Brown v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 23 December 1942
• Docket Number: No. 76.,76.
• Citation: 6 N.W.2d 914,303 Mich. 616
• Parties: BROWN v. ARNOLD.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

303 Mich. 616

6 N.W.2d 914

BROWN

v.ARNOLD.

No. 76.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 23, 1942.

Action by Carrie T. Brown against Maude Arnold, administratrix of the estate of Baron Arnold, deceased, to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff when she was struck by an automobile which was driven by Baron Arnold immediately after having alighted from the automobile. From a judgment in favor plaintiff for $547.60, the defendant appeals, and the plaintiff cross-appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County; Glenn E. Warner, Judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Alexander, McCaslin & Cholette, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Carroll B. Jones, of Marcellus, for cross-appellant.

BOYLES, Justice.

On January 5, 1941, Baron Arnold, after attending church, stopped at the home of plaintiff, Carrie T. Brown, and took her in his automobile to his sister's home for Sunday dinner. At about five o'clock in the afternoon he brought plaintiff back to her home, in his automobile. The transportation was solely for social and friendly purposes and Arnold was not paid for the transportation. He was a relative of the plaintiff by marriage. When they reached the plaintiff's home on the return trip, Arnold brought his automobile to a stop in the street in front of plaintiff's home, parallel with the gutter and at a distance of two or three feet between the side of his car and the gutter. The street was about two feet higher in the center, sloping toward the gutter, there was no curb, and there was a terrace a foot or two in height sloping up on the lawn from the gutter. The street was slippery, covered with ice and snow. Plaintiff got out of the car on the side betwen the car and the terrace, closed the door, and Arnold immediately started the car, turning the front end toward the center of the street. Plaintiff had taken only a step or two and while still in the gutter was struck by the rear feder of the car due to the rear wheels of the car skidding sideways struck by the rear fender of the car due to to the gutter. Plaintiff was thereby thrown to the ground and quite severely injured, sued for damages, and the case was tried before a jury. Before the case was started, Arnold died and the administratrix of his estate was named as defendant. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff was a guest passenger and that there was no proof of gross negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct on the part of Arnold. This motion, and defendant's subsequent motion for judgment non obstante veredicto on the same grounds, were denied. The questions of Arnold's negligence and plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence were submitted to the jury and plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $547.60, from which defendant appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals and asks for a new trial, claiming that the verdict was grossly inadequate.

The first question for determination is whether the relationship of guest passenger existed at the time of the injury within the meaning of 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 4648 (Stat.Ann. § 9.1446), the applicable provision of which is as follows:

‘That no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner of operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.’

The precise question is, whether the plaintiff, after being returned to her home and having alighted from the car in front of her home and closed the car door, the car having been started and she having taken a step or two when struck by the rear fender of the car, was still a guest passenger at the time of the injury within the meaning of the act.

Obviously the actual transportation had ended when the injury occurred. Plaintiff had been returned in front of her home and the automobile started up again toward some other destination. There was no part of the ‘transportation’ requiring Arnold to return the plaintiff to her doorstep or even to the sidewalk. However, the defendant, relying upon decisions applying to common carriers of passengers and goods for hire, claims that plaintiff was still a guest passenger, i. e., that the ‘transportation’ continued within the meaning of the guest passenger act not only while plaintiff was alighting from the automobile, but also ‘while in close proximity in time and place’ to the vehicle in which she was given a gratuitous ride.

Defendant cites numerous cases, applying both to railroad transportation and to street cars, holding that common carriers of passengers or goods for hire owe a duty to safety deliver. As applied to whether Arnold was guilty of ordinary negligence, they are authority in the case before us. But the issue in those cases was whether the defendant was guilty of negligence, not whether the defendant was guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. We know of no decision where the provisions of the motor vehicle guest passenger act have been held to apply to the liability of common carriers for negligence in transporting passengers or goods for hire. In fact, the act itself limits its application to cases where the transportation is not for hire. Nor do the decisions relied upon by defendant which hold that the act of transportation continues while the passenger is alighting, such as Serviss v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 169 Mich. 564, 135 N.W. 343, and Tuttle v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 193 Mich. 390, 159 N.W. 498, apply to the facts now before us. Plaintiff had already alighted from the car, closed the door, taken a step or two, and the car had started up. Defendant also relies upon our holding in Langford v. Rogers, 278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692. In that case, the owner of the car had attached a bobsled and a toboggan behind his car, on which were loaded the plaintiff's decedent and other children who were being transported to the place where they were to go coasting. The defendant himself was riding on the toboggan when the accident occurred, and plaintiff's decedent was actually being tranported by the defendant's car at the time. The facts distinguish the case from the one at bar. In Hunter v. Baldwin, 268 Mich. 106, 255 N.W. 431, the parties were about to start on the return trip, the car would not start, plaintiff proceeded to crank it and was injured when the automobile which was in gear started up. Defendants claimed that the relationship of guest passenger existed and that defendants would be liable only for gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. We rejected this theory and upheld verdict and judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the defendants owed a duty to plaintiff, whom they had asked to crank their car, not to leave the same in gear and that they must respond in damages when the jury found them guilty of ordinary negligence.

In the case before us, the act of transportation of the plaintiff had ended. Plaintiff was no longer within the guest passenger act and the guest passenger act has no bearing in the case. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove Arnold guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct before she could recover damages.

Is the question whether Arnold was guilty of ordinary negligence an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury? On the day of the accident, Arnold had driven for some distance on a street covered with ice and snow and must have known the slippery condition; he also knew that the street sloped from the center toward the gutter, and must have known the condition of the street where he stopped his car two or three feet from the gutter next to the terrace. He knew that plaintiff after alighting was in the space of two or three feet between the side of his car and the terrace, plaintiff not having had time to remove herself from this place of possible danger when the car skidded sideways toward the gutter. He started his car, turned it toward the higher center of the slippery street while the plaintiff was still between the car and the terrace. The car did skid toward the gutter 14 to 18 inches, plaintiff was struck by the rear fender and injured. If the question whether Arnold was negligent in thus starting his car toward the center of the street under these circumstances and conditions is a matter on which the minds of reasonable men might differ, the question of his negligence is one for the jury.

The facts we have recited were established by the testimony, and we have repeatedly held that a jury may draw reasonable and legitimate inferences from established facts. Negligence may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Physical facts may justify a jury finding that defendant is guilty of negligence. Faustman v. Hewitt, 274 Mich. 458, 264 N.W. 863;Trent v. Pontiac Transportation Co., Inc., 281 Mich. 586, 275 N.W. 501. Negligence may be inferred from circumstances which place the case within the field of legitimate inferences from established facts. Fish v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 275 Mich. 718, 269 N.W. 568. The proofs adduced by plaintiff establish that in starting his automobile, Arnold turned toward the center of the street, slightly upgrade, and the rear wheels skidded 14 to 18 inches toward the gutter. If Arnold knew, or should have known, that starting his automobile turning toward the center of the street would likely cause the rear wheels to skid toward plaintiff, he should have guarded against the...