Brown v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., EP-13-CV-131-KC
| Decision Date | 08 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | EP-13-CV-131-KC |
| Parties | RICKY BROWN, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS GP, L.P., and ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS GP, L.P. LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Aetna's Motion to Strike, ECF No. 3, in the above-captioned case. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Aetna's Motion is GRANTED.
On February 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint in County Court at Law No. 5 in El Paso, Texas. Defs.' Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ("Plaintiff's Original Complaint"), ECF No. 1-1. In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants are liable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for denying Plaintiff benefits under an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Id. ¶¶ 21-23. Plaintiff's Original Complaint included requests for extracontractual and punitive damages, as well as a demand for a jury trial. Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27-28, 31. On April 19, 2013, Defendants removed this case and invoked this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defs.' Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
Defendant Aetna then filed the instant Motion to Strike on May 8, 2013. Def. Aetna's Mot., ECF No. 3. In that Motion, Defendant Aetna challenges the availability of extracontractual and punitive damages for violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), as well as Plaintiff's right to a jury trial for claims brought under this provision. Def. Aetna's Mot. 3-4.
On May 28, 2013, nearly three weeks after Defendant Aetna filed its Motion to Strike, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ECF No. 6. This Amended Complaint retained Plaintiff's original claim for denial of benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and raised three new claims for breach of fiduciary duty, failure to provide information regarding employee benefits, and equitable estoppel arising under different provisions of ERISA and federal common law. Id. ¶¶ 27-40.
Defendant Aetna filed its Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def. Aetna's Mot. 1. Plaintiff argues, however, that Rule 12(f) is "not the proper vehicle" by which to challenge the availability of extracontractual and punitive damages or a trial by jury. Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 3-4, 9-10, ECF No. 4. In this context, the Court observes that where district courts in the Fifth Circuit have found that a party's motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is "more akin to a motion to dismiss" under Rule 12(b)(6), such a motion has been construed to be a motion to dismiss. See Longman v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., CIV.A. 3:97-CV-3102, 2003 WL 22244675, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003); Goldman v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., CIV.A. 03-759, 2004 WL 1934986, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2004); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., CIV.A. 97-3012, 1999 WL 816503, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 1999); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. La. 1976).
Therefore, this Court first examines whether Defendant Aetna's challenge to Plaintiff'sclaims for damages should properly be considered under Rule 12(f) or construed to be a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). This Court then examines, similarly, whether Defendant's challenge to Plaintiff's jury demand must be considered under Rule 12(f) or should more properly be evaluated under another procedural rule. With respect to both inquiries, this Court confines its analysis to Plaintiff's claim for denial of benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and does not address any aspects of the three new claims raised in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.1 See Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-40. Nor does this Order address any motions filed by Defendants in this case subsequent to Defendant Aetna's Motion to Strike. See, e.g., Def. Energy Transfer's Mot., ECF No. 13.
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are generally disfavored, but a motion to strike a defense should be granted where the challenged defense is insufficient as a matter of law. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). As for matters challenged as "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter," a district court should not strike challengedallegations or pleadings simply because they "offend the sensibilities" of the objecting party. United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2005)). Such matters should be stricken, rather, only where they possess "no possible relation to the controversy." Id. (quoting Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)) (internal alterations omitted). Where a challenged matter is "directly relevant to the controversy at issue" and is at least "minimally supported" by the allegations set forth in the pleadings, it should not be stricken under Rule 12(f). Id.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted); Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass'n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass'n, 658 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2011). Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations [in the complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, a "well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
In its Motion to Strike, Defendant Aetna challenges Plaintiff's requests for extracontractual and punitive damages. Def. Aetna's Mot. 3-4. In Defendant Aetna's view, such damages are not available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Id. Similarly, Defendant Aetna argues that there is no right to a jury trial for such claims. Id. Rather than responding to the substance of these challenges, Plaintiff argues instead that these challenges are not properly raised in a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 3-10. Plaintiff's position is based on the text of Rule 12(f), which by its own terms applies only to "an insufficient defense" or to "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
As set forth in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks "punitive damages against Defendants for their willful, intentional, and malicious conduct, to the extent such damages are allowed by law." Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 45. Plaintiff also seeks "extracontractual damages." Id. ¶ 44. In the context of ERISA, "extracontractual damages" constitute "[d]amages that would give a beneficiary more than he or she is entitled to receive under the strict terms of the plan." Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 931 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1335 (5th Cir. 1992)).
In this Court's view, Plaintiff's claims for extracontractual and punitive damages are not properly challenged in a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Logically, a request for damages cannot be "an insufficient defense." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A "defense" is a means of defeating liability for an alleged injury, and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be raised only in a "responsive pleading" or "by motion." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1057-58. Plaintiff's claims for damages, of course, identify the compensation sought for his alleged injuries, and were raised in Plaintiff's Original and Amended Complaints. See Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44-45; Pl.'s Original Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27-28. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims cannot properly be challenged under this first component of Rule 12(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
Similarly, Plaintiff's claims for damages are not "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that challenged matters are not "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous" so long as they possess any "possible relation to the controversy." See Coney, 689 F.3d at 379 (citing Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868). In this Court's view, claims for damages will usually possess at least a "possible relation" to the same injuries from which the claimed damages are...
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