate, Fla.App., 130 So.2d 888. We turn now to the constitutional and statutory provisions which are material in this case.

These provisions are as follows:

'The county judge's courts shall have * * * jurisdiction in all cases at law in which the demand or value of property involved shall not exceed one hundred dollars; * * * The county judge's courts shall have jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of decedents * * *, to take probate of wills, to grant letters testamentary and of administration * * *, and to discharge the duties usually...