Brown Transport Corp. v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 05 July 1973
• Docket Number: 2,No. 47885,Nos. 1,3,47885,s. 1
• Citation: 129 Ga.App. 457,199 S.E.2d 910
• Parties: BROWN TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. Minnie JENKINS
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 910

199 S.E.2d 910

129 Ga.App. 457

BROWN TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. Minnie JENKINS.

No. 47885.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3.

July 5, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 25, 1973.

Hopkins & Gresham, H. Lowell Hopkins, Atlanta, for appellant.

Cumming, Nixon, Yow, Waller & Capers, O. Palmour Hollis, Augusta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

EVANS, Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case. The deputy director made an award in claimant's favor, finding that her husband's death arose out of and in the course of employment as a truck driver for Brown Transport Corporation on or about midnight, September 7, 1971; that he died of a myocardial infarction, secondary to arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease (heart disease) while he was driving a GMC tractor, pulling two vans, on a trip from Augusta to Atlanta; and that death occurred before the employee reached the unloading station in Atlanta.

The board affirmed this award, and the Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed the award of the board.

Certain significant facts should be noted at the outset, to wit: The employee had suffered with heart disease for a long time prior to his death, sufficient to cause enlargement of his heart and severe diseases of the coronary arteries. His heart was so greatly enlarged that it was twice as large as was normal. (R-105, 106). The employee had made complaints about his physical situation but he attributed it to a large amount of gas on his stomach (R-64). On the morning of September 7, 1971, he had engaged in strenuous work at home, consisting of climbing up and down a ladder for a great number of times, as he nailed plastic screening onto a porch (R-58; R-124, 125). He had tried to secure insurance in the past but had not been able to get it. During April or May, 1971, his doctor told him his 'pressure' was up (R-122; R-60, 61). On the night of his death he was driving a GMC tractor, which was pulling one 26 foot trailer and one 20 foot trailer, loaded with 40,000 pounds of material. He usually drove at a speed of from 50 to 60 miles per hour at times on the trip (R-14, 15, 16, 17). His route from Augusta to Atlanta was partly on Interstate 20, and partly on the old highway, and usually required about 3 1/2 hours (R-14). The truck he was driving was not equipped with power-drive (R-32). It was his unbroken custom, and that of his fellow drivers, to always stop in Union Point for a rest break, but on the night in question he speeded up on his approach to Union Point and continued on to Atlanta, without making the customary stop (R-17). He never did reach the unloading station, but his truck was discovered on the public streets of Atlanta, not parked, but headed into the curb with the front wheel on or against the curb (R-20), his headlights were still burning; he slid his pedal brakes four or five feet (R-21); the truck was sitting 'catty-cornered' in the street against the curb (R-23); when the truck was discovered, his lifeless form was found in the truck, not in a driving position, but he was lying in the truck with his head in his hand (R-31). His truck, because of its overall length, was much longer than a car, and he was required to exercise care in making turns (R-32). When his fellow drivers found him, he was 'just folded over on his right side.' (R-22)

The employer appeals from the judgment of the superior court affirming the award of the board. Held:

1. The two awards of the Workmen's Compensation Board, and the judgment of Fulton Superior Court are presumed to have been supported by every fact essential to make same valid and binding. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Gause, 116 Ga.App. 216, 225, 156 S.E.2d 476; Chance v. Chance, 60 Ga.App. 889, 892, 5 S.E.2d 399; Allen v. Smith, 223 Ga. 265, 266, 154 S.E.2d 605. In workmen's compensation cases, the weight and credit of the testimony, and evidence, including conflicts therein, are solely matters for determination by the board. Phoenix Ins. of Hartford v. Weaver, 124 Ga.App. 423(1), 183 S.E.2d 920, and cits. p. 425, 183 S.E.2d 920. Further, in workmen's compensation cases, under numerous decisions of this court, an award of the board will not be disturbed where there is any evidence to support such award. Wilson v. Aragon Mills, 110 Ga.App. 392, 138 S.E.2d 596, and cit. p. 393, 138 S.E.2d 596. And, of course, all the evidence, inferences, and conflicts, if any, must be construed most strongly in favor of upholding the award. Austin v. General Accident Assurance Co., 56 Ga.App. 481, 193 S.E. 86; Weathers v. American Casualty Co., 94 Ga.App. 530(1), 95 S.E.2d 436; Garrett v. Employers Mutual, 105 Ga.App. 308, 311, 124 S.E.2d 450.

2. In order to show that a heart attack was precipitated by exertion of the employee while in the course of his employment, it is only required that it be shown that the work engaged in was sufficiently strenuous, or of such nature that, combined with other factors in the case, it raises a natural inference through human experience that the exertion contributed toward the precipitation. Hoffman v. National Surety Corporation, 91 Ga.App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784. It may be shown by opinion evidence that the exertion, no matter how slight, or strenuous, when combined with other factors, such as pre-existing heart disease, precipitated the attack. J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Peck, 116 Ga.App. 405, 406, 157 S.E.2d 806. Moreover, it has been held that 'when the employee had a sudden attack while exerting himself at work, and there was no medical evidence that exertion at work did or did not contribute to the attack, an award of compensation was demanded.' Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey, 119 Ga.App. 809, 811, 168 S.E.2d 660, 662.

The 1963 amendment to Code § 114-102 (Ga.L.1963, pp. 141, 142) has uniformly been construed to mean that when an employee in the course of his employment dies of a heart attack, the hearing director must initially weigh the evidence and determine whether or not the employment was a contributing proximate cause of the attack; 'and where he concludes either way, if there is any evidence to support the finding, it cannot be set aside on appeal.' Brown Transport Corp. v. Blanchard, 126 Ga.App. 333, 334, 190 S.E.2d 625, 626. As pointed out by Judge Bell in Fulton Industries v. Knight, 127 Ga.App. 604, 194 S.E.2d 346, where the findings are sufficient and supported by evidence where some exertion is shown, and where the medical evidence shows that the death was caused by cardiac arrest, and where the hearing director, after weighing such evidence, finds in favor of either side, the award will be affirmed. In the Knight case the only exertion shown by the employee is that he walked up and down a flight of stairs two and a half hours before the heart attack. In the present case the evidence is undisputed that the employee was perfectly well when he left for work, and that he left Augusta and drove nonstop for three and a half hours to Atlanta in a heavy GMC tractor pulling two vans, much of it on an old highway, without power drive. It does not take expert testimony by anybody under these circumstances to authorize the hearing director to find that the employee has been subjected to exertion. The employee had a bad heart and was ripe for a heart attack, but that is not the question. It matters not how predisposed the employee is to the attack, if he is in the course of his employment, and if the exertion of that employment, no matter how slight, contributes, no matter in what degree, to the accident. J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Peck, 116 Ga.App. 405, 157 S.E.2d 806, supra. What amount of exertion, absent opinion testimony, will authorize the hearing director to find 'from a natural inference through human experience' that the two are related-that is, the work and the heart attack-is ordinarily a question for the hearing director, not for this court. Hoffman v. National Surety Corp., 91 Ga.App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 supra, is not to the contrary of this statement. In that opinion, written by Judge Townsend, the only exertion shown by the employee was that he walked into his place of work after lunch, stepped up one step, and squatted down to drink a Coca Cola. That case was sent back to the Board with leave to the widow claimant to present additional testimony, if she could, linking the heart attack to the exertion shown.

3. In this case, the only witness who knew what happened is dead, and other evidence must be relied on. The claimant enters the trial with a presumption in her favor. 'Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.' (Emphasis supplied.) Ga.Cas. & Surety Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga.App. 233(1), 160 S.E.2d 436. Further, claimant was not required to show by direct evidence that there was exertion because of performance of the employee's duties. It may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Home Indemnity Co. v. Floyd, 122 Ga.App. 87, 89, 176 S.E.2d 269. Or it may be shown by knowledge from human experience. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Waters, 87 Ga.App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70; Davis v. Cobb County, 106 Ga.App. 336(1), 126 S.E.2d 710. Presumptive evidence may exist in any case without the testimony of any witness. Any fact finding body, such as a jury or the Workmen's Compensation Board, is entitled to consider as proven certain matters even without any testimony being introduced. It is provided in Code § 38-102 that 'presumptive evidence consists of inferences drawn by human experience from the connection of cause and effect, and observations of human conduct.' This statute is often called 'the common-sense rule' and it is the silent witness that goes into every jury-room with the jurors without the necessity of introduction of evidence. Jurors and all fact-finding boards are entitled to use their own common sense as intelligent...